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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three chapters. In the first essay of my thesis, I document
a marked declined in the share of entrepreneurial households in the United States and
I propose and quantify a mechanism to account for such decline. Using individual-level
data, I provide evidence on the decline in the population share of entrepreneurs and in
the entry rate into entrepreneurship. I also show that the decline is most concentrated
among college graduates. Then, using an otherwise standard entrepreneurial choice model
with two skill groups of individuals, I show that the decline in entrepreneurship is the
equilibrium outcome of two forces that have increased the returns to high skill labor: the
skill-biased technical change and the decrease in the cost of capital goods. I find that these
two technological forces jointly account for three-quarters of the decline in the share of
entrepreneurs observed in the United States over the last 30 years. In the second essay of
this thesis, Nicholas Bloom, Fatih Guvenen, and I study the cyclicality the distribution of
firm-leve outcomes over the business cycle. Using firm-level panel data from the US Census
and for more than forty other countries, we show that the skewness of the growth rate of
employment and sales is procyclical. In particular, during recessions, they display a large
left tail of negative growth rates (and during booms, a large right tail of positive growth
rates). These results are robust to different selection criteria, across countries, industries,
and measures. We find similar results at the industry level: industries with falling growth
rates see more left-skewed growth rates of firm sales. We then build a heterogeneous agents
model in which entrepreneurs face shocks with time-varying skewness that matches the
firm-level distributions we document for the United States. Our quantitative results show
that a negative shock to the skewness of firms’ productivity growth (keeping the mean and
variance constant) generates a significant and persistent drop in output, investment, hiring,
and consumption. In the third and last essay of this thesis, Mons Chan, Min Xu, and I,
study the importance of fluctuation of firm-level productivity in explaining the fluctuations
in workers’ wages. In particular, we use matched employer-employee data from Denmark
to analyze the extent to which firms’ productivity shocks are passed to workers’ wages.
The richness of our dataset allows us to separately study continuing and non-continuing
iii
workers, to correct for selection, and to investigate how the passthrough varies across
narrow population groups. Our results show a much larger degree of passthrough from
firms’ shocks to workers’ wages than reported in previous research. On average, an increase
of one standard deviation in firm-level TFP commands an increase of 3.0% in annual wages
($1,500 USD for the average worker). Furthermore, we find that the effect of productivity
shocks on wage growth for workers who switch firms is larger relative to workers that stay
within the same firm. Finally, we find large differences in the passthrough for workers of
different income levels, ages, industries, and firms of different productivity levels. In the
second part of our paper, we estimate a stochastic process of income that captures the
salient features the data. We then embed the estimated stochastic process into a life-cycle
consumption savings model to evaluate the welfare and distributional implications of the
passthrough from firms’ TFP shocks to workers’ wages.
iv
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Chapter 1
Technical Change and
Entrepreneurship
1.1 Introduction
Entrepreneurs are widely considered the backbone of the US economy. However, an in-
creasing number of studies document a significant decline in the pace of formation of new
businesses and other measures of entrepreneurship starting in the early 1980s.12 This de-
crease in entrepreneurship is at the center of the decline in dynamism experienced by the US
economy in recent decades (Davis and Haltiwanger, 2014). This has raised concern among
scholars and policymakers because of the importance of entrepreneurs for productivity and
economic growth.3
1I am extremely grateful to my advisors, Fatih Guvenen, Patrick J. Kehoe, and Elena Pastorino for
many helpful comments and encouragement. I also thank Nicholas Bloom, Simone Civale, Luis Dı´ez-
Catala´n, Carlos Garriga, Eugenia Gonza´lez-Aguado, Parisa Kamali, Sergio Ocampo, John Shea, Guillaume
Sublet, Tasaneeya Viratyosin, and seminar participants at the Macro-Labor Workshop at the University of
Minnesota, the Innovation and Inequality Workshop at the University of Washington in St. Louis (October
2017), Minneapolis Fed, Dallas Fed, University of Maryland, UC San Diego, UCLA, Georgetown, and
Wharton for helpful comments and discussions.
2Several other papers have discussed the decline in the pace of creation of new businesses and en-
trepreneurship. Reedy and Strom (2012); Decker, Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda (2014, 2015) show
evidence on the decline in the startup rate (the share of the firm population accounted for by age-zero firms)
and in the share of fast-growing firms (which are disproportionally young). Pugsley and Sahin (2014) show
the evidence of increasing concentration of economic activity on older and larger firms.
3See, for instance Haltiwanger, Decker, and Jarmin (2015) and Yellen (2016).
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Previous researchers have proposed that the decline in firm creation maybe be driven by
an increase in the cost to start a firm, stemming possibly from an increase in regulation
(Davis and Haltiwanger, 2014), or a shift towards an older population (Karahan, Pugsley,
and Sahin, 2016). However, in this paper I propose that the decline in entrepreneurship is
the equilibrium response to technological improvements that have changed the incentives of
individuals to start their own business. In particular, I show that the same aggregate forces
that have resulted in an increase in the returns to high skill labor, namely, the skill-biased
technical change (Krueger, 1993) and the decrease in the cost of capital goods (Krusell,
Ohanian, R´ıos-Rull, and Violante, 2000), account for a significant fraction of the decrease
in entrepreneurship observed in the United States since the mid-1980s.4
The first contribution of this paper is to provide new evidence on the decline of en-
trepreneurship experienced by the US economy over the last three decades. Using individual-
level data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) I show that the decline in
the pace of firm creation has been accompanied by a decline in the share of entrepreneurs
in the US working-age population. Specifically, I show that the population share of en-
trepreneurs declined from 7.8% in 1985 to 3.9% in 2014. Moreover, the share of individuals
transitioning into entrepreneurship declined by a half over the same period. By separating
the population into different education groups, I find that the decline in entrepreneurship
is most concentrated among the college graduates. In fact, the share of college graduates
who are entrepreneurs declined from 12.2% in 1985 to 5.3% in 2014, whereas the share
of non-college graduate entrepreneurs declined from 4.7% to 2.7% over the same period.5
Finally, I provide evidence of an increase in selection into entrepreneurship. Using past
labor earnings as a measure of individual skill, I show that among college graduates, the
average past labor income of new entrepreneurs increased by 35 log points over the last 30
years, whereas the average past labor earnings among individuals that stayed as workers
4The rapid increase of the returns to high skill workers has been extensively documented. See, for
instance, Acemoglu (2002), Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2008), or Acemoglu and Autor (2011) and the
references therein.
5Here I consider a sample of heads of household from the PSID between 22 and 60 years of age. I classify
as entrepreneurs those heads of household in the PSID for whom four conditions hold: (i) the household
owns a business, (ii) the head is self-employed, (iii) the head of the household declares to have worked for
the family business, and (iv) the head has a professional or managerial occupation. However, as I show
in section 1.2, the magnitude of this decline does not significantly depend on the particular definition of
entrepreneurs.
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grew only by 10 log points. This suggests that newer entrepreneurs are selected from more
productive workers.
The second contribution of this paper is to develop a quantitative model of entrepreneurial
choice with two distinct skill groups to study the contribution of the skill-biased technical
change and the decline in the relative cost of capital to the observed decline in entrepreneur-
ship. In the model, a large number of heterogeneous individuals decide each period whether
to be a worker or an entrepreneur conditional on their skill type, entrepreneurial ability,
and assets. Additionally, entrepreneurs can borrow to increase the scale of their business
but are subject to a collateral constraint.
The mechanism of my model is simple and works through the equilibrium effect of pro-
ductivity improvements on profits and wages. As workers become more productive and
capital becomes cheaper, both wages and profits increase for all entrepreneurs in the econ-
omy, existing and potential. However, because of the complementarity between capital and
high skill labor, entrepreneurial profits for the marginal entrepreneur increase less that the
wages she would obtain as a worker. This reduces individuals’ incentives to run a busi-
ness, thereby generating a decrease in the share of entrepreneurs. Yet, consistent with my
empirical evidence, those individuals that do become entrepreneurs are increasingly more
productive, raising average entrepreneurial productivity. Furthermore, the remaining en-
trepreneurs obtain larger profits because the workers they hire are more productive and
capital is less costly.6
I calibrate the model to account for several salient features of the US economy in the mid-
1980s, such as the share of entrepreneurs, the proportion of high and low skill entrepreneurs,
and the wage skill premium. Then, I study the equilibrium transition of my modeled
economy generated by three aggregate trends which have affected both entrepreneurial
profits and the returns of high skill workers over the last three decades, each of which
I consider as exogenous. The first is the skill-biased technical change, which refers to
improvements in technology that have increased the productivity of high skill workers
(Krueger, 1993). The second is the investment-specific technical change which induces a
decrease in the relative cost of capital goods (Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell, 1997).
Notice that, if capital is more complementary to high skill labor than to low skill labor,
6My results are consistent with Michelacci and Schivardi (2016) that document a rapid increase in the
profits for entrepreneurs relative to wages, especially at the highest educational level.
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a decrease in the relative cost of capital goods increases the demand for high skill labor,
generating an increase in the returns to high skill workers (Krusell et al., 2000). The third
is the increase in the population share of college graduates observed in the United States
over the last 30 years that has raised the supply of high skill labor. I take the decline of
the cost of capital goods and the increase in the supply of high skill labor directly from
the data, whereas the skill-biased technical change is calibrated to match the increase in
the college wage premium observed in the United States between 1985 and 2015.
The main finding of this paper is that a standard model of entrepreneurial choice with
the aforementioned trends can account for most of the decline in entrepreneurship ob-
served in the United States between 1985 and 2014. In my modeled economy, the share of
entrepreneurs drops 3.8 percentage points, almost all of the 3.9 percentage points decline
observed in the data. I then decompose the contribution of each trend. I find that the skill-
biased increase in productivity explains half of the reduction in the share of entrepreneurs
in the US population, whereas the other half is equally explained by the decrease in the
cost of capital goods and the increase in the supply of high skill labor. I find similar results
when I decompose the time series of the transition rate into entrepreneurship implied by
the model.
In the last part of this paper I consider a simple input cost subsidy that aims to bring the
entry rate of new entrepreneurs in 2014 to the level observed in 1985. This subsidy relaxes
entrepreneurs’ borrowing constraint–the only source of inefficiency in my model–inducing
more individuals to start a firm. I find this policy generates a sizable increase in the
share of entrepreneurs and an increase in output and productivity. Specifically, relative to
the baseline stationary economy, the share of entrepreneurs increases by 2.42 percentage
points, output grows by 4.0%, and productivity grows by 9.2%. The increase in output
and productivity stems from two factors: first, the reallocation of resources to existing
entrepreneurs that can operate their firms closer to the optimal scale, and second, the
entrance of new entrepreneurs that were borrowing constrained in the unsubsidized equi-
librium. Welfare also improves, with the group of high skill entrepreneurs experiencing the
largest increase. The cost of this subsidy, however, is quite substantial, amounting to 3.2%
of the GDP.
4
Literature Review
This paper relates to several areas of research. First, my paper contributes to the growing
literature on the decline of firm creation and dynamism experienced by the US economy
in recent decades. Hyatt and Spletzer (2013) document a decline of several measures of
job market dynamism such as job creation, job destruction, and job-to-job flows using
firm- and individual-level data. Davis and Haltiwanger (2014) show that the decline of
job reallocation rates had harmful effects on employment growth even before the Great
Recession. Furthermore, several studies by Reedy and Strom (2012), Hathaway and Litan
(2014a), Decker et al. (2014, 2016), Pugsley and Sahin (2014), Gourio et al. (2016), and
others have documented a decrease in the share of activity accounted for by new and
small firms. These papers show that this decline is not limited to a particular industry or
geographical area. This suggests that structural factors are responsible for the decline in
the pace of firm creation experienced by the US economy. My research complements these
studies by using individual-level data to show that the decline in the startup rate has been
accompanied by a fall in the share of entrepreneurs in the population.
Recent studies have postulated that an aging population is partly responsible for the decline
in entrepreneurship. For instance, Liang, Wang, and Lazear (2014) exploit cross-country
variation to quantify the importance of differences in the age distribution for entrepreneur-
ship. Similarly, Hathaway and Litan (2014b) and Karahan et al. (2016) use differences in
population growth across states in the United States to explain the decrease in the startup
rate. However, differences in the decrease in the proportion of entrepreneurs across dif-
ferent age groups would suggest that additional factors are also important drivers of the
decline in the startup rate.
Another possible explanation for the decline in firm entry is an increasing cost of regulation
that affects existing and new entrepreneurs (Davis and Haltiwanger, 2014). My model cap-
tures a regulatory burden by imposing a cost on firm creation, which I can use to quantify
the effect of an increase in the entry cost on entrepreneurship. Specifically, I ask what
entry cost is necessary to reduce the share of entrepreneurs observed in 1985 to the level in
2014, absent any other change in the economy. Comparing these two stationary economies,
I find that an entry cost that is seven times the cost in the initial stationary equilibrium,
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representing 2% of total output, is necessary to generate the drop in entrepreneurship ob-
served in the data. Furthermore, an increasing cost of firm creation is unable to explain the
differential decrease in the share of entrepreneurs between high and low skill individuals.
My paper is also related to the literature on entrepreneurial choice and its macroeconomic
consequences. See Quadrini (2011) and Buera, Kaboski, and Shin (2015) for excellent
reviews on the subject. Quadrini (2000) and Cagetti and De Nardi (2006) build models
with an entrepreneurial choice to analyze the relation between entrepreneurs and the level
of wealth inequality observed in the US economy. However, these papers study stationary
economies and do not consider how aggregate trends, such as the ones that I consider in my
quantitative analysis, affect the population share of entrepreneurs and wealth accumulation
over time.
The work of Jian and Sohail (2017) is closely related to my paper. The authors document a
decline in the transition rate into self-employment using a matched sample of the Current
Population Survey (CPS). They show that the decline in the transition rate is stronger
among college graduates. Then they study the effects of a skill-biased increase in produc-
tivity on the share of entrepreneurs in the context of a static occupational choice model.
I depart from these authors in at least three aspects: First, I study the decline in the
fraction of entrepreneurs and the transition into entrepreneurship considering a more com-
prehensive definition of entrepreneurship. Second, I consider a general equilibrium model
that incorporates several degrees of heterogeneity and is consistent with the increase in
the skill premium and with the extent and increase of wealth inequality observed in the
United States. This is crucial because wealth accumulation is an important determinant
of the transition into entrepreneurship. Third, in my quantitative exercise, I consider not
only the direct effect of the skill-biased technical change, but also the indirect effect of a
decline in the relative cost of capital and the increasing share of high skill workers in the
population, both of which are absent from the analysis of Jian and Sohail (2017).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 shows evidence about the decline
in the share of entrepreneurs in the US population, for different education and age groups.
The evidence of section 1.2 motivates the entrepreneurial choice model that I describe in
section 1.3. Section 1.4 presents the results of the model, and section 1.5 presents the
policy and welfare analysis. Section 1.6 concludes.
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1.2 Measuring Entrepreneurship
In this section, I show that the US economy has experienced a steady decline in the
fraction of the population participating in entrepreneurial activities. Moreover, this decline
is stronger among individuals with a college degree or more. I also show that the transition
rate into entrepreneurship, that is, the share of wage workers that start a business in the
following year, has also fallen in recent decades.
1.2.1 Data and Definitions
I this subsection I describe the sample that I use to study the evolution of the share of
entrepreneurs in the population and the transition into entrepreneurship. My main data
source is the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), which is a nationally representative
survey that was conducted annually in the United States from 1968 to 1997, and every
two years thereafter, on a sample of approximately 5000 families.7 My results are based on
a sample of heads of households from 1985 to 2015. The sample includes information on
gender, income, education attainment, self employment status, and whether the household
owns a business. The sample comprises those who are in the labor force and between 22
and 60 years old (both ends of the range included). All the statistics presented below are
calculated using sample weights. Appendix A.1 describes in full detail the sample selection
and variable construction.
Defining who is an entrepreneur is difficult and the empirical literature on entrepreneurship
offers little consensus about which households or individuals should be classified as such.8
Henceforth, most of the results in this section refer to four classifications of entrepreneurs
that encompass the different alternatives considered in the literature. The PSID provides
several questions that can be used to classify individuals by their entrepreneurial status.
7In this study I focus on the Survey Research Center sample (SRC). However, the main conclusions of
the empirical section remain almost unaltered if we include the Survey of Economic Opportunities sample
and use the proper weights.
8Evans and Leighton (1989) considers as entrepreneurs those that are self-employed, Hurst and Lusardi
(2004) all those households that own a business, whereas Gentry and Hubbard (2004) defines as en-
trepreneurs all those business owners with businesses with a total market value of $5,000 or more. Quadrini
(2000) considers both, business owners and self-employed as entrepreneurs. Cagetti and De Nardi (2006)
and Michelacci and Schivardi (2016) define entrepreneurs as those self-employed business owners that have
an active management in the firm.
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In my analysis, I use four questions. The first is, “Did you (or anyone else in the family
there) own a business at any time in (year) or have a financial interest in any business
enterprise?” The second question is, “On your main job, are you (head) self-employed, are
you employed by someone else, or what?” Third, starting in 1984 the heads of household are
asked, “Did you (head) put in any work time for this business in (year)?” Finally, I use the
occupation of the head of the household. Using this information, I separate households into
four different groups. The first group considers all households who are “business owners”
(those who answered affirmatively to the first question). Between 1985 and 2014, this group
represented an average of 16.7% of all households in the United States. Second, I consider
business owners that declare having worked for their businesses during the previous year,
denoted as “active business owners”. These households account, on average, for 14.8% of
the population. The third group considers households who are business owners, worked for
their businesses, and whose head is self-employed, that is, “self-employed business owners”.
These households represented an average of 10.0% of the population between 1985 and
2014. Finally, I define as “ entrepreneurs” those self-employed business owners who have a
managerial or professional occupation. These households, which are closer to the definition
of an entrepreneur in my model economy, represented an average of 6.0% of the population
between 1985 and 2014. Table 1.1 reports the average number of households in each class
and their average share in the population. Table 1.1 also shows the share of entrepreneurs
at the start and end of the sample. Notice that independent of the definition used, the
share of households participating in entrepreneurial activities has declined substantially,
between 3.5% and 5% during the last 30 years. Appendix table A.1 reports additional
characteristics of the sample and within the different classifications of entrepreneurs.
1.2.2 The Declining Share of Entrepreneurs
In this subsection, I document a decline in the proportion of entrepreneurs in the US
population and the drop in the share of households transitioning into entrepreneurship
between 1985 and 2014. The left panel of figure 1.1 shows the substantial drop in the
population share of individuals participating in entrepreneurial activities. For instance, in
1985, 16% of households in the United States were active business owners, whereas in 2014
only 12% of households were classified as such. Similarly, in 1985, 7.8% of all households
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Table 1.1: Proportion of Entrepreneurs in the Population
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Years Obs. Business Active Self-Emp. Entrepreneurs
Owner Bus. Owners Bus. Owner
[1985− 2014] 3.664 16.73% 14.84% 10.50% 6.0%
1985 2.902 17.58% 16.32% 11.69% 7.80%
2014 4.140 13.57% 11.33% 7.78% 3.90%
∆(2014− 1985) -4.01% -5.99% -3.91% -3.90%
Note: Table 1.1 shows the average proportion of entrepreneurial households for four different
classifications. Business owners are households whose head declares that he or another member of the
household owns a business. Active business owners are households whose head declares having worked for
the family business in a given year. Self-employed business owners are households classified as active
business owners whose head declares being self-employed in his or her main job. Finally, entrepreneurs are
households classified as self-employed business owners whose head has a managerial or professional
occupation. The first row shows the average proportion within each group between 1985 and 2014. The
second and third rows show the share of entrepreneurs in 1985 and 2014, respectively. The last row shows
the change between 1985 and 2014 (differences are statistically significant at the 1% level of confidence).
can be classified as entrepreneurs. This figure was 3.9% in 2014. To better appreciate the
decline in the rate of entrepreneurship across different definitions, the right panel of figure
1.1 shows the time series of the share of entrepreneurs rescaled by the level in 1985.9
The top panels of figure 1.2 show the time series of the fraction of entrepreneurs separating
the population into two education groups. Two patterns are worth noticing. First, the
share of entrepreneurs among college graduates is significantly larger than the share of
entrepreneurs among high school graduates and dropouts. This is true independent of the
definition of entrepreneur that one uses. Second, although both groups have experienced a
decline in the share of entrepreneurs, the drop is steeper for the group of households with
college education. This is more clearly shown in the bottom panels of figure 1.2, which
display the share of entrepreneurial households rescaled to the level in 1985: the group of
households whose head is a college graduate experienced a decline of roughly 7 percentage
9In this section, I calculate the fraction of entrepreneurs on a sample of heads of household that considers
those that did and did not work for a wage in the corresponding year. Dropping the later group of
observations–mostly unemployed heads of household–changes the level of the share of entrepreneurs in the
population (it reduces the denominator). However, the declining trend remains almost the same, as I show
in appendix figure A.4.
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Figure 1.1: Share of Entrepreneurs
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Note: The left panel of figure 1.1 shows the proportion of entrepreneurial households in each year for
different classifications. From top to bottom, the slopes are -0.13, -0.20, -0.10, and -0.12, respectively. All
slopes are statistically significant at the 1% level of confidence. The right panel shows the proportion of
entrepreneurial households normalized by the value in 1985. See notes in table 1.1 for more details on the
classification of entrepreneurial households.
points between 1985 and 2014 (a 50% decline), whereas the decline for the group with a
high school diploma or less is about 2 percentage points (a 20% decline).
Transition into Entrepreneurship
The decline in the share of entrepreneurs has been accompanied by a decrease in the rate at
which workers decide to start new businesses. To illustrate this, I calculate the transition
rate into entrepreneurship across the population and over the years. In order to have a
more direct comparison between the different classifications of entrepreneurial households,
I measure the transition rate as the share of the population that is neither a business owner
nor self-employed in year t, but transitions into one of the four classifications in year t+2.10
Figure 1.3 shows that the transition rates have declined for each classification since 1985.
The drop is substantial: in 1985, 8.1% of the households that did not own a business or
were self-employed started a business two years after. This figure was only 4.2% in 2014,
which implies a decline of 50% in the transition rate. I find a similar drop in the transition
rates for the rest of the definitions of entrepreneurial households (see right panel of figure
10I construct two-year transition rates to accommodate the biannual waves of the PSID after 1997.
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Figure 1.2: Share of Entrepreneurs by Education Groups
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Note: Figure 1.2 shows the proportion of entrepreneurs within education groups. Individuals with some
college are not considered. The bottom plots show the same statistics rescaled to their corresponding
levels in 1985. See notes in table 1.1 for more details on the classification of entrepreneurial households.
1.3). The exit rate out of entrepreneurship, that is, the share of active entrepreneurs in
period t that transitioned to being wage workers in t + 2, does not show any particular
trend between 1985 and 2014.11
Next, I use the panel dimension of the PSID to study how the characteristics of the house-
holds that start new businesses have changed over time. Specifically, I look to the wage
level of entrepreneurs before they started their business. Arguably, workers with higher
wages are more skilled than workers with lower wages. Therefore, an increase in the wage
11Using data from the Survey of Consumers Finances, Michelacci and Schivardi (2016) show that the
exit rate from entrepreneurship has declined since 1989.
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Figure 1.3: Transition rate to Entrepreneurship
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Note: Figure 1.3 shows the proportion of households that are neither business owners nor self-employed in
period t that are classified as entrepreneurial households in period t+ 2 for the different definitions of
entrepreneurship. See notes in table 1.1 for additional details of the definition of entrepreneurial
households.
of the households that transition into entrepreneurship might be indicative that new en-
trepreneurs are more skilled and expect higher future profits, since they gave up higher
earnings to start their firms. Hence, the decline in the share of entrepreneurs would have
been accompanied by a selection of more talented individuals. To see whether this is the
case, I consider a sample of male, heads of household who are neither self-employed nor
business owners in year t (wage workers in period t). For each individual, I measure recent
labor earnings as the average of total labor earnings between years t and t− 2.12 I divide
the sample into two groups: those with a high school diploma or less and those with at
least some college studies.13 Then, I calculate the average recent labor earnings within
the group of individuals that become business owners in t+ 2 (switching households) and
within those that stay as workers (non-switching households).
Figure 1.4 shows that, within the group of individuals with some college, the average wage
of those who became entrepreneurs grew faster than the average wage of individuals who
remained as workers. The difference in the growth rate of earnings is both economically
12I calculate recent labor earnings to reduce business cycle variations which can heavily affect workers
at the bottom of the skill distribution.
13The results are stronger if one includes workers with some years college in the first group strengthens
my results.
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and statistically significant (at the 1% level of confidence): the average recent earnings
of workers that became entrepreneurs grew 1.7% per year between 1985 and 2014, ac-
cumulating more than 35% increase in three decades. On the other hand, the average
earnings for those that remained as workers grew less than 0.4% on average during the
same period of time, accumulating roughly a 10% increase. This suggests that new high
skill entrepreneurs are increasingly selected from a pool of workers with higher average
wages and are therefore more talented. In contrast, the growth rate of wages did not differ
significantly between switching and non-switching workers within the group of individuals
with a high school diploma or less. Figure 1.5 shows that the average recent earnings for
less educated households transitioning to entrepreneurship decreased during the sample
period, whereas earnings increased less than 0.1% per year for individuals that remained
as workers.14
Several studies have shown the importance of wealth and borrowing constraints to ex-
plain entrepreneurial choices. In particular, the transition rate into entrepreneurship varies
greatly across the wealth distribution and between individuals of different education groups
(see, for instance, Hurst and Lusardi (2004) and Mondrago´n-Ve´lez (2009)). Similarly to
other studies, I find significant differences in the wealth accumulation of workers before
they start their own business relative to those workers that do not transit to entrepreneur-
ship. Specifically, the median wealth of workers transitioning into entrepreneurship in the
following period is 30% higher than the wealth of workers that stay as such. These differ-
ences increase if one considers higher percentiles of the wealth distribution (the differences
are 37% and 46% at the 90th and 95th percentiles of the wealth distribution respectively).
14Figure A.3 in appendix A.4 shows the results using a pooled sample of entrepreneurs. In such case,
the growth rate of recent earnings for switching workers grew an average of 1.3% per year between 1985
and 2014 but only 0.5% for non-switching workers. In appendix A.4 I also show that these results are quite
robust and do not change much if we consider wages and salaries instead of total labor earnings (figure
A.7), if we consider current labor earnings (figure A.8), or if we look at the 50th percentile of the labor
earnings distribution (figure A.9). The differences in the growth rate of earnings between those that switch
to being business owners and those that remain as workers tend to vanish at higher levels of the recent
income distribution. This can be seen in figure A.10, which shows the evolution of the 90th percentile of
the recent labor income distribution.
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Figure 1.4: Labor Income for Workers with Some College or More
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Note: Figure 1.4 shows the average log of recent labor earnings for a sample of men, heads of household,
who are neither business owner nor self-employed in year t and have some college studies or more. The
left panel shows the average recent earnings within the group of households that become business owners
in year t+ 2, whereas the right panel shows the same statistics for individuals that remain as workers in
period t+ 2. The difference in the slope between the left and right panels is statistically significant at the
1% level.
Figure 1.5: Labor Income for Workers with High School Diploma or Less
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Note: Figure 1.5 shows the average log of recent labor earnings for a sample of men, heads of household,
who are neither a business owner nor self-employed in year t and have a high school diploma or less. The
left panel shows the average recent earnings within the group of households that become business owners
in year t+ 2, whereas the right panel shows the same statistics for individuals that remain as workers in
period t+ 2. There is no statistical difference between the slopes in the left and right panels.
1.2.3 Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances
In this subsection, I present additional evidence on the decline in the share of entrepreneurs
in the United States using information from the Survey of Consumer Finances. The SCF
14
is a nationally representative survey conducted every three years since 1983. The SCF
over samples wealthy households, which are more likely to be entrepreneurs (Cagetti and
De Nardi, 2006), allowing for a more precise measure of the share of entrepreneurs in the
population. Besides collecting information on household assets and business ownership, the
SCF asks whether the head or another member of the family has an active management
role in any of the businesses he or she owns. The main disadvantage of the SCF is that it
does not follow individuals over time.
I use information from the SCF from 1989 to 2016. Following the definitions of the previous
section, I define as self-employed business owners those households whose head or spouse
has an active management role in a business owned by the family and whose head is
self-employed.15 These households represented an average of 9.2% of the total population
between 1989 and 2016. The left panel of figure 1.6 shows that the share of self-employed
business owners in the SCF declines over time, from 10.1 in 1989 to 7.8 in 2016. Separating
the sample by education groups, I find that the decrease in the share of entrepreneurs is
concentrated among households whose head has at least some college education (center
panel of figure 1.6).16
The firms of high skill entrepreneurs are more profitable than the firms of low skill en-
trepreneurs. The right panel of figure 1.6 displays the (average) age profile of the log
real sales-to-employment ratio after controlling for industry and year fixed effects, and by
the gender and age of the entrepreneur. For better comparison, I have normalized each
15See Appendix A.5 for additional details on the construction of the SCF sample.
16Michelacci and Schivardi (2016) also use the SCF and suggest that the share of entrepreneurs is stable
between 1989 and 2013. The difference is mainly due to the sample selection. Similar to Hurst and Lusardi
(2004), I consider individuals between 22 and 60 years old, whereas Michelacci and Schivardi (2016) consider
the entire sample of heads of household, independent of their age. Appendix figure A.15 shows the share of
entrepreneurs with and without this age restriction (left panel) and within each age group (center panel).
The share of entrepreneurs within the group of individuals of more than 60 years old has increased over
time. Since this group has increased its population share, it is not surprising to find that the share of
entrepreneurs is more stable if these individuals are considered in the sample: between 1989 and 2016, the
share of entrepreneurs declines 1.55 percentage points among individuals between 22 and 60, but only 0.5
percentage points considering the entire sample. In this paper, I focus on the 22 to 60 range because these
individuals are more likely to switch between workers and entrepreneurs and are more inclined to start
new businesses. The right panel of appendix figure A.15 shows that the share of startup entrepreneurs
(entrepreneurs whose main business is one year old or less) among individuals 22 and 60 averages 17%
between 1989 and 2016 and has been declining over time, much like the evidence presented by Pugsley and
Sahin (2014) using firm-level data, whereas the share of startups within the group of entrepreneurs older
than 60 is smaller (average of 5%) and has increased over the last 25 years.
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Figure 1.6: Characteristics of Entrepreneurs in the SCF
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Note: The left and center panels of figure 1.6 display the time series of the share of self-employed business
owners in the SCF. High skill entrepreneurs are heads of household with some college studies or more.
Low skill entrepreneurs are heads of households with a high school diploma or less. Self-employed business
owners are households that own a business, declare having an active management role, and whose head is
self-employed. The slopes in the center plot are statistically different at the 5% level. The right panel
shows the average sales-to-employment ratio. Each point is the value of the age fixed effect on a regression
of the log sales-to-employment on industry, year, and gender fixed effects, and a quadratic in the age of
the entrepreneur. All monetary values are expressed in 2012 US dollars. See Appendix A.5 for additional
details on the construction of the SCF sample.
profile by the sales-to-employment ratio in the first year. The firms of high and low skill
entrepreneurs generate a similar amount of dollars per worker in their first year of opera-
tion (an average of $16,400 per employee in the case of high skill entrepreneurs relative to
$15,500 for low skill entrepreneurs), but the firms of high skill entrepreneurs grow much
faster than the firms of low skill entrepreneurs. The average sales-per-employee ratio of
the firms managed by low skill entrepreneurs grows by 21% in the second year of operation
and grows by 80% when the firm has reached the age of five. This increase is more sub-
stantial among the firms managed by high skill entrepreneurs: in the second year, these
entrepreneurs are selling 80% more per worker than in their first year, and after five years
of operation, the sales-to-employment ratio is 150% higher than in the first year. The
differences are also economically significant. The median high skill entrepreneur running
a firm that has been operating for five years generates $77,812 per worker, while a firm of
the same age but owned by a low skill entrepreneur generates $28,874 per worker. I do not
find important differences between average employment size of firms of high and low skill
entrepreneurs after I have controlled for industry.
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Using the SCF one also can study in more detail the changing characteristics of en-
trepreneurs and their firms. For instance, one would like to know whether the decline
in the share of entrepreneurs is concentrated among those managing small, medium, or
large firms. This would give us a sense of how important is the decrease in the share of
entrepreneurs. To see this, I separate the sample of entrepreneurs in the SCF into four size
categories, measured by the amount of sales (expressed in 2012 dollars). I consider three
cut-offs, one at 0.1 million dollars, a second at 1 million dollars, and the third at 10 million.
Then, I calculate the share of entrepreneurs within each of these groups. Figure 1.7 shows
that the decline of the proportion of entrepreneurs has been accompanied by a shift in
entrepreneurs’ size distribution. In particular, the share of the smallest group has stayed
constant over the years, the share of middle-sized entrepreneurs, with sales between 0.1M
and 1M, has declined, whereas the group of entrepreneurs selling more than 10 million has
increased substantially over time. Importantly, this change in the sales-size distribution of
entrepreneurs is mostly explained by changes in the distribution of high skill entrepreneurs,
which represent a disproportionate share of the group or large entrepreneurs: high skill en-
trepreneurs represent 80% of all entrepreneurs selling more than 10M dollars per year,
but less than 20% in the group of entrepreneurs selling less than 0.1M. Furthermore, the
sales-size distribution among low skill entrepreneurs almost did not change over the sample
period as shown in Appendix figure A.16.17
In summary, I have shown that the US economy has experienced a decline in the proportion
of households involved in entrepreneurial activities. The decline is stronger among more
skilled households. I also find a decline in the transition rate into entrepreneurship and
an increase in the selection of entrepreneurs with higher wages. Building on this evidence,
the next section presents an equilibrium model that is consistent with the decline in the
share of entrepreneurs, with the differential decrease in the share of entrepreneurs across
education groups, and with the increase in the selection of more talented workers to start
new firms.18
17This results are robust to other classification in terms of sales size and if I use employment instead of
sales as a measure of entrepreneur’s firm size.
18For further robustness, appendix A.1.2 presents additional evidence on the declining share of en-
trepreneurs using a sample drawn from the CPS.
17
Figure 1.7: Size Distribution of Entrepreneurs
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Note: The figure 1.7 shows the evolution of the share of entrepreneurs for different size classifications. All
monetary values are expressed in 2012 US dollars. See appendix A.5 for additional details on the
construction of the SCF sample.
1.3 The Model
1.3.1 Households and Production
This section describes the model I use to study the effect of technical change and the
increase in the supply of skilled labor on the decision to become an entrepreneur.
Demographics
Consider an economy with a continuum of individuals of measure one. In each period, there
is a proportion Ht of high skill individuals and a proportion Lt of low skill individuals.
An individual dies with probability (1− χ), in which case her offspring enters the model
carrying the same skill type of her parents with probability ζs, with s ∈ {H,L}. She also
inherits the assets bequeathed by her parent and her parent’s business in the case the
parent dies as an entrepreneur.
18
Preferences and Discounting
Each individual values consumption by means of the utility function c1−σt / (1− σ) and
supplies one unit of labor inelastically. Individuals discount future streams of utility at the
rate β < 1, and the utility of their offspring by a proportion βη with η ∈ [0, 1].
Production Technology
In each period, an individual decides whether to work or to become an entrepreneur (labor
is indivisible).19 If the individual decides to be a worker, she receives an income of ωs,tyt,
where s ∈ {H,L}, yt is an idiosyncratic, positively autocorrelated shock, and ωs,t is the
wage of a worker of type s in period t. A worker cannot borrow but can save in a riskless
asset, at, with return rt.
If the individual chooses to be an entrepreneur, she gains access to a productive technology
that uses four different factors: Her own entrepreneurial ability, low skilled labor, nL,t, high
skilled labor, nH,t, and capital, kt. All entrepreneurs produce the same homogeneous good.
Entrepreneurial ability has two components: a fixed part, denoted by θs, which depends
on the skill type of the individual, and an idiosyncratic part, zt, which is positively auto-
correlated and independent of yt. The production technology available to the entrepreneur
is ztθs [f (nH,t, nL,t, kt)]
γ , where γ < 1 is the span-of-control parameter that determines
the degree of decreasing returns to scale, and hence, the returns to entrepreneurial ability
(Lucas, 1978). The function f (nH,t, nL,t, kt) is given by
f (nH,t, nL,t, kt) =
[
ψ (τ (AH,tnH,t)
ρ + (1− τ) kρt )
α
ρ + (1− ψ)nαL,t
] 1
α
. (1.1)
The value of ρ determines the elasticity of substitution between high skill labor and capital,
and α determines the elasticity of substitution between the composite of capital and low
19In this model, the assumption of indivisibility of labor is important. Alternatively, one could assume
that individuals can receive a wage and run a business at the same time. In such case, since firms profits are
always positive and there is no uncertainty about firms returns, the individual does not face any tradeoff
between be a worker or be an entrepreneurs. In this case, and increase of the productivity of high skill
workers (or a decrease in the price of investment) results in an increase in the share of entrepreneurs.
However, in such model, individuals are not entrepreneurs in the sense that I consider in this paper, but
business owners that have a firm as an investment opportunity.
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skill labor. The parameter τ determines the output share of capital whereas ψ determines
the output share of labor. The value of AH,t captures a skill-biased change in productivity
that directly affects the relative contribution of high skill workers to output. There is no
fixed cost of production; however, creating a new firm implies a one period cost, κ. Notice
this cost affects only individuals transitioning from wage worker to entrepreneur.
In reality, a large fraction of firms are not managed by individuals weighing the cost and
benefit of running their own business or working in someone else’s company. Therefore, as
in Quadrini (2000) and Cagetti and De Nardi (2006), I model a second sector of production
populated by a large number of homogeneous firms operating a constant returns to scale
production technology given by
F (NH,t, NL,t,Kt) = A
[
ψ (τ (AH,tNH,t)
ρ + (1− τ)Kρt )
α
ρ + (1− ψ)NαL,t
] 1
α
,
which I will refer to as the non-entrepreneurial sector. Both sectors produce the same
good, and in both sectors capital depreciates at the rate δ.
Borrowing Constraint
Several papers have documented the importance of borrowing constraints to the decision
to become an entrepreneur.20 Here I assume that entrepreneurs need to buy capital and
pay wages before revenues are realized. This captures that idea that an entrepreneur needs
some working capital to run her business. To finance this working capital, entrepreneurs
obtain an intraperiod loan with gross interest of (1 + rt) and total amount pk,tkt+ωH,tnH,t+
ωL,tnL,t, where pk,t is the price of capital goods in terms of consumption.
21 The maximum
amount of the loan is constrained by the wealth of the household. In particular, each
entrepreneur faces a simple collateral constraint of the form
pk,tkt + ωH,tnH,t + ωL,tnL,t ≤ λat,
20See, for instance, Evans and Jovanovic (1989), Hurst and Lusardi (2004), or Mondrago´n-Ve´lez (2009).
21My baseline results do not depend on this particular form of the borrowing constraint. Appendix A.3.1
compares my quantitative exercise under a different collateral constraint.
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with λ ≥ 1.22
Exogenous Aggregate Processes
The economy is subject to three exogenous aggregate processes: investment-specific tech-
nological change that decreases the relative price of capital goods, pk,t, an increase in the
supply of high skill workers, Ht, and a skill-biased improvement in technology that in-
creases the productivity of high skill workers, AH,t. In my baseline exercise I assume there
is no aggregate uncertainty and the time series of each of these processes are fully known
by the individuals.23
The Problem of the Individuals
At the beginning of the period, an individual is characterized by her fixed skill type,
s ∈ {H,L}, asset level, at, entrepreneurial ability, zt, worker ability, yt, and previous
occupation, dt ∈ {wt, et}, where w identifies a worker and e an entrepreneur. To simplify
the notation, name the vector of idiosyncratic states by Ωt ≡ {at, zt, yt, dt−1}, and the
distribution of individuals of type s in period t over idiosyncratic states by µs,t with µt ≡
{µH,t, µL,t}. Denote the vector of aggregate states by Θt ≡ {pk,t, AH,t, Ht}. Then, a s−type
individual solves
Vs,t (Ωt,Θt, µt) = max
{
V ws,t (Ωt,Θt, µt) , V
e
s,t (Ωt,Θt, µt)
}
, (1.2)
22This type of borrowing constraint can arise from a limited enforcement problem as in Jermann and
Quadrini (2012) and has been used in several other papers. See, for instance, Evans and Jovanovic (1989),
Buera (2009) Buera and Shin (2013), Moll (2014), Guvenen, Kambourov, Kuruscu, Ocampo, and Chen
(2015), among others.
23I assume that the price of capital goods is exogenously given. This is equivalent to modeling a third
productive sector with a linear production technology that transforms consumption goods into capital
goods. A decrease in the relative price of capital would result from an increase in this sector’s productivity.
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where V ws,t (Ωt,Θt, µt) is the value of being a worker in period t and V
e
s,t (Ωt,Θt, µt) is the
value of being an entrepreneur. The value of being a worker is given by
V ws,t (Ωt,Θt, µt) = maxct,at+1
{
c1−σt
1− σ + β
[
χEzt+1|zt,yt+1|ytVs,t+1 (Ωt+1,Θt+1, µt+1) +
(1− χ) η
∑
j∈{H,L}
ζs,jEVs,t+1 (Ωt+1,Θt+1, µt+1)
]}
(1.3)
ct + at+1 ≤ (1 + rt (Θt, µt)) at + ωs,t (Θt, µt) yt,
at+1 ≥ 0,
subject to the laws of motion of yt and zt, the law of motion of the distribution of individuals
over idiosyncratic states, µt+1 = Ψ (Θt, µt), and the evolution of the aggregate states, Θt+1.
In the problem of the worker described by equation (1.3), the first expectation is taken
over the conditional distributions of zt+1 and yt+1, and over the next period’s distribution
of individuals over idiosyncratic states, while the second expectation is taken over the
unconditional distributions of zt+1 and yt+1, and over the next period’s distribution of
idiosyncratic states.
The value of being an entrepreneur is given by
V es,t (Ωt,Θt, µt) = maxct,at+1
{
c1−σt
1− σ + β
[
χEzt+1|zt,yt+1|ytVs,t+1 (Ωt+1,Θt+1, µt+1) +
(1− χ) η
∑
j∈{H,L}
ζs,jEVs,t+1 (Ωt+1,Θt+1, µt+1)
]}
, (1.4)
pis,t (zt, at) = max
nH,t,nL,t,kt
{
ztθs [f (nH,t, nL,t, kt)]
γ − pk,t (r + δ) kt−
(1 + r (Θt, µt)) (ωH,t (Θt, µt)nH,t + ωL,t (Θt, µt)nL,t)
}
,
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ct + at+1 + I (dt−1 = wt−1)κ ≤ (1 + r (Θt, µt)) at + pis,t (zt, at) ,
pk,tkt + ωH,t (Θt, µt)nH,t + ωL,t (Θt, µt)nL,t ≤ λat
at+1 ≥ 0,
subject to the non-negativity constraints of factor demands, the laws of motion of yt and
zt, the law of motion of the distribution of individuals over idiosyncratic states, µt+1 =
Ψ (Θt, µt), and the law of motion of the aggregate states, Θt+1. Here, I (dt−1 = wt−1) is an
indicator function which is equal to 1 if the individual was a worker in the previous period
and is equal to zero otherwise. This function captures the assumption that the fixed cost of
creating a firm is paid only by those individuals transitioning from worker to entrepreneur.
The solution of the problem of the household is characterized by a z−threshold which
depends on the individual’s level of assets, the labor productivity, and the previous period’s
occupation.
The Problem of the Non-Entrepreneurial Sector
The problem of the non-entrepreneurial sector is simple and is given by
pic,t = max
NH,t,NL,t,Kt
{
F (NH,t, NL,t,Kt)− pk,t (r (Θt, µt) + δ)Kt−
ωH,t (Θt, µt)NH,t − ωL,t (Θt, µt)NL,t
}
, (1.5)
subject to the non-negativity constraints of factor demands.
1.3.2 Equilibrium
Given an initial distribution µ0 and an exogenous path of Θt = {pk,t, AH,t, Ht}∞t=0, a
recursive competitive equilibrium in this economy is
• A time path for prices, {ωH,t (Θt, µt) , ωL,t (Θt, µt) , rt (Θt, µt)}∞t=0 , and a sequence of
distributions over idiosyncratic states {µt+1 (Θt, µt)}∞t=0 ,
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• a sequence of individual’s policy functions {cst (Ωt,Θt, µt) , ast+1 (Ωt,Θt, µt) , dst (Ωt,Θt, µt)}∞t=0 ,
with {Vs,t (Ωt,Θt, µt)}∞t=0, the associated value functions and s ∈ {H,L} ,
• factor demands for the entrepreneurs,
{
kst (Ωt,Θt, µt) , n
s
H,t (Ωt,Θt, µt) , n
s
L,t (Ωt,Θt, µt)
}∞
t=0
,
• demands of the non-entrepreneurial sector, {Kt (Θt, µt) , NH,t (Θt, µt) , NL,t (Θt, µt)}∞t=0 ,
such that
• The policy functions, value functions, and factor demands solve the individual’s prob-
lem given by (1.3) and (2.6),
• The factor demands of the non-entrepreneurial sector solve (1.5),
• Labor markets for high and low skill workers clear,
∫ (
1− dHt (Ωt,Θt, µt)
)
dµHt (Ωt) = NH,t (Θt, µt) +∑
s∈H,L
∫
nsH,t (Ωt,Θt, µt) d
s
t (Ωt,Θt, µt) dµ
s
t (Ωt) , (1.6)
∫ (
1− dLt (Ωt,Θt, µt)
)
dµLt (Ωt) = NL,t (Θt, µt) +∑
s∈H,L
∫
nsH,t (Ωt,Θt, µt) d
s
t (Ωt,Θt, µt) dµ
s
t (Ωt) , (1.7)
• Capital market clears,
∑
s∈H,L
∫
ast (Ωt,Θt, µt) dµ
s
t (Ωt) = pk,tKt (Θt, µt) +
∑
s∈H,L
∫ (
pk,tk
s
t (Ωt,Θt, µt) +
ωH,t (Θt, µt)n
s
H,t (Ωt,Θt, µt) + ωL,t (Θt, µt)n
s
L,t (Ωt,Θt, µt)
)
dst (Ωt,Θt, µt) dµ
s
t (Ωt) . (1.8)
A stationary competitive equilibrium is similarly defined but over a constant path of Θt,
which implies a constant sequence of prices and distributions over idiosyncratic states.
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The solution of the model requires an initial and a final steady state, and the complete
transition path of aggregate states and factor prices, given an exogenous sequence of Θt.
Appendix A.2 describes in detail the algorithm that I use to solve the model.
1.3.3 Calibration
This section describes the quantitative specification of the model. To maintain the tractabil-
ity of the calibration, I take some parameters directly from the literature (e.g., the risk
aversion or the depreciation rate), I calculate other parameters directly from the data (e.g.,
the parameters governing the labor income process), and I choose other parameters such
that the stationary equilibrium matches several features of the US data in the mid 1980s.
In this section, I also describe how I pin down the three exogenous time series (the price
of capital, the share of high skill workers, and relative productivity of high skill workers)
that I will incorporate into the model. In order to highlight the effects of the change in
wages on entrepreneurs, I will assume, for the moment, that this is a small open economy
and the interest rate is constant over time. In section 1.4.4, I show how my quantitative
results change when considering a full-fledged general equilibrium model.
Frequency, Preferences, and Discounting
I set the time period to equal a year. I take a standard value of 2.0 for the coefficient of
risk aversion. In the baseline case, I set η = 1 so parents are perfectly altruistic. I assume
β to be 0.88, and a fixed interest rate of 3.0%.24
Demographics
I set the value of χ equal to 0.025 so that the average working life of an individual is 40
years. In the baseline calibration, I assume when an individual dies, the offspring inherits
her parent’s skill type with probability one, so ζhh = ζll = 1.
24I choose the value of β equal to 0.88 to be consistent with my calibration in the general equilibrium
case which I discuss in the robustness section.
25
Production and Capital Depreciation
Following Krusell et al. (2000), I assume that capital is more complementary to skilled
than to unskilled workers. Hence, I set α equal to 0.401 and ρ equal to -0.495. The value
of γ in the technology of the entrepreneur is equal to 0.88, as in Cagetti and De Nardi
(2006), and the depreciation rate of capital, δ, is set at an annual value of 0.06.
Labor Income Shocks
I assume that the process of yt is such that log yt+1 = ρy log yt + σ,yy,t+1 where y,t+1
is distributed normal with mean zero and unitary variance. The values of ρy and σy are
estimated using data from the PSID using a sample of workers for the period 1970 to
1996.25 In the model, all households are subject to the same stochastic shocks. Therefore,
I select a pooled sample of heads of household with valid labor income that are neither
business owners nor self-employed in periods t and t − 1. Then, I estimate the following
equation:
logwi,t = β0 + β1Ai,t + β2A
2
i,t + β3A
3
i,t + ρw logwi,t−1 + νi,t, (1.9)
where wi,t is the total real labor earnings of the head of the household in period t.
26 The
right-hand side includes a polynomial in age to control for life-cycle patterns. The estimated
autocorrelation of earnings, ρw, is 0.73, and the standard deviation of νi,t is 0.53. Using
these values for ρy and σy, I discretize the continuous process using the method developed
by Tauchen (1986). The sample selection and additional estimation results are described
in appendix A.1.1. Table 1.2 shows the fixed parameters chosen from the literature or
calculated directly from the data.
Exogenous Aggregate Processes
In this section, I discuss how I choose the time series of the relative price of capital goods,
pk,t, the supply of high skill labor, Ht, and the productivity of high skill workers, AH,t.
25After 1997 the PSID becomes biannual and it is not possible to calculate the one-year changes.
26Here, total labor income includes only wages and salaries, bonuses, tips, and commissions. The labor
part of businesses income and the income from farm are excluded as I am considering in the sample
individuals that work for a wage only and do not own a businesses neither in period t nor in period t− 1.
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Table 1.2: Fixed Parameters in the Benchmark Model
Value Source
Risk Aversion σ 2.0 -
Prob. Dying 1− χ 2.5% Average working life of 40 years
Perfect Altruism η 1 Perfect Altruism
Depreciation δ 0.06 -
Capital-High Skill ES ρ -0.49 Krusell et al. (2000)
Capital-Low Skill ES α 0.40 Krusell et al. (2000)
Span-of-Control γ 0.88 Cagetti and De Nardi (2006)
Autocorrelation of y ρy 0.75 PSID
Standard Dev. of y σ,y 0.53 PSID
Note: Table 1.2 reports the set of fixed parameters used in the baseline model.
The first two time series have obvious empirical counterparts, whereas the third needs to
be pinned down using additional conditions.
For the time series of pk,t I use the quality-adjusted relative price of capital goods calculated
by DiCecio (2009) and normalized to 1 in 1985.27 Using this time series, the relative price
of capital declined 55% between 1985 and 2015.28 In my simulation, I will assume that
from 2015 on, pk,t remains fixed at its 2015 level for the rest of the simulation. This is
an extreme case and therefore, in the robustness section, I study how sensitive my results
are to a different assumption on the time trend of the price of capital and the rest of the
exogenous trends after 2015.
I equate the share of high skill workers in the model, Ht, to the fraction of individuals with
a college degree or more calculated from a sample of heads of household between ages 22
to 60 years drawn from the CPS. The share of college graduates in this sample increased
from 26% in 1985 to 39% in 2015. In my baseline results, I assume that the share of high
skill workers remains at its 2015 level for the rest of the transition.
Finally, I need to choose the time series for the skill-biased technological progress, AH,t.
I select the time series of AH,t such that the increase in the skill premium implied by the
27DiCecio (2009) extrapolates the quality-adjusted price time series of Gordon (2007) to 2010 using the
same techniques of Cummins and Violante (2002). I take the updated time series up to 2015 from FRED.
28Alternatively, one could use the measure of the price of capital goods calculated by the Bureau of
Economic Analysis (BEA) to compute the relative price of capital goods. Using this measure, the relative
price of capital declined 50% between 1985 and 2015. See appendix A.1.3 for additional details and a
comparison of the relative price of investment calculated by DiCecio (2009), the time series using the
BEA’s data, and an additional measure that only considers equipment and software.
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model (the log difference between the wage of high skill workers and the wage of low skill
workers) matches the increase in the college premium observed over the last 30 years in
the United States. I measure the college premium as the log difference of the real annual
labor income of college graduates and the real annual labor income of high school graduates
over a sample of workers from the CPS. Additional details of the construction of the skill
premium are discussed in appendix A.1.2. Using this sample, the college premium increased
from 39% in 1985 to 60% in 2015.
Because my model economy is subject to two additional aggregate trends (the price of
capital and the supply of high skill workers), there is no clear mapping between the college
premium implied by the model and the evolution of AH,t. In particular, since high skill
workers are more complementary to capital than low skill workers (recall α > ρ in the
production function), the decline in pk,t and the rise in Ht will affect the skill premium in
opposite directions. To solve this issue, I take a very simple approach: I fix the value of AH,t
in the initial stationary economy to be equal to 1 and select the value of AH,t at the final
stationary equilibrium so that my model matches a skill premium of 60% conditional on the
values of pk,t and Ht in 2015. Then, the sequence of {AH,t}Tt=1 grows linearly between these
two fixed points for 30 years. As I do with the other two aggregate exogenous processes,
I assume that the value of AH,t is fixed for the rest of the transition. Figure 1.8 displays
the time series of the relative price of capital goods, the share of college graduates, and the
college premium in the data that I use to discipline the aggregate processes in my model.
Parameters Determined Jointly in Equilibrium
The parameters that are calibrated simultaneously with the equilibrium of the model are
the factor shares in the production function, τ and ψ, the borrowing limit, λ, the entry
cost, κ, and the parameters of entrepreneurial ability, θs and zt. I normalize θH to 1, and I
assume that log zt+1 = ρz log zt + σ,zz,t+1. This leaves seven parameters that need to be
calibrated jointly with the equilibrium of the model. I use these seven parameters to pin
down the same number of moments generated by my model in 1985. I select this particular
year because it is the first for which I have information about each of the moments that
I seek to match. I normalize the relative price of capital goods, pk,t, and the productivity
of high skill workers, AH,t, to 1 in 1985, and I set the share of high skill workers, Ht, to
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Figure 1.8: Aggregate Processes
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Note: Figure 1.8 displays the time series of the relative price of capital goods (left panel), the share of
college graduates in the population (center panel), and the college premium (right panel). The relative
price of capital goods (calculated by DiCecio (2009)) is normalized to 1 in 1985. The supply of college
graduates is calculated over a sample of heads of household drawn from the CPS. The supply of college
graduates in each year is the share of heads of household between ages 22 and 60 that have a college
degree or more. The college premium is calculated as the difference between the average of the log of real
wages of heads of household with a college degree or more and the average of the log of the real wages of
heads of household that have a high school degree over a sample of wage workers. See appendix A.1.2 for
additional details on the calculation of the supply of college graduates and the college premium.
0.26, which is the fraction of heads of household with a college degree in the CPS sample
in 1985. Conditional on these three fixed values, I choose the rest of the parameters to
match:
• a skill premium of 39%, which is the value of the college premium in 1985, as shown
in figure 1.8,
• a labor share of output of 63%, which is the average labor share of non-farm business
sector output between 1980 and 1985 calculated by the Bureau of Labor Statistics,
• a ratio of liabilities plus equity in the non-financial sector to non-financial private
sector output of 0.88,29
29The ratio of liabilities plus equity of the non-financial sector is the sum of the total liabilities of the
non-financial non-corporate sector as reported by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Economic Data
(FRED) – time series NNBTILQ027S – plus total liabilities plus equity of the non-financial corporate sector
– time series NCBLEYQ027S – divided by the total nominal output of the private non financial sector as
reported by the BEA. See appendix A.1.3 for additional details.
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• a population share of entrepreneurs of 7.80%, which is the fraction of entrepreneurs
calculated from the PSID for 1985,
• a population share of entrepreneurs that are high skill of 4.2%, which is the fraction
of entrepreneurs with a college degree or more calculated from the PSID for 1985,
• a share of households transitioning from being wage workers into entrepreneurship of
2.4%, which is the fraction of wage workers transitioning to entrepreneurship calcu-
lated from the PSID for 1985,
• and a share of new entrepreneurs of 23%, which is the fraction of households that
switched to entrepreneurship in 1985 over the total number of entrepreneurs in 1985.
Table 1.3 reports the parameters calibrated jointly with the equilibrium of the model and
table 1.4 shows the calibration targets and the model generated moments. The model
matches well the population share of entrepreneurs, the population share of entrepreneurs
that are high skill, and the skill premium, all of which are key for my quantitative ex-
ercise. However, the share of new entrepreneurs and the transition rate of workers into
entrepreneurship implied by the model are larger than the corresponding values calculated
from the data. The model also generates substantial wealth inequality although the cali-
bration did not intend to match any of the moments of the wealth distribution. As reported
by Bricker, Henriques, Krimmel, and Sabelhaus (2016), the Gini coefficient on wealth in
1989 was 0.84, while the Gini coefficient implied by the model for the same year is 0.83.
Similarly, the share of wealth accrued by the top 1% of the population was 32% in 1989
and 34.2% in the model.30
1.4 Results
1.4.1 Transition
This section shows the main quantitative results of my model. The economy is assumed to
be at a stationary equilibrium in 1985. Then, individuals learn about the future path of the
30The moments reported by Bricker et al. (2016) are start in 1989. Hence, the model moments are taken
from the fourth year of the transition generated by the model, which corresponds to 1989. For 1985, the
model generates a Gini coefficient of 0.84 and a share of wealth of the top 1% of 33.2%.
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Table 1.3: Calibrated Parameters in the Benchmark Model
Parameter Value
Capital Share τ 0.48
Labor Share ψ 0.50
Borrowing Limit λ 2.5
Entry Cost κ 0.10
Relative Productivity of Low Skill θL 0.96
Autocorrelation of z ρz 0.82
Standard Dev. of z σ,z 0.22
Note: Table 1.3 reports the set of calibrated parameters and their corresponding values. The data and
analogous model generated moments are reported in table 1.4.
Table 1.4: Data and Model-Generated Moments
Data Model Source
log-Skill Premium 0.39 0.39 CPS
Labor share 0.63 0.63 BLS
Debt and Equity to GDP 0.88 0.90 Flow of Funds
Share of Entrepreneurs (%) 7.80 7.87 PSID
Share High Skill of Entrepreneurs (%) 4.20 4.15 PSID
Transition Rate (%) 2.40 3.10 PSID
Share of New Entrepreneurs (%) 23.1 35.0 PSID
Note: Table 1.4 shows the set of moments that are targeted to choose the parameters in table 1.3.
three aggregate time series (the cost of capital goods, the share of skilled workers, and the
relative productivity of high skill workers), the evolution of the distribution of individuals
over idiosyncratic states, and consequently, factor prices. In other words, individuals have
perfect foresight about the evolution all the relevant variables from 1985 to the infinite
future.31 In my benchmark exercise, the time series of each of these variables are as shown
in figure 1.8 and remain constant after 2015 for the rest of the transition.32 The left panel
of figure 1.9 shows the evolution of the fraction of entrepreneurs in the data (blue-dashed
line) and in the model (black-starred line). The model accounts well for the decline in the
share of entrepreneurs in the population and the speed of the decline. In the model, the
31I choose 1985 as my starting point because of data availability. However, as I show in the robustness
section, my main quantitative results do not change substantially if I assume that the economy was at
steady state in 1970.
32The entire transition consists of 300 periods, from 1985 to 2285.
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Figure 1.9: Evolution of the Share of Entrepreneurs
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Note: The left panel of figure 1.9 shows the evolution of the share of entrepreneurs as calculated from the
PSID data (blue dashed line) and the share of entrepreneurs implied by the model (black-starred line).
The right panel shows the share of entrepreneurs within skill groups.
fraction of entrepreneurs drops 3.8 percentage points between 1985 and 2014, accounting
for almost all of the 3.9 percentage points decline observed in the data. The model is also
consistent with differences in the evolution of the share of entrepreneurs between high and
low skill workers, as shown in the right panel of figure 1.9. In the model, however, the
decline in the share of high skill entrepreneurs is faster than the decline observed in the
data (for the group of college graduates), especially in the first years of the transition. The
model more closely matches the evolution of the share of low skill workers, although it
underpredicts the speed of the decline. Finally, the decline in the entry rate implied by my
model economy is similar to the decline observed in the data, as is shown in figure 1.10.
Figure 1.10: Transition Rate of Workers to Entrepreneurship
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Note: Figure 1.10 shows the evolution of the transition rate into entrepreneurship as calculated from the
PSID data (blue-dashed line) and the corresponding measure obtained from the model. The transition
rate is equal to the proportion of households that were not entrepreneurs in period t but transitioned to
entrepreneurship in period t+ 2.
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1.4.2 Decomposition
What is the relative contribution of each of the exogenous trends to the decline in the
share of entrepreneurs? To answer this question, I study the evolution of the fraction
of entrepreneurs considering the effect of each of the aggregate trends, starting with the
skill-biased technological progress, AH,t.
33 Here I consider the same values of AH,t used in
my baseline exercise but I fix the values of pk,t and Ht to their levels in 1985 (the initial
stationary equilibrium). The evolution of the population share of entrepreneurs in this case
is shown in the left panel of figure 1.11. The black-starred line is the population share of
entrepreneurs implied by the model in the baseline case and the red-circled line shows the
proportion of entrepreneurs for the case in which only AH,t moves. This can be thought of
as the direct effect of skill-biased technological change on the share of entrepreneurs. In this
case, the proportion of entrepreneurs drops 2.1 percentage points between 1985 and 2015,
or 55% of the overall decline implied by the model (and 53% of the decline in the data).
The discrepancy between my baseline results and this case is explained by the response
of the low skill individuals. First, the center panel of figure 1.11 shows that an increase
in AH,t reduces the share of high skill entrepreneurs slightly more than in the baseline
case. This is because an increase in AH,t, coupled with the relative scarcity of high skill
workers in the economy, makes the wages for this group increase very fast, decreasing the
incentives for high skill workers to become entrepreneurs. On the other hand, although low
skill workers are relatively less able as entrepreneurs, they experience an increase in their
profits as the high skill workers that they hire are, in fact, more productive. Moreover,
the relative abundance of low skill workers implies that their wages do not increase as
much compared to my baseline results. Consequently, the share of low skill entrepreneurs
increases, as shown by the red-circled line in the right panel of figure 1.11.
Next, I consider the transition of the economy when both AH,t and Ht change over time. In
this case, the share of entrepreneurs declines even further, as shown by the green-squared
line in the left panel of figure 1.11. An increase in the relative supply of high skill workers
has two opposite effects. First, it depresses the wage of high skill workers, increasing the
incentives for this group to become entrepreneurs. Moreover, since high skill individuals
33This decomposition might be influenced by the order in which each exogenous trend is considered. I
have run several robustness checks for different combinations, yielding similar results.
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are more productive than low skill individuals as entrepreneurs (recall the differences in
θs), the total effect is an increase in the share of high skill entrepreneurs in the economy,
as shown by the green-squared line in the center panel of figure 1.11. On the other hand,
the surge in the demand for labor and the decreasing share of low skill workers push their
wages up, decreasing the incentives for low skill workers to become entrepreneurs. Then,
because low skill workers still represent the largest share of the population, the overall
proportion of entrepreneurs declines. Taken together, the increase in the productivity of
high skill workers and the increase in the supply of high skill labor account for 75% of the
drop in entrepreneurship implied by the model.
Finally, the decline in the relative price of capital brings the green-squared line in the
left plot of figure 1.11 to the black-starred line. Because of the complementarity between
capital and high skill workers, a decrease in the price of capital goods raises the demand
for high skill workers, increasing their wages and depressing their incentives to become
entrepreneurs. This brings down the share of high skilled individuals that decide to run
their own firm while holding steady the share of low skill entrepreneurs in the economy.34
I find similar results when looking at the transition rate into entrepreneurship and the
exit rate of entrepreneurs. Appendix figure A.13 displays the time series of the share of
workers that start a new firm in the next period under the same decomposition that I
consider in this section. Figure A.14 shows the corresponding time series for the exit rate
of entrepreneurs. Similarly the results on the population share of entrepreneurs, the skill-
biased technological change explains about 50% of the decline in the transition rates in
and out of entrepreneurship generated by the model. In summary, each of the three trends
considered in my quantitative exercise explains an important fraction of the decline in
entrepreneurship and implies different responses of high and low skill individuals along the
transition. The direct effect of skill-biased technological change explains the lion’s share
of the overall decline and explains half of the drop in the proportion of entrepreneurs and
the entry and exit rate dynamics generated by the model.
34Varying the order of the shocks in this decomposition does not alter the proportion of the decline in the
share of entrepreneurs explained by each of the exogenous trends that I consider. For instance, appendix
figure A.12 shows a decomposition in which I first let AH,t vary over time, then pk,t, and finally, Ht. In
such a case, the first two exogenous processes explain three-quarters of the total decline in the share of
entrepreneurs implied by the model.
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Figure 1.11: Decomposition of the Share of Entrepreneurs
1990 2000 2010%
 E
nt
re
pr
en
eu
rs
 in
 P
op
.
2
4
6
8
All
Baseline
Only AH,t
Only AH,t and Ht
1990 2000 2010%
 E
nt
re
pr
en
eu
rs
 in
 P
op
.
2
4
6
8
High Skill
Baseline
Only AH,t
Only AH,t and Ht
1990 2000 2010%
 E
nt
re
pr
en
eu
rs
 in
 P
op
.
2
4
6
8
Low Skill
Baseline
Only AH,t
Only AH,t and Ht
Note: Figure 1.11 shows the time series of the population share of entrepreneurs implied by the model.
The black-starred line shows the share for the baseline case, the red-circled line considers only the
evolution of AH,t, while the green-squared line considers AH,t and Ht. The center and right panel show
similar statistics for high and low skill workers.
1.4.3 Wages, Skill Premium, and Productivity
In the model, individuals decide in each period whether to run a firm or work for a wage,
comparing the utility value of each of these options. Intuitively, an increase in wages will
reduce the incentives to start a firm, more so for those workers whose wage grows faster.
Since both the decrease in the price of capital goods and the increase in the productivity of
high skill workers increase the marginal productivity of labor, the productivity threshold
that makes individuals indifferent between working for someone else or running a firm also
increases, shrinking the share of entrepreneurs in the economy. The top left panel of figure
1.12 shows the log-level of wages of high and low skill workers generated by the model. Both
are increasing, reducing the share of high and low skill entrepreneurs. However, since the
wages of high skill workers rise faster, generating the increase in the skill premium displayed
in the top right panel of figure 1.12, the share of entrepreneurs declines more within the
group of high skill workers. Importantly, only entrepreneurs with high managerial abilities
remain active, and the average value of z rises, as shown in the bottom left panel of figure
1.12. The profits of the remaining entrepreneurs also increase because the workers they
hire are more productive.
In my model, the excess return to entrepreneurship, that is, the average profits of the active
entrepreneurs relative to the profits they would obtain as workers, also increases. To see
this, the bottom right panel of figure 1.12 shows the percentage increase in the average
excess returns with respect to the value in 1985 for high and low skill individuals. Relative
to the initial steady state, the excess return increases by 15% for the group of high skill
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entrepreneurs. This is qualitatively consistent with the evidence presented by Michelacci
and Schivardi (2016) that reports a large increase in the excess return, particularly for
entrepreneurs with postgraduate studies. Low skill individuals are, on average, less pro-
ductive, and the excess return decreases relative to the initial steady state as the wages of
low skill workers increase during the transition.35
Similar to the evidence shown in figures 1.4 and 1.5, my model predicts, first, an increase
in the mean labor earnings of individuals that switch from worker to entrepreneur, and
second, a stronger increase within high skill individuals. This is shown in figure 1.13 which
displays the average labor earnings of high and low skill individuals before transitioning
into entrepreneurship (black-starred line) and the income of those individuals that stayed
as workers. My model results are qualitatively consistent with the large increase in labor
earnings for individuals that switch from workers to entrepreneurs.
1.4.4 Robustness
Firm Creation Cost and Borrowing Constraints
A possible explanation for the decrease in new business formation is the increasing cost
of regulation in the United States, which affects existing and potential entrepreneurs.36
Arguably, an increase in the regulatory burden would deter firm creation in a similar way
to the deterrence effect of an increase in the value of κ, the creation cost in the problem
of the entrepreneurs. Hence, in this section I ask, what is the level of κ that generates
the same proportion of entrepreneurs in 2014 conditional on the parameter values of 1985?
I find that the value of κ required to reduce the proportion of entrepreneurs to the level
observed in 2014 is almost seven times the value of κ in my calibration exercise. Denote
this new level of the entry cost by κ˜. Next, I study the transition observed in the model
generated by a linearly increasing trend of the entry cost. As in my previous exercise, I
35Michelacci and Schivardi (2016) define the excess return as the difference between the average en-
trepreneurs’ returns and average labor earnings. In their analysis, entrepreneurs’ returns are the sum of
labor earnings of self-employment, dividends, and expected capital gains. My model only considers the
dividends part of entrepreneurs’ returns.
36The cost of regulation is difficult to measure. One proxy for this cost is the number of restrictions in the
administrative code. Al-Ubaydli and McLaughlin (2017) provide an estimate of the number of restrictions
and words that indicate that a specific action is prohibited or required for firms. Using this dataset, I find
that the average number of restrictions within 2-digit NAICS industries grew 75% from 1985 to 2015.
36
Figure 1.12: Wages, Skill Premium, and Productivity
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Note: The top-left panel of figure 1.12 shows the evolution of the (log) wages in the model. The top right
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normalized 1985.
assume that the economy is at a stationary equilibrium in 1985. Then, the agents learn
the entire sequence of κt. I assume that κt increases between 1985 and 2015 and remains
fixed at the value in 2015 for the rest of the transition. For the initial value of κt, I take
the level used in my baseline calibration, and for the terminal level, I choose κ˜.
The left panel of figure 1.14 shows the evolution of the population share of entrepreneurs
resulting from an increase in the cost of firm creation. To facilitate the comparison with
my previous results, the figure also displays the evolution of the population share of en-
trepreneurs for my baseline calibration and the population share of entrepreneurs in the
data. First, notice that the decline in the share of entrepreneurs implied by an increase in
κt is more moderate than the decline observed in the data. This is because, in anticipation
of higher future costs, some households decide to transition earlier into entrepreneurship,
raising the share of entrepreneurs above the original stationary level. The increase in the
share of entrepreneurs is mostly explained by the response of low skill individuals as shown
37
Figure 1.13: Labor Earnings for Switching and Non-Switching Workers
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Note: Figure 1.13 shows the average labor earnings of individuals prior switching to entrepreneurship and
the average labor earnings of those individuals that stayed as workers.
Figure 1.14: Effects of an Increase in κ
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Note: The left panel of figure 1.14 shows the share of entrepreneurs implied by a linear increase in the
cost of creating a firm (κ). The center and right panel show same statistics within the group of low and
high skill households.
in the right panel of figure 1.14. Finally, the center panel displays the evolution of the
share of high skill entrepreneurs, which is flatter than the evolution implied by my baseline
exercise. In summary, an increasing cost of regulation, in the form of an increase in the cost
of firm creation, generates a small decline in the share of entrepreneurs along the transition
and does not seem to account for the rapid decrease in the share of entrepreneurs among
high skill individuals.37
37These results might overestimate the real effect of the increase in the entry cost in my model. If one
takes the entry cost as a proxy for the cost of regulation imposed by the tax code and other mandatory rules
that firms need to follow, then the entry cost must have increased only 75% based on my calculations using
the data collected by Al-Ubaydli and McLaughlin (2017). In such a case, keeping the rest of the parameters
as in 1985, my model would predict a decrease of 0.5 percentage point in the share of entrepreneurs, much
less than the drop of 3.9 percentage points observed in the data.
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A tightening of the borrowing constraint could also generate a decrease in the share of
entrepreneurs. There are at least two possible problems for such channel to be quantita-
tively important. First, given the large increase of house prices observed before the Great
Recession, it is unlikely that the borrowing constraints have tightened over time, as many
entrepreneurs use their house as a collateral to start a firm. Moreover, if the borrowing
constraints have become tighter, then one would expect that the rate at which households
and entrepreneurs get rejected by a financial institution when asking for a loan to increase.
However, data from the SCF shows that the rate of rejection has decreased, if anything,
across the population in general, and for entrepreneurs in particular.38 Second, in the con-
text of my model, a tightening of the borrowing constraint is inconsistent with the decrease
in the share of low skill entrepreneurs observed in the data. In fact, the model predicts
an increase in the share of entrepreneurs within this group. Figure 1.15 shows the time
series of the share of entrepreneurs under the assumption that the value of λ decreases by
a third between 1985 and 2015, keeping fixed the rest of the parameters as in 1985. In this
case, the population share of entrepreneurs declines by half, mostly because of the decrease
in the share of high skill entrepreneurs. However, within the group of low skill individu-
als, the share of entrepreneurs increases over time. This differential response comes from
the differences in managerial ability of high and low skill individuals. Because high skill
individuals are relatively more productive as entrepreneurs they run larger projects that
require more resources. Therefore, a tightening of the borrowing constraint affects them
the most, whereas the effect for low skill individuals is weaker because they are less able
as managers and run smaller projects.39
38The share of households whose head is between 22 and 60 years old that asked for a credit but where
rejected has remained constant around 25% since 1989. For entrepreneurs, the rate of rejection declined
from 25% in 1992 to less than 15% in 2016. Separating the sample in different age groups or considering
heads of households more than 60 year old does not change this result. Alternatively, it is possible that
individuals do not get rejected because they never asked for a credit in the first place. The SCF provides
information on the share of households (entrepreneurs) that did not ask for a credit because they expected
to be reject by the financial institution. Similarly to the rejection rate, the share of households that did
not ask for a credit because they expected a rejection has remained constant around 15% (12% within
entrepreneurs) between 1989 to 2007, increased during the Great Recession, and then declined again in
2016.
39Importantly, these results do not depend on the specific form of the borrowing constraint. The results
showed in appendix A.3.1 consider a more standard borrowing constraint of the form pkk ≤ λa. I find
a similar decline in the share of entrepreneurs despite the fact that the borrowing constraint is becoming
more relaxed over time as the cost of capital declines.
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Figure 1.15: Effects of a Decrease in λ
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Note: The left panel of figure 1.15 shows the share of entrepreneurs implied by a linear decrease in the
value of λ. The center and right panel show same statistics within the group of low and high skill
households.
Myopic Transition
So far I have assumed that agents have perfect foresight about the future path of the
aggregate state of the economy. Alternatively, one could consider that agents are surprised
every period about changes in the aggregate variables and expect that the current state
of the economy remains fixed for the infinite future. In this sense, agents are perfectly
myopic. This assumption does not change the equilibrium definition, but it does modify
the information set available for the agents. Hence, one needs to change the solution
algorithm accordingly. Appendix A.2 explains in detail the algorithm used to solve the
transition path in this case. The upper left panel of figure 1.16 shows the evolution of the
fraction of entrepreneurs in this case, along with the time series for the perfect foresight
case and the share of entrepreneurs calculated from the data. Overall, the evolution of the
share of entrepreneurs is quite similar, both qualitatively and quantitatively. Relative to
the perfect foresight case, the overall fall in the share of entrepreneurs and the speed of
decline remain basically unchanged if one assumes that entrepreneurs learn every period
about the current aggregate state of the economy. Therefore, I conclude that assuming
perfectly myopic agents does not affect the results of my model.
Smooth Transition of Aggregates
How would my results change under an alternative assumption about the evolution of the
aggregates after 2015? To answer this question, I assume that the price of capital goods,
the relative productivity of high skill workers, and the supply of high skill workers all keep
40
a constant growth rate equal to the average growth rate observed during the period 2005-
2015. I assume the growth rate of each trend declines geometrically to reach 0 growth in
2035. The upper right panel of figure 1.16 shows that the share of entrepreneurs and the
decline implied by the model remain basically the same as in my baseline results.
General Equilibrium
In the benchmark results, I have assumed a fixed interest rate. This was with the explicit
purpose of highlighting the effects of the change in wages on the decision to become an
entrepreneur while muting the general equilibrium effect of the change in the interest
rate on the production cost and individuals’ savings. In this section, I study how my
results change if I solve for the equilibrium interest rate along with the wages of high
and low skill workers.40 The bottom left panel of figure 1.16 shows the evolution of the
share of entrepreneurs in the data, in the benchmark small open economy case and in
the general equilibrium case.41 In the latter, the decline in the share of entrepreneurs
is half of the decline generated by my benchmark case. This is because the interest rate
increases substantially along the transition path, increasing the rate of households’s saving.
The increase in individuals’ savings has two effects on entrepreneurial profits. First, more
savings imply more capital for the firms, increasing the profits of entrepreneurs. Second,
more wealth relaxes the borrowing constraint, allowing entrepreneurs to operate firms
closer to their optimal size. These two effects increase the value of being an entrepreneur.
Consequently, the general equilibrium feedback dampens the effects of the changes in the
wages on the share of entrepreneurs. Overall, the general equilibrium version of the model
predicts a decline of 2.0 percentage points in the share of entrepreneurs, which is about 52%
of the decline generated in the fixed interest rate case. Consequently, although considering
general equilibrium changes my results quantitatively, the changes in wages and profits
induced by the three aggregate trends I consider can account for at least half of the fall in
the share of entrepreneurs observed in the data.
40Since this is now a closed economy, one needs to pin down a particular value of capital-to-output ratio
at the initial steady state. I do that by choosing value of β to that the capital-to-output ratio is equal to
three in the stationary equilibrium at the beginning of my simulation. The corresponding value of β is 0.88,
which is what I use in my baseline calibration.
41Appendix figure A.11 shows the evolution of the skill premium and the interest rate implied by the
model.
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A Longer Transition
In my baseline exercise, I have assumed that the economy is in steady state in 1985. Then
agents learn about the path of aggregate variables from that year to the infinite future.
However, the relative price of investment has shown a declining trend starting several
years before 1985, so one might wonder how much my quantitative results depend on the
assumption that the economy is at steady state in 1985. To address this concern, here
I assume that the economy is at its stationary equilibrium in 1970, and then individuals
observe the evolution of the price of capital, the evolution of the productivity of high skill
workers, and the supply of high skill labor. As in my previous results, here I take the
values of pk,t and Ht directly from the data, and I change the value of AH,t to reproduce
the skill premium observed in 1970. Then, I assume that each exogenous process remains
constant after 2015. The bottom right panel of figure 1.16 shows the evolution of the share
of entrepreneurs in the data and the model. First, notice that starting the economy in
1970 does not affect the ability of the model to closely follow the decline in the share of
entrepreneurs from 1985 on. Second, the model predicts that the share of entrepreneurs
was more or less stable between 1970 and the early 1980s, and started its decline in the mid-
1980s. The data necessary to construct my preferred definition of entrepreneurs start in
1984. However, one can look at the evolution of the share of self-employed business owners
to get a sense of the evolution of the share of entrepreneurs before 1985. This is show by
the squared-red line in the bottom right plot of figure 1.16. Between 1970 and 1985, the
college premium decreased and then bounced back, explaining why my model predicts a
flat rate of entrepreneurs in the first years of the transition. Therefore, I conclude that a
longer transition starting from 1970 does not substantially change my baseline, post-1985,
results. However, the model cannot account for the increasing trend of entrepreneurs in
the early 1980s. Some other factors (such as changes in taxation or changes in the age
distribution of the labor force) might explain the increase in the share of entrepreneurs in
the late 1970s and early 1980s.
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Figure 1.16: Share of Entrepreneurs for Different Robustness Exercises
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Note: The upper left panel of figure 1.16 compares the evolution of the share of entrepreneurs in the
baseline perfect foresight case with the share of entrepreneurs in the perfectly myopic case. The upper
right panel shows the transition path of the share of entrepreneurs under the assumption that aggregate
variables grow at a decreasing rate after 2015. The bottom left panel of figure 1.16 compares the baseline,
fixed interest rate case with the evolution of the share of entrepreneurs in the general equilibrium case.
Finally, the bottom right panel displays the share of entrepreneurs implied by the model under the
assumption that the economy was in steady state in 1970.
1.5 Policy Analysis
Several researchers have considered the decline in firm creation to be a negative outcome
that should be addressed by policy. In my model, a decline in firm creation is equivalent
to a fall in the transition rate of workers into entrepreneurship. In this section I study the
aggregate response of the economy to a subsidy that intends to increase the rate of entry of
new entrepreneurs to its 1985 level conditional on the parameter values in 2015. Consider
now a policy reform that directly relaxes the borrowing constraint of the entrepreneurs.
Specifically, I assume that the government gives a subsidy of ιt to finance the cost of inputs
to every entrepreneur in the economy. Hence, entrepreneurs face a new collateral constraint
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given by
(1− ιt) (pk,tkt + ωH,t (Θt, µt)nH,t + ωL,t (Θt, µt)nL,t) ≤ λat.
Although this subsidy affects every entrepreneur, it has a larger impact on small and
new entrepreneurs, who typically have less wealth than large, established entrepreneurs. I
assume that the government collects revenues using an equal linear tax on workers’ and
entrepreneurs’ income. Denote this tax by τg. Then, the government budget constraint is
given by
∑
s∈H,L
∫
τg (d
s
t (Ωt, pk,t, µt) ytωs,t + d
s
t (Ωt, pk,t, µt)pis.t (at, zt))µ
s
t (Ωt) =
∑
s∈H,L
∫
dst (Ωt, pk,t, µt)
((
pk,tk
s
t + ωH,t (Θt, µt)n
s
H,t + ωL,t (Θt, µt)n
s
L,t
))
ιtdµ
s
t (Ωt) . (1.10)
The equilibrium definition for this case is similar to the definition in section 1.3.2, with
the additional condition that the government must balance the budget in every period.
Using this simple policy, I run the following experiment. I start as if the economy is
in a stationary equilibrium conditional on the parameter values of 2015, and I compare
this economy to a new stationary economy in which the subsidy is such that the entry
rate of new entrepreneurs is equal to 2.4%, which is the transition rate from workers into
entrepreneurship observed in 1985. Columns (1) and (2) of table 1.5 compare aggregate
output, total factor productivity (TFP), the tax burden as a percentage of output, and
other aggregates at the stationary equilibrium of both economies.42 To reach an entry
rate of entrepreneurs as in 1985, the government imposes a tax that generate revenues
that are equivalent to 3.16% of aggregate output. The increase in the entry rate induces
a rise in the fraction of entrepreneurs in the population of 2.42 percentage points and
an increase in aggregate output of 4.0%. TFP increases 9.20% in the new steady state.
This happens for two reasons. First, on the extensive margin, some production factors
are reallocated from the non-entrepreneurial sector to the new entrepreneurs that are, on
42TFP is defined as Y
(
K0.33L0.67
)−1
. Here, Y is aggregate output, K is the sum of the capital utilized
by all the entrepreneurs and the non-entrepreneurial sector, and L is the size of the labor force, which is
normalized to 1.
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average, more productive than the firms in the non-entrepreneurial sector. Second, on
the intensive margin, already existing entrepreneurs can run firms closer to their optimal,
unrestricted, scale.
The subsidy also induces higher welfare, measured in consumption equivalents. In partic-
ular, the average consumption equivalent required to make individuals indifferent between
the baseline steady state and the steady state with a subsidy to firms is 0.04; that is, indi-
viduals are willing to give up some consumption to live in an economy where the subsidy
is in place.43 The welfare gains, however, are not distributed equally across the popula-
tion. High skill individuals experience a larger increase in welfare because they are able
to run larger firms. Low skill workers also enjoy an increase in welfare as their wages go
up because of the increase in labor demand. Low skill entrepreneurs experience the lowest
increase in welfare. This is because, although they receive a subsidy that relaxes their bor-
rowing constraint, the tax is large and pushes down their consumption, and hence welfare,
although not enough to reduce it below the level of the unsubsidized economy.
In fact, the subsidy is much more effective in inducing high skill workers to become en-
trepreneurs than it is for low skill workers. The fraction of high skill individuals that are
entrepreneurs increases 1.56 percentage point, from 2.41% to 3.96%, whereas the fraction
of low skill entrepreneurs rises 0.88 percentage points from 1.26% to 2.14%. Alternatively,
the government could impose a tax that maximizes the welfare of the economy. If the
government considers an equally weighted average of utility across the individuals in the
economy, the maximum level of utility is reached with a subsidy of 2.58% of GDP, as
column (4) in table 1.5 shows. Output, productivity, and the share of entrepreneurs also
increase in this case. I conclude that a policy that aims to subsidize firms through a credit
line that relaxes the borrowing constraint with the goal of increasing the entry rate of
entrepreneurs to its level in 1985 would generate substantial benefits to the economy.
The previous exercise shows that the decline of entrepreneurship can be alleviated by a
subsidy to entrepreneurs’ cost. What would the transition of the economy looked like is
such policy had been implemented in 1985? Figure 1.17 shows the time series of the share
43The average consumption equivalent is the equally weighted average of the value ω (Ω) that solves
the equation (1 + ωs (Ω))
1−σ V ∗s,t (Ω) = V˜s,t (Ω) where V
∗
s,t (Ω) is the value of an individual in the original
stationary equilibrium without subsidies and V˜s,t (Ω) is the value at the new stationary equilibrium, both
conditional on the same idiosyncratic states, Ω.
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Table 1.5: Steady State Comparison of a Subsidy to Firm Costs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Baseline 1985-level Optimal
Level ∆ Level ∆
Subsidy (% of GDP) - 3.16 2.58
Entry Rate (%) 1.55 2.40 2.35 0.80
Aggregate Output 1.50 1.56 4.0% 1.56 4.0%
Total Factor Productivity 0.87 0.95 9.2% 0.94 8.0%
Entrepreneurs All (%) 3.68 6.10 2.42 5.85 2.17
High Skill (%) 2.41 3.96 1.55 3.77 1.36
Low Skill (%) 1.26 2.14 0.88 2.08 1.08
Entrepreneurs W/High Skill (%) 6.34 10.30 9.80
Entrepreneurs W/Low Skill (%) 2.03 3.48 3.38
Note: Table 1.5 compares the macroeconomic aggregates of different stationary economies. Column (1)
shows the results for the baseline stationary economy if the parameters were as in 2015 and remain
constant for the infinite future. Column (2) uses the same set of parameters but introduces a subsidy to
finance the production costs of the entrepreneurs financed with linear tax for all individuals in the
economy. The subsidy level is ιt = 6.5% of the total cost of production. Column (4) shows the same
statistics under the assumption that the government implements the subsidy that maximizes the average
welfare of the stationary economy given the parameter values in 2015. The value of the subsidy is
ιt = 5.73%.
of entrepreneurs both in the data, for my baseline results, and for different levels of the
subsidy. As in the steady state comparison, a positive subsidy generates an increase in
the level of the share of entrepreneurs in each year of the transition, however, it does not
change the slope of the time series. In other words, although a fixed subsidy is effective
in generating a larger share of entrepreneurs, it is unable to undo the impacts of the
technological changes affecting the economy that have led to an equilibrium decline in the
share of entrepreneurs and the entry rate to entrepreneurship.
1.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I have studied the causes of the decline in the share of entrepreneurs in the
US population, and I have linked such decline to technological changes experienced by the
US economy in recent decades. In doing that, I have argued that the same technological
changes that have given rise to the increase of returns to high skill workers are responsible
for the decline in the share of entrepreneurs observed in the United States over the last
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Figure 1.17: Entrepreneurs and Transition for Different Subsidies
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Note: The left panel of figure 1.17 shows the time series of the share of entrepreneurs in the data for four
different levels of input subsidies to entrepreneurs. The right panel shows the transition rates into
entrepreneurship.
three decades.
I provide new evidence on the fall in the share of households participating in entrepreneurial
activities and on the share of households transitioning into entrepreneurship. Moreover,
I show that the decline in the proportion of entrepreneurs has been concentrated among
individuals with high levels of educational attainment. Additional empirical evidence sug-
gests that the skill level of new entrepreneurs has increased over time, which is consistent
with an increase in the selection of individuals with higher managerial abilities.
Building on this evidence, I study an entrepreneurial choice model where the increase in
the wage of high skill workers is the equilibrium outcome of the interplay of three exoge-
nous trends, namely, the decrease in the price of capital goods, the increase in the supply
of skilled labor, and the increase in the productivity of high skill workers. My model is
able to account for the level and the speed of the decline in the share of entrepreneurs. In
my baseline exercise, the model generates a decline of 3.8 percentage points in the share
of entrepreneurs, which is almost all of the decline of 3.9 percentage points experienced in
the United States over the last 30 years. My model is also consistent with the differen-
tial decrease in the share of entrepreneurs among high and low skill individuals and the
observed decline in the transition rate into entrepreneurship. Moreover, I find that each
of the exogenous trends is quantitatively important in explaining the drop in the fraction
of entrepreneurs in the economy. The increase in the productivity of high skill workers
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accounts for half of the decrease in the share of entrepreneurs, whereas the other half is
equally explained by the decrease in the price of capital goods and by the increase in the
supply of high skill workers.
Taken together, my results indicate that a large fraction of the decline in the pace of firm
creation and entrepreneurship is the result of the same technological improvements that
have increased the returns to high skill workers over the last 30 years. Such changes have
naturally led to a reduction in entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial dynamism. However,
viewed trough the lens of my model, the decline in entrepreneurship, firm creation, and
overall dynamism of the US economy should not be cause for concern. This does not imply,
there is no role for government intervention. To the extent that the government can ease
the borrowing constraint faced by entrepreneurs–the only source of inefficiencies in my
model–the share of entrepreneurs would increase, as well as output and productivity.
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Chapter 2
Skewed Business Cycles
2.1 Introduction
This paper studies the cyclicality of the distribution of the growth rate of firm-level out-
comes.1 In the prior literature, recessions have been characterized as a combination of
a negative first-moment (mean) shock and a positive second-moment (uncertainty) shock
(Bloom, 2014). In this paper we argue that recessions are also accompanied by negative
third-moment (skewness) shocks implying that, during economic downturns, a subset of
firms does extremely badly, leading to a left tail of large negative outcomes. Consequently,
the skewness of the growth rates is procyclical.
Using Census firm-level panel data for the United States and firm-level panel data of pub-
licly traded firms for the United States and for more than thirty five other countries, we
show that the cross-sectional skewness of the distribution of several firm-level outcomes,
such as sales growth, employment growth, and stock returns, is strongly procyclical, de-
clining sharply during recessions. As an illustration of our main empirical result, the top
panel of figure 2.1 displays the distribution of firms’ employment growth from the Census
1With Fatih Guvenen and Nicholas Bloom. For helpful comments and suggestions, we thank John
Shea, and seminar participants at Penn Wharton, the 11th World Congress of the Econometric Society
(Montreal, 2015), the CESifo Conference on Macroeconomics and Survey Data (Munich, 2015), and the
Society for Economic Dynamics Annual Meeting (Toulouse, 2016). Any opinions and conclusions expressed
herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Census Bureau. All
results have been reviewed to ensure that no confidential information is disclosed. The replication packet
for the empirical results of the paper is available on the authors’ websites.
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Longitudinal Business Dynamics dataset (LBD). The solid line shows the empirical density
of employment growth pooling observations from the most recent two recession years, 2001
and 2008. The dashed line instead shows the density for the following expansion years,
in this case years 2003 to 2006 and 2010 to 2014. One can clearly see that, relative to
expansion periods, the distribution of employment growth during recessions has a thicker
left tail, whereas the right exhibits little change, indicating an increase in dispersion that
is mostly due to a widening left tail.
The uneven change in the distribution of employment growth from expansion to recession
years can be quantified using the Kelley skewness (Kelley, 1947), which is defined as the
difference between the 90th-to-50th percentiles spread (a measure of dispersion in the right
tail) and the 50th-to-10th percentiles spread (a measure of dispersion in the left tail)
divided by the distance between the 90th-to-10th percentiles spread (a measure of the
total dispersion of the distribution). For a distribution with a compressed upper half and a
dispersed lower half (i.e., a left-tail skew), the Kelley skewness is negative. In the case of the
top panel of figure 2.1 we find a decline of the dispersion of employment growth above the
median from 0.22 to 0.20 from expansion to recession years whereas the dispersion below
the median increases from 0.17 to 0.25. This asymmetric change in the tails generates a
decline in the Kelley skewness from 0.10 to -0.12.2 The bottom panel of figure 2.1 shows a
similar pattern for the distribution of sales growth in a sample of publicly traded firms in
the United States. As in the case of employment growth, here we also find that recessions
are characterized by an increase in dispersion that is mostly accounted for by a widening
left tail. Hence, the skewness of the sales growth distribution also drops during recessions.
Our second empirical finding is that skewness of firm-level outcomes is strongly procyclical
at the industry-level. That is, within narrow industries groups the skewness of the firm-
level employment growth, sales growth, and stock returns are positively correlated with the
within-industry economic cycle. Furthermore, using a panel of firms spanning thirty-nine
countries we find that the within-country cycle is associated with a decline in the skewness
of firm outcomes.
Motivated by the robust empirical evidence that the skewness of firms’ growth decreases
2Put in a different way, a Kelley skewness of 0.10 indicates that during expansion, 45% of all the
dispersion is accounted for by firms with employment growth below the median, whereas during recessions,
this share increases to 56%.
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during recessions, in the second part of the paper we build a heterogeneous agents model
where the key feature is the presence of a large number of entrepreneurs that face shocks
with time-varying risk featuring both, time-varying variance and time-varying skewness. In
order to capture the potentially non-linear response of firms to shocks, we assume that en-
trepreneurs are risk-averse, face a combination of convex and non-convex adjustment costs
to capital, and can invest in capital and in a risk-free asset. We numerically solve the model
and choose the parameters of the firm’s productivity process so that our modeled economy
matches the average skewness of the sales growth distribution we observe among US firms
during expansionary periods and the large decline in the skewness observed during a typ-
ical recession. Our results suggest that first-moment shocks combined with risk-aversion
and capital adjustment costs, both of which generate asymmetries in the response of firms
to shocks, are not sufficient to generate the large swings in the skewness of firm outcomes
we document. Hence, in order to match the changes in the skewness of firms outcomes we
observe in the data, we consider time-varying skewness in the firms’ productivity process.
In our main quantitative exercise, we study the aggregate effect of a pure skewness shock: a
decline in the skewness of firms’ productivity while keeping the mean and variance constant.
Our model predicts that a change in the skewness of the distribution of firm-level shocks
that matches the decline in the skewness of sales growth we observe among US firms
has a negative impact on gross domestic output (GDP) of 1.7%. The decline in aggregate
economic activity is quite persistent as GDP stays below its pre-shock level several quarters
after the shock. This is in contrast to the standard uncertainty shock analyzed in the
literature that typically generates a sharp drop and rapid rebound of GDP. This significant
and persistent drop in output is driven by a decline in capital investment, which is the
result of three forces. First, the presence of a fixed cost to capital adjustment creates a
real options effect that reduces the incentives of firms to invest when skewness declines.
Second, the drop in skewness makes capital riskier, inducing an increase in investment
in the risk-free asset. Finally, relative to the standard uncertainty shock (a symmetric
increase in dispersion), in our model a decline in skewness commands a widening of the
left tail of the firm productivity distribution without a corresponding widening of the right
tail (an asymmetric increase in dispersion). This change in the skewness cancels out the
increase in output generated by an uncertainty shock in models without adjustment costs.
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Hence, our results indicate that a negative shock to the skewness of firms’ productivity
(that keeps the mean and variance constant) can generate by itself a recession.
This paper is related to several strands of literature. First and foremost, our paper relates
directly to the study of the effects of uncertainty on firms’ decisions. Several papers have
shown that an increase in uncertainty can have important macroeconomic implications in
the presence of adjustment costs or financial frictions.3
Second, several authors have suggested that rare disasters—presumably arising from an
asymmetric distribution of shocks—can generate large fluctuations in economic activity,
such as the Great Recession. Reviving the ideas introduced first by Rietz (1988), Barro
(2006) uses a panel of countries to estimate the probability of large disasters and argue
that these low-probability events can have substantial implications for aggregate economic
activity and asset pricing.4 The results of our paper can be seen as evidence that rare
disasters also occur at the microeconomic level.
Finally, our paper contributes to a growing literature that focuses directly on the skewness
of firms and workers outcomes such as firm productivity (Kehrig (2011)), employment
growth (e.g. Ilut et al. (2018) and Decker et al. (2015)), stock returns (e.g. Harvey and
Siddique (2000), Kapadia (2006), and Oh and Wachter (2018)), and labor earnings (e.g.
Guveven et al. (2014) and Schmidt (2016)).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the data we use and the
basics statistics discussed in the empirical section. Section 2.3 shows the main empirical
results of our paper, that is, that the skewness of several firm-level outcomes is procyclical.
Section 2.4 shows the model and section 2.5 shows our quantitative results. Section 2.6
concludes.
3See, for example, Arellano et al. (2010), Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2011), Bachmann and Bayer
(2013), Bachmann and Bayer (2014), Gilchrist et al. (2014), Jurado et al. (2015), Leduc and Liu (2016),
Basu and Bundick (2017), Berger et al. (2017), Alfaro et al. (2018) and Bloom et al. (2018).
4See for instance Gabaix (2008, 2012), Gourio (2008, 2013, 2012), Wachter (2013), Kilic and Wachter
(2015), among others.
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2.2 Data and Measurement
2.2.1 Data and Sample Selection
Our analysis is based on three large datasets. First, we extract panel data on employment
at the firm-level from the Census Bureau’s Longitudinal Business Data Base (LBD). The
LBD provides high quality measures of employment, wage bill, industry, and firm age for
the entire US nonfarm private sector linked over time at the establishment-level from 1976
to 2015. From the LBD we construct employment at the firm and establishment-levels and
use it to calculate cross-sectional moments of the distribution of employment growth at
narrow firm population groups.
Second, we draw panel data information of publicly traded firms from Compustat, which
contains information on sales, employment, stock prices, and other firm-level outcomes.
We use data on quarterly sales, daily stock prices, annual sales, and annual employment
from 1970 to 2017, and we restrict attention to a sample of firms with more than ten years
of data to minimize the types of compositional issues identified in Davis et al. (2006).
Third, we study whether we patterns we document for the United States are also observed
in other countries, both developed and developing. To that end, we use cross-country
firm-level panel data containing sales and employment information between 1986 and 2016
from the Bureau van Dijk’s Osiris dataset. To ensure that changes in the sample of firms
do not bias our results, we focus on firms that are present in the sample for ten years
or more. Additionally, we restrict our sample to country/year bins with more than one
hundred firms, countries with at least ten years of data, and years with five countries or
more. Our main results are based on an unbalanced panel of firms spanning forty countries
from 1991 to 2015. We complement this dataset with information on firm-level stock prices
obtained from the Global Compustat dataset. Applying similar selection criteria, we obtain
a sample of daily stock price information for firms in 29 countries from 1985 to 2017. Table
2.1 summarizes the data sources and the main sample characteristics. Additional details
on data construction, selection criteria, and moment calculation can be found in Appendix
B.1.5
5The online appendix–available at the authors’ websites–provides additional details about the under-
lying data and describes the material to replicate the results presented in the empirical section of the
paper.
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2.2.2 Measuring Skewness
For most of our results, we measure the growth rate of a firm-level outcome as the log-
difference between period t and t+k where t is a quarter for stock returns, and a year in the
case of employment and sales. Our basic measure of dispersion is the cross-sectional spread
between the 90th and the 10th percentiles, denoted by P9010t, where t is a quarter or a
year depending on the dataset. The P9010t is used (rather than, for example, the standard
deviation of growth rates) for robustness to outliers which, are common in firm level micro
datasets. Additionally, we use the difference between the 90th and 50th percentiles, denoted
by P9050t, and the difference between the 50th and 10th percentiles, denoted by P5010t,
as measures of dispersion in the right and left tails of the distribution respectively. Finally,
our preferred measure of skewness is the Kelley skewness, which is defined as
KSKt =
P90t − P50t
P90t − P10t︸ ︷︷ ︸
Right Tail Share
− P50t − P10t
P90t − P10t︸ ︷︷ ︸
Left Tail Share
∈ [−1, 1]. (2.1)
Relative to the third standardized moment (which is another measure of skewness), the
Kelley skewness has the advantage of being robust to outliers and provides a simple de-
composition of the share of total dispersion that is accounted for by the left and the right
tails of a distribution.6 A negative value of the Kelley skewness indicates that the left tail
accounts for more than one-half of the total dispersion and the distribution is negatively
skewed. In the same way, a positive value indicates a positive skewed distribution, with a
right tail that accounts for the largest share of the total dispersion. Clearly, this measure
is equal to zero if the distribution is symmetric, such as for the Normal distribution.
2.3 Skewness over the Business Cycle
In this section we show that the distribution of firm-level growth has a larger left tail in
recessions in both the United States (section 2.3.1), across countries (section 2.3.2), and
6An important drawback of this measure of skewness is that it is invariant to 20% of the observations
in the sample (the top and bottom 10% of the distribution). Alternatively, one could write KSKt by using
the 95th and 5th percentiles of the distribution. Our main results, however, are not sensitive to changes in
the percentiles used to calculate KSKt. Additional measures of skewness can be found in Kim and White
(2004).
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then confirm our results hold within industries (section 2.3.3).
2.3.1 Firm Skewness over the Cycle
The first contribution of our paper is to show that the skewness of the growth rates of
firm–level outcomes varies over time and is strongly procyclical, declining substantially
during recessions and rising in booms. We start by considering the evolution of the Kelley
skewness of the distribution of the growth rate of firm employment for a sample of firms
from the Census’s LBD which is displayed in the top panel of figure 2.2. To calculate Kelley
skewness we weight observations by firm’s employment so that our measure reflects the
underlying firm-size distribution.7 Figure 2.2 shows, first, that the skewness of employment
growth, in average, is positive and around 10% for most the sample period. Second, the
skewness of employment growth is strongly procyclical, declining from an average of 11%
at the peak of the typical recession to around -10% at the trough, that is, a drop of 21
percentage points. Similarly, the bottom of figure 2.2 shows the cross sectional skewness
of annual sales growth for a sample of publicly traded firms from Compustat. Relative to
our sample from LBD, this is a more selective set of mostly large firms. Still, we find that
the skewness of the distribution of sales growth is positive on average, and declines around
20 percentage points during a recession.
The decline in the skewness of firm growth occurring during recessions is driven by a rapid
change in the relative weight of the tails of the distribution. This can be observed in the
top panel of figure 2.3 where we plot the spread between the 50th and the 10th percentiles
of the employment growth (P5010t, black solid line) and the 90th and the 50th percentiles
spread (P9050t, blue dashed line). The bottom panel of figure 2.3 shows the same set
of statistics for sales growth. Two important aspects are worth noticing. First, during
expansionary periods, the right tail outweighs the left tail (P9050t is most of the times
above the P5010t), generating a distribution of firm’s outcomes that is positively skewed.
Second, both for employment and sales growth, recessions are episodes in which the P5010t
expands, indicating a left tail that stretches out, whereas the right tail shrinks. This uneven
7In particular, we weight the employment growth of firm i in period t by the average employment in
periods t and t+1, that is Ei,t = 0.5×(Ei,t + Ei,t+1). The results for publicly traded firms are un weighted
since most of the firms are large.
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change of the tails drives a drop in the skewness of firms’ employment and sales growth.8
To have a better sense of the magnitude of the change in the skewness and its relation
with the cycle, the left panel of table 2.2 shows a set of time-series regressions where the
dependent variable is the Kelley skewness of the cross-sectional distribution of different
firm-level outcomes for the United States. In all regressions, the independent variable is
the growth rate of real GDP per capita, which we have normalized to have unitary variance
so the coefficients are comparable across columns. Column 1 shows that a change of one
standard deviation in GDP per capita is associated with a change in the skewness of firms’
employment growth of 4.6 percentage points. Columns 2 and 3 show similar results for the
skewness of sales growth and stock returns.9
2.3.2 Firm Skewness Across Countries
Are the cyclical properties of the skewness of firm-level outcomes a characteristic of the
US economy or are observed across a broader set of countries? To answer this question
we use firm-level panel data across different countries to show that the skewness at the
microeconomic level positively co-moves with the country business cycle.
The top panel of figure 2.4 displays the empirical density of the distribution of the growth
rate of annual real sales (in US dollars as of 2005) for a panel of firms spanning across
thirty nine countries from 1991 to 2015. The solid red line is the density of the growth
rate of sales during recession periods, where a recession is defined as a year in which the
growth rate of GDP is in the first decile of the country-specific GDP growth distribution.
The dashed black line is the density of sales growth during expansion periods defined as
years in which GDP growth is above the first decile of the country-specific distribution
of GDP growth. Similar to the results presented in figure 2.1, the dispersion of the sales
growth distribution increases little during recession years as the difference between the
90th and the 10th percentiles of the distribution widens from 0.82 to 0.85. The left tail
8Figure B.1 shows a similar set of results for the annual change of real sales at the quarterly level.
9Table B.3 in appendix B.2 shows that the skewness of firm-level outcomes remains strongly procyclical
if we residualize the firms’ outcomes by firm’s observable characteristics and fixed heterogeneity, if we
consider the growth rate of sales-per-worker– more closely related to firm productivity– and if we look at
the three year growth rate of firm’s outcomes (appendix table B.1). We also confirm that the dispersion of
firms outcomes is countercyclical (appendix table B.2) but we do not find significant business cycle variation
in the Kurtosis of firm’s outcomes (right panel of table B.3).
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of the distribution, however, stretches out with a corresponding increase in the spread
between the 50th and 10th percentiles from 0.36 to 0.43. At the same time, right tail
shrinks, as the spread between the 90th and 50th percentiles which declines from 0.46 to
0.43. Consequently, the Kelley skewness drops from 0.12 to 0.00.
To have a clearer picture of the relation between the within-country skewness of firm out-
comes and the business conditions, the bottom left panel of figure 2.4 shows a scatter plot
in which the x-axis is the average of firm-employment growth within a country-year bin
whereas the y-axis is the Kelley skewness of the same firm-level outcome. This figure in-
dicates that when the within-country average firm employment growth is -15% –typically
during a recession– the Kelley skewness is -30%, which means that most of the mass of the
distribution of employment growth (actually, a 65% of the total dispersion) is accounted
for by the left tail. In contrast, when the average employment growth is 10%, the skew-
ness is 30%, indicating that 65% of the total dispersion is accounted for by the right tail
of the distribution. The bottom right panel of figure 2.4 shows similar results for the
within-country sales growth distribution. Importantly, to construct these figures we have
controlled for country- and time-fixed effects, therefore, the results are not driven by fixed
characteristics of the countries considered in the sample or aggregate shocks–such as the
Great Recession–that can affect all countries at the same time.10
Finally, the center panel of table 2.2 exploits our cross-country data to evaluate more
systematically the relation between firm-level skewness and aggregate economic conditions.
Column (4) shows a country panel regression in which the dependent variable is the cross-
sectional skewness of the employment growth across all firms within the country. The
business cycle is captured by the growth rate of GDP per capita which is again normalized
to have unit variance so the results can be directly compared with those obtained using data
from the United States. The regression also includes a full set of time- and country-fixed
effects to control for aggregate economic conditions that might affect all countries or fixed
differences across countries. Here we also find strong procyclical skewness for employment
growth, sales growth, and firm’s stock results. This further confirms that the decline in
10One important concern is that our cross country results are based on exclusively on publicly traded
firms. Interestedly, we also find remarkably similar results if we consider a unbalanced panel of firms (private
and publicly traded) drawn from the BvD Amadeus dataset as figure B.2 shows. The BvD Amadeus dataset
covers a shorter period of time (2000 to 2015 for most countries) over a smaller sample of European countries.
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the skewness of firm-level outcomes is a robust feature of the business cycles.
2.3.3 Firm Skewness Across Industries
Our second empirical finding is that the skewness of firm-level outcomes is strongly pro-
cyclical within industries. We show this result by using our sample of firms from LBD.
The top panel of figure 2.5 shows a bin scattered plot between the average employment
growth within an industry-year bin and the cross-sectional Kelly skewness of employment
growth within the same group. In this case, a positive correlation between the average and
the skewness of employment growth indicates that periods of low economic activity at the
industry-level are associated with a distribution of employment growth that is negatively
skewed, whereas periods of high industry economic activity are associated with a positively
skewed distribution. In terms of magnitudes, the top panel of figure 2.5 shows that when
the industry employment growth is -8%, the Kelley skewness is around 20%, indicating
that 60% of the total dispersion of employment growth is accounted for by the left tail
of the distribution. When the average employment growth is 8% instead, the Kelley is
skewness is 20%, indicating that the right tail accounts for 60% of the total dispersion.
Similarly, the bottom panel of figure 2.5 shows that the within industry skewness of sales
growth is higher when the within industry average sales growth is higher. Hence, sectors
that grow faster are also sectors in which the skewness of firm-level outcomes is higher.11
We then use firm-level data from a sample of firms from Compustat to examine the relation
of the industry cycle and the skewness of sales growth, employment growth, and quarterly
returns within NAIC 2-digit industry-period bins. Columns 7 to 9 of table 2.2 display a
series of industry panel regression in which the dependent variable is the Kelley skewness of
the growth rate of different firm-level outcomes across all firms within an industry-period
bin. The specification we run is,
KSKj,t = αj + γt + β∆Sj,t + j,t, (2.2)
where KSKj,t is the Kelley skewness of the annual growth for firms in sector j in period t,
αj is an industry fixed effect, and γt is a period fixed effect. The independent variable in
11Appendix figure B.3 shows remarkably similar results for other firm’s outcomes such as three-years
sales growth, three-year employment growth, and stock returns.
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each regression, ∆Sj,t, is a measure of the industry cycle which we proxy with the within-
industry average growth rate of sales. Here we have re scaled the real sales growth within
each sector to have a variance of one so that the regression coefficient can be interpreted
as the effect of a change in the within industry sales growth of one standard deviation and
can be directly compared to the coefficients of columns 1 to 2 of table 2.2. Importantly, we
also include a full set of time and industry fixed-effects, so that the results will be driven
by industry rather than aggregate changes in growth rates.12
Column 7 of table 2.2 shows that the skewness of employment growth is significantly lower
during industry slowdowns. Specifically, a one standard deviation decline in the within
industry average sales growth is associated with a decline in the skewness of employment
growth of 7 percentage points. This is almost two times larger than the effect of a change
in one standard deviation in GDP growth on the skewness of employment growth across all
firms in the economy. Similarly, a one standard deviation decline in average sales growth
is correlated with a decline of 13 percentage points in the skewness of sales growth, and a
decline of 1.6 percentage points in the skewness stock returns. Again, it is worth noting that
these regressions include a full set of period and industry dummies, the relation between
skewness and the business cycle is independent of the aggregate economic conditions.
2.3.4 Robustness
In this section, we perform several robustness checks using the large sample size of the
LBD. First, we study whether the skewness of employment growth declines within firms’
groups defined by age and size, or if we look at establishments instead of firms. We then
expand the notion of skewness to account for a larger proportion of the distribution of
employment growth, and finally, we study whether including the entry and exit of firms
change the observed evolution of the skewness during recessions.
First, as we show in the top panels of figure 2.6, the skewness of employment growth is
procyclical for firms within different employment size groups. The middle left panel shows
that the skewness of employment growth of young firms (those of five years old or less)
12We find a similar positive and statistically significant relationship between industry cycles and skewness
when we consider each industry separately. Appendix figure B.4 shows the coefficient of a set of within-
industry time-series regressions of the Kelley skewness of firms’ growth on the within-industry average firm
growth. Notice that there is substantial heterogeneity across industries and for all of them the coefficient
on the average firm growth is economically and statistically significant.
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is larger than the skewness for the rest of the firms the economy which relates to the
fact that young firms must grow fast in order to survive (Haltiwanger et al. (2016)). The
skewness, however, drops during recessions across all age categories. The middle right
panel of figure 2.6 shows that the skewness of employment growth is also procyclical at the
establishment-level, indicating that our results are not driven by a small number of large
firms.13
Second, we vary our preferred measure of skewness. By considering the 90th and the
10th percentiles we are effectively dropping twenty percent of the distribution, which is
potentially important, as our results hinge on the differential response of the tails of the
distribution of firm-level outcomes to aggregate economic conditions. We can modify the
Kelley skewness in equation 2.1 to reduce the proportion of the sample left out at the tails.
In particular, we calculate the skewness considering the 95th and 5th percentiles of the
distribution, and as a third measure, we consider the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles. The
bottom left panel of figure 2.6 shows that decreasing the proportion of the distribution left
out of the sample does not change substantially the cyclical properties of the skewness of
the distribution of employment growth.
Third, our main results are based on the distribution of employment growth calculated
as the log-change of firm employment. If a firm exits the market due to a change in
aggregate economic conditions or a new firm enters, our measure of growth rate, and con-
sequently, the skewness of the distribution, will not take them into account. To solve
this problem we calculate the skewness of the employment growth distribution consid-
ering the arc-percent change of employment. The arc-percentage change is defined as
2 (xi,t+k − xi,t) / (xi,t+k + xi,t). This measure has been popularized in the firm dynamics
literature by Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) and has the advantage that, while it is similar
to a percentage change, it allows for entry/exit by including both time t and t+k measures
in the denominator, one of which is allowed to be zero.14 The bottom right panel of figure
2.6 shows that the cyclical properties of the skewness of employment growth do not change
13Furthermore, appendix figure B.5 shows that the skewness of employment growth is also procyclical
within establishment groups defined by establishment size and age.
14Notice that, for a firm with a positive value of xi,t which is inactive in period t + k, and henceforth
has a value of xi,t+k equal to 0, the arc-percent change takes the value of -2. Similarly, for an entering firm
(that is, xi,t is equal to 0 but xi,t+k is positive) the arc-percent change takes the value of 2.
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substantially when accounting for the entry and exit of firms.15
In summary, we have shown that the skewness of firm-level outcomes declines sharply
during recessions, both at the aggregate and at the industry level. Motivated by this
robust evidence, in the next section we study a heterogeneous agents model that we use to
evaluate the macroeconomic importance of the large swings in the skewness we observe in
the data.
2.4 Model
Given the robust evidence presented in the previous section, a natural question is to ask
whether these uneven changes in the distribution of firm-level outcomes have aggregate
economic implications. To answer this question in this section we analyze the quantitative
impact of a variation in the skewness on firm-level shocks in the context of a heteroge-
neous agents model. Specifically, we consider an economy populated by a large number of
households/entrepreneurs that have access to a production function that uses capital and
labor to produce a homogeneous good. Entrepreneurs can save in capital and in a risk-free
asset that pays a fixed return. Crucially, the shape of the distribution of idiosyncratic
shocks changes with aggregate business conditions so as to match the time-varying na-
ture of the distribution of firm-level outcomes. Furthermore, in order to capture potential
non-linearities in the response of entrepreneurs to aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks, we
assume that entrepreneurs are subject to capital adjustment costs.
2.4.1 Entrepreneurs
Production Technology
The economy is populated by a large number of infinitely lived heterogeneous households
that use capital and labor inputs to produce a homogeneous good by means of a decreasing
returns to scale production function. Specifically, each entrepreneur j produces output
according to,
yj,t = Atej,tk
α
j,tn
ν
j,t, with α+ ν < 1.
15Our results are also robust when we look at firms of different size and age, and for the growth of
establishments rather than firms. All these results are based on a sample of firms from Census’ LBD and
are under disclosure process.
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The aggregate productivity shock, denoted by At, follows a standard first-order autore-
gressive process, given by
logAt = ρA logAt−1 + σηηt,
where ηt is a Gaussian innovation with zero mean and unitary variance. We assume that
the idiosyncratic process ej,t is given by,
ej,t = ρej,t−1 + j,t, (2.3)
where the innovation j,t is assumed to have zero mean, time-varying variance, denoted
by σ,t−1, and time-varying skewness, denoted by γ,t−1. Notice we have assumed that the
distribution of innovations in period t depends on the values of the variance and skewness
observed in period t−1. Hence, an increase in risk, in the form of an increase in dispersion
or a decrease in the skewness of firms’ shocks, represents news about the characteristics
of the distribution of innovations in the future but not a change in the distribution from
which the current realizations of j,t are drawn.
Capital Adjustment Costs
It is possible that the distribution of firm-level outcomes changes asymmetrically over the
business cycle because of adjustment costs or other rigidities that distort firms’ responses
to shocks. In other words, the distribution of firm-level outcomes, such as sales growth
or employment growth, can change asymmetrically because of the endogenous response of
firm to symmetric shocks.16 In order to capture this channel, we consider a combination of
convex and non-convex adjustment cost to capital. In particular, we assume that physical
capital depreciates at the rate δ and adjustment costs are equal to the sum of a fixed
disruption cost, φ1, which the entrepreneur pays for any investment or disinvestment, a
quadratic adjustment cost, φ2, and a resale cost for disinvestment, φ3. The adjustment
cost function for capital input is then given by,
φ (kj,t+1, kj,t) = φ1I|ij,t|>0yj,t +
φ2
2
(
ij,t
kj,t−1
)2
+ (1− φ3) |ij,t| Iij,t<0, (2.4)
16Ilut et al. (2018), for instance, argues that a left skewed distribution of employment growth is the
results of an asymmetric response of firms to positive and negative shocks.
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where ij,t is the entrepreneur’s investment in capital given by
ij,t = kj,t+1 − (1− δ) kj,t. (2.5)
The Problem of the Entrepreneur
Denote the entrepreneur’s consumption by cj,t which is valued by the utility function
u (cj,t) = c
1−λ
j,t . Entrepreneurs do not value leisure and supply one unit of labor, which
they use for running their own firm (they cannot work for someone else’s firm). They
can save in capital and in a risk-free asset that pays an interest rate rt. Denote the
entrepreneur’s value function by V (kj,t, aj,t, ej,t;ωt) where kj,t is the entrepreneur’s stock
of physical capital, aj,t is the beginning-of-the-period holdings in the risk-free asset, and ej,t
is the level of her idiosyncratic productivity. For notational simplicity, define the vector of
aggregates states as ωt ≡ (At, σ,t−1, γ,t−1, µt) where At is the level aggregate productivity,
σ,t−1 and γ,t−1 are the variance and the skewness of the distribution of idiosyncratic shock
respectively, and µt is the distribution of entrepreneurs over idiosyncratic states. Then, we
can write the problem of the entrepreneur as,
V (kj,t, aj,t, ej,t;ωt) = max
cj,t, kj,t+1,
aj,t+1, nj,t
(
c1−λj,t + βE
[
V (kj,t+1, aj,t+1, ej,t+1;ωt+1)
1−ξ
] 1−λ
1−ξ
) 1
1−λ
,
(2.6)
s.t. cj,t + ij,t + aj,t+1 ≤ yj,t − wtnj,t − φ (kj,t+1, kj,t) + (1 + rt) ai,t,
ij,t = kj,t+1 − (1− δ) kj,t,
µt+1 (kj,t+1, aj,t+1, ej,t+1) = Γ (ωt) ,
kj,t > 0, aj,t ≥ 0, nj,t > 0,
given the laws of motion for At, σ,t, and γ,t. In this specification, ξ is the coefficient of
risk aversion and λ is inversely related to the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution. The
term wt ≡ w (ωt) denotes the wage rate in the economy. In what follows, we assume the
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interest rate on the risk-free asset is fixed, that is rt = r (ωt) = r.
17 Let Ce (kj,t, aj,t, ej,t;ωt),
Ke (kj,t, aj,t, ej,t;ωt), N
e (kj,t, aj,t, ej,t;ωt), and A
e (kj,t, aj,t, ej,t;ωt) , denote the policy rules
of consumption, next’s period capital, current period labor, and risk-free asset for the
entrepreneurs.
2.4.2 Non-Entrepreneurial Households
The economy is populated by a large number of identical hand-to-mouth household that
consume Ct units of the homogeneous good and supply labor elastically which we denote
by Nt. In concrete, we assume that the non-entrepreneurial households solve the static
problem,
U (Ct, Nt) = max
Ct,Nt
{
C1−σt
1− σ − ψ
N1−γt
1− γ
}
, (2.7)
Ct ≤ wtNt,
given the law of motion of the aggregate state, ωt. Denote by C (ωt) and N (ωt) the optimal
choices of consumption and labor for the non entrepreneurial household.
2.4.3 Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
Given the exogenous process for the aggregate productivity, A, the exogenous process of the
variance and skewness of ej , an interest rate of the risk-free asset, r, and the evolution of the
idiosyncratic productivity processes for the entrepreneurs, {ej}j∈J , a recursive competitive
equilibrium for this economy is a set of policy functions{{
Cej ,K
e
j , N
e
j , A
e
j,
}
j∈J
, C,N
}∞
t=0
, a wage function {w}, and value functions {V,U} such
that i) the policy and value functions solve (2.6) and (2.7) respectively, ii) labor market
clears, that is ∫
N e (kj , aj , ej ;ω) dµ (kj , aj , ej) = N (ω) ,
17This imply that we will not solve the interest rate in equilibrium. The wage rate, however, is such that
the labor market clears.
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and iv) the mapping Γ (ω) that determines the evolution of the joint distribution of ej , kj ,
and aj is consistent with the policy functions, the evolution of the aggregate productivity
process, and the evolution of the process of σ and γ.
2.4.4 Parameters, Estimation, and Model Fit
In this section, we describe the quantitative specification of our modeled economy. To
solve the entrepreneurs’ problem we employ non-linear methods similar to Krusell and
Smith (1998). Most of our parameters are standard in the macro literature and we take
them from the existing estimates when possible. However, the parameters governing the
stochastic process of productivity are novel to our analysis and we use a simulated method
of moments approach to estimate them.
Frequency and Preferences
We set the time period to a quarter. For the entrepreneurs, we set ξ, the risk aversion
coefficient, equal to 6.0 and 1/λ, the elasticity of substitution, to 1/λ = 0.2, which are in
the midpoint of the values used in Guvenen (2009). The household’s discount rate, β, is
set to 0.950.25, whereas the interest rate on the risk-free asset is set to match an annual
return of 2%. For the non-entrepreneurial sector, we set σ to 2. For the labor supply of
the non-entrepreneurial households, we fix a value of γ to 1.5 and we choose ψ so that they
spend an average of 33% of their time working.
Production Technology and Adjustment Costs
The exponents of the capital and labor inputs in the entrepreneur’s technology are set to
α = 0.25 and ν = 0.5. The capital depreciation rate, δ, is set to match a 14% of annual
depreciation. As for the adjustment cost parameters, we set the fixed adjustment cost of
capital, φ1, equal to 1.5%, a quadratic adjustment cost, φ2, equal to 7.0, and a resale cost,
φ3, equal to 34.0%.
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Aggregate Productivity
We assume that the aggregate productivity follows a standard first-order autoregressive
process with autocorrelation of 0.95 and normally distributed innovations with mean 0 and
standard deviation of 0.75%, similar to the quarterly values used in other papers in the
literature. Table 2.3 summarizes the set of calibrated parameters.
Idiosyncratic Productivity
To capture time-varying risk we assume that the economy transitions between in two states.
The first, which we denote as low risk state, corresponds to periods where the variance of
the innovations of the idiosyncratic shocks is low, σ,t = σL, and the skewness is positive,
γ,t = γH , as we observe in non-recession periods. The second state, or high risk state,
corresponds to periods of high dispersion, σ,t = σH , and negative skewness, γ,t = γL, as
we observe during a typical recession. Low and high risk states alternate following a first-
order Markov process. To capture the potential non-gaussian nature of the idiosyncratic
shocks we assume that, conditional on the values of σ,t and γ,t, the innovations in 2.3 are
drawn from a mixture of two normally distributed random variables, that is,
j,t ∼
N (µ
s, σs1) with prob p
s,
N
(
− ps1−psµs, σs2
)
with prob 1− ps,
(2.8)
where s can be a high or low risk state. Hence, in order to fully characterize the stochastic
process faced by firms we need to find ten parameters, namely, {µs, σs1, σs2, ps} with s ∈
{H,S}, and the parameters governing the transition probabilities between low and high
risk periods, denoted by piL and piH respectively.
Since we do not directly observe the productivity process faced by the firms, we choose
the parameters of the stochastic process of firm’s productivity of our model to match the
main features of the US data described in the empirical section of the paper. In particular,
we take data of quarterly sales growth from a sample of publicly traded firms, and we
search for parameters of the stochastic process so that the cross sectional distribution of
sales growth derived from the model reproduces the observed average values of the 90th-to-
50th percentiles spread, the 50th-to-10th percentiles spread, the Kelley Skewness, and the
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90th-to-10th percentiles spread during expansion periods and the same set of moments for
recession periods for a total of eight moments of the quarterly sales growth distribution.18
The probability of being in the high risk state in the next period conditional on being in the
high risk state in this period, piH , is set to be equal to the fraction recession quarters that
are followed from another recession quarter in the data, piH = 0.84, whereas the transition
probability of the low risk state, piL, is set so that the share of expansion quarters following
another expansion quarter is 0.95. Recession and expansion periods in the data correspond
to the recession quarters defined by the NBER from 1970 to 2014.
Based on our estimations, we find that in periods of low risk, the variance of the idiosyn-
cratic productivity shocks, η, is equal to 4.85% whereas the skewness is equal to 0.85. In
contrast, in periods of high risk, the variance of the productivity shocks is equal to 6.85%
and the skewness is negative and equal to -1.14. Table 2.6 displays our estimates for the
different parameters of the idiosyncratic productivity process whereas table 2.4 shows the
targeted and model-simulated moments.19
2.5 Quantitative Results
In this section, we study the quantitive implications of our model. We first analyze stan-
dard business cycle statistics. Then, in our main quantitative exercise, we evaluate the
response of our modeled economy to a shock that increases risk by reducing the skewness
of idiosyncratic productivity while keeping the mean and variance constant. Finally, we
compare the response of our model after a variance shock (i.e., a standard uncertainty
shock which implies a symmetric increase in dispersion) to a negative skewness shocks
(i.e., an asymmetric increase in dispersion), and then to a combined shock of dispersion
and skewness (i.e., a change in risk that resembles what happens in a typical recession).
18Appendix figure B.1 displays the evolution of the cross-sectional dispersion and skewness of the sales
growth distribution for our sample of publicly traded firms from Compustat at the quarterly frequency.
19The variance of a random variable η which is distributed as a mixture of two normally distributed
random variables is given by V ar (η) = E
(
η2
) − E (η)2 whereas the skewness is given by Skew (η) =(
E
(
η3
)− 3E (η)V ar (η)− E (η)3) /V ar (η) 32 . Here E (η) is the first moment of the η given by E (η) =
p1µ1+p2µ2. Similarly, E (η)2 = p1
(
µ21 + σ
2
1
)
+p2
(
µ22 + σ
2
2
)
and E
(
η3
)
= p1
(
µ31 + 3µ1σ
2
1
)
+p2
(
µ32 + 3µ2σ
2
2
)
are the second and third moments.
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2.5.1 Business Cycle Statistics
Table 2.7 shows a set of standard business cycle statistics generated from our modeled
economy. To obtain these statistics we simulate our economy for 5,000 periods and we dis-
card the first 500. We then calculate the standard deviation and correlation with aggregate
output for several aggregate time series. All statistics are in the neighborhood of what is
observed in the data: investment is more volatile than output whereas consumption is less
volatile. Additionally, our model generates an average annual risk premium of 5.3%, which
is in line with the empirical estimates based on US data. We conclude that our model is
consistent with the standard business cycle statistics found in the literature.
2.5.2 Idiosyncratic Shocks and Model Fit
To evaluate the effects of a decrease in the skewness of firm-level shocks, we independently
simulate 1,000 economies, each of 300 quarters length. For the first 150 periods, the
economy remains in the low-risk state, then all economies are hit by a change in the level
of risk (i.e. a decrease in the skewness of firm-level shocks, an increase in dispersion of firm-
level shocks, or both at the same time). From that period on, all economies evolve normally.
We then average different macroeconomic outcomes across all simulated economies and we
calculate the impact of the change in risk as the percentage deviation of a given macro
variable relative to its value in the period previous the shock.
Comparing the impact of a change in risk that combines dispersion and skewness to a case
in which either skewness or dispersion change while keeping the mean of the productivity
shocks constant is key for the quantitative analysis we perform in the next section. Hence,
before analyzing the effect on the macroeconomic aggregates it is informative to study the
evolution of the distribution of idiosyncratic shocks experienced by the firms after a risk
shock. In particular, we must make sure that our model can separate a change in dispersion
from a change in the skewness of shocks without impacting the average productivity of the
firms, so that our results are not driven by changes in the first moment of the productivity
distribution, but only by changes in either the dispersion and or the skewness.
The left row of figure 2.7 displays moments of the distribution of firm’s idiosyncratic pro-
ductivity growth, ∆ej,t = ej,t − ej,t−4, for three cases. In the first, the economy moves
from the low-risk state to the high-risk state leading to an increase in the variance and a
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decrease in the skewness of idiosyncratic shocks (blue line with circles) which corresponds
to what is observed during a typical recession. In the second case, the increase in risk
leads only to a decrease in the skewness of idiosyncratic shocks (black line with diamonds),
and finally, in the third case, the increase in risk leads to an increase in the variance of
idiosyncratic shocks only which is the typical uncertainty shock studied in the literature
(red line with triangles).20 The top left panel of figure 2.7 shows that the average firm in
our model does not experience a change in firm-level productivity when risk changes. This
ensures that our results are not driven by a change in average firm productivity. Then,
comparing the black line in the middle and bottom left panels one can see that our model
is able to generate a pure change in the skewness, that is, a change in the productivity
distribution that reflects only a decrease in the skewness but a muted change in the mean
and the variance of the firm-level productivity distribution.21 Similarly, our model can
generate a pure uncertainty shock (the red line with triangles in the middle panel of figure
2.7).
It is also important to analyze the impact of the change in risk on the sales growth
distribution. The right row of figure 2.7 shows the average, the dispersion, and the
skewness of the annual change in quarterly sales implied by the model calculated as
∆yj,t = log yj,t − log yj,t−4. It is not surprising that a change in risk that combines a
simultaneous increase in the variance and a decrease in the skewness of firm-level produc-
tivity shocks generates an increase in the cross-sectional dispersion of sales growth and
a large decrease in skewness (blue line with circles in the middle and bottom right pan-
els). Comparing the case in which only dispersion changes–which is the typical uncertainty
shock–to the case in which only the skewness changes–the baseline case we discuss in the
following section–one can see that by considering a shock with time-varying skewness the
model is able to capture the asymmetric response of the tails of the sales growth distribu-
tion (compare the red line with triangles to the blue line with circles in the bottom right
20To make this comparison, we reestimate the parameters of the stochastic process in 2.8 to separate the
changes in dispersion (a symmetric increase in risk) from changes in dispersion and skewness (an asymmetric
increase in risk). Table 2.5 shows the estimation targets for each case.
21The median firm, however, experiences an increase in productivity after a decline in the skewness that
keeps the mean and variance constant. This increase in productivity goes against our results as our model
predicts a negative aggregate response of the economy to a drop in skewness.
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panel). Moreover, the model generates a drop in Kelley skewness of around 20 percent-
age points which is in line with the drop observed during recession periods in the United
States. This is the first results of our quantitive analysis: in the context of a model with
adjustment cost to capital and risk-averse entrepreneurs, a pure uncertainty shock does not
generate the large asymmetric changes in the sales growth distribution that we document
in section 2.3.22 Notice also that the average sales growth greatly responds to a change in
the risk conditions in the economy (left bottom panel) but this response is only driven by
the endogenous capital and hiring response of firms to a change in the risk conditions as
the average productivity growth is unaltered.
2.5.3 The Macroeconomic Effect of a Skewness Shock
In this section, we analyze the macroeconomic effect of a decrease in the skewness of firm-
level productivity. For doing that, we shock the economy with a change in the skewness of
the innovations of ej,t and we calculate the response of different macroeconomic aggregates
as the percentage change relative to their value prior the shock. In our exercise, when
the economy receives a skewness shock that drives the skewness from γH to γL, we keep
the mean and variance of the idiosyncratic productivity constant at their low-risk level so
our results reflect a pure change in the skewness of the distribution. Moreover, our timing
assumption implies that in the period the shock arrives, the change in the skewness only
represents news about the future economic conditions as the realizations of the productivity
process that firms experience are drawn from a distribution with skewness equal to its pre-
recession values.
Figure 2.8 shows that output declines by 1.4% four quarters after a skewness shock and 1.7%
after eight quarters. This is a significant decline in aggregate economic activity considering
that only the shape of the distribution of firm-level shocks has changed. Moreover, the
decline in output is quite persistent, staying below its pre-shock level even after twelve
periods after the shock. This is in contrast with the typical uncertainty shock that generates
a decrease in output and a rapid rebound few quarters after the shock. In our model, the
22Figure B.5c in the appendix shows that the dispersion and skewness of sales growth do not respond
to a shock to aggregate productivity, At, neither. Furthermore, as it is shown in figure B.5a, a change in
the skewness of firm’s shocks generates a persistent decline in the skewness of employment growth and a
decline in the skewness of three-years sales growth.
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drop in output is generated by the rapid and persistent decline in capital investment after
a change in skewness. The top right panel of figure 2.9 shows that capital investment drops
around 15% during the first quarter after the shock and stays below its pre-shock level for
several quarters. Labor does not drop in the first period after the shock because labor
is fully flexible and news about the future conditions of risk do not change firms’ hiring
decisions.23 In contrast, consumption declines rapidly in response to the decrease in the
skewness of firm-level shocks, dropping around 1% relative to its pre-shock level, whereas
the accumulation of risk-free asset increases because capital is now riskier.
Importantly, in the first quarter after the shock, the response of investment and consump-
tion is not driven by a change in the skewness of the realizations of ej,t received by the
firms–recall our timing assumption in equation 2.3–but by a change in the perception about
the risk in the economy: at the moment of the shock, entrepreneurs receive news that in
the future the distribution of ej,t will be left skewed and their endogenous responses drive
a decline in investment and consumption. A decrease in skewness triggers a precautionary
increase on entrepreneur’s savings, but since capital is riskier, investment in the risk-free
asset surges as it is shown in the bottom right panel of figure 2.9. We conclude that a
decline in the skewness of the distribution of idiosyncratic shocks can by itself generate a
persistent drop in aggregate economic activity.
2.5.4 Variance and Skewness Shocks
Our empirical evidence indicates that a typical recession is characterized by an asymmetric
increase in the dispersion of firm growth, which leads to a decline in the skewness. Hence,
in this section, we evaluate the response of our modeled economy to a pure change in
the variance of firm-level shocks–the typical uncertainty shock considered in the previous
literature–and to a change in risk that combines both, an increase in the variance and a
decrease in the skewness of firm-level shocks. This is displayed in figure 2.10, where we
plot the evolution of several economic aggregates after a shock that combines variance and
skewness (blue line with circles), a pure skewness shock (black line with diamond), and
pure variance shock (red line with triangles).
23Adding labor adjustment costs will trigger an automatic response of labor to changes in risk, increasing
the aggregate impact of a change in variance and skewness.
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Starting with the effects of a pure uncertainty shock, we see that an increase in the variance
of idiosyncratic productivity generates an increase in output and consumption. The dif-
ference with respect to a skewness shock is mainly due to the Oi (1961), Hartman (1972),
and Abel (1983) effect: a symmetric increase in dispersion pushes up the productivity of
some firms at the top of the distribution, which, in the absence of labor adjustment costs,
increases labor demand and output for these firms.24 This increase in productivity of firms
at the top of the distribution more than compensates the decrease in productivity and
labor demand from firms at the bottom, increasing aggregate output.
Capital investment responds negatively to an uncertainty shock in the first period (top right
panel of figure 2.10) first, because of a real-options effect generated by the fixed adjustment
cost, and second, because of a change in the composition of assets in the economy as the
accumulation of risk free assets increases. After the first few periods, however, these two
reverse as investment jumps and the accumulation of risk-free assets declines. In contrast,
a pure skewness shock does not generate an increase in aggregate output: a decrease in
the skewness implies that the left tail of the productivity distribution widens, generating a
decrease in investment due to the real-options effect, an increase in precautionary savings in
the risk-free asset, and a muted Oi-Hartman-Abel effect as the right tail of the productivity
distribution does not change.
The overall effect of an increase in risk that combines a variance and a skewness shock
depends on the relative strengths the real-options channel, the risk-aversion, and the Oi-
Harman-Abel effect. For our model to match the asymmetric increase in the dispersion of
the sales growth distribution that we observe in the data, an increase in dispersion is mostly
due to widening of the left tail of the distribution of firm-level shocks without a parallel
widening of the right tail, which commands a decline in the skewness in productivity and
sales growth.25 The combined effect of dispersion and skewness is followed by a significant
24We omit the evolution of labor in figure 2.10 since it follows the same pattern of aggregate output.
25The asymmetric increase in dispersion generated by the model can be appreciated by comparing the
response of the 90th-to-50th and the 50th-to-10th percentiles spreads generated by the model. Appendix
figure B.5b displays the evolution of these moments for the three cases we have discussed. In the case of a
pure variance shock–red line with triangles–both tails of the distribution expand symmetrically (compare
the 50th-to-10th percentile spread to the 90th-to-50th percentiles spread), but in the case of an increase in
dispersion that is accompanied by a decrease in the skewness it is only the left tail that expands (measured
by the 50th), whereas the dispersion of the right tail almost does not change–blue line with circles. This is
exactly what we observe in the data when we compare periods of high and low risk in our model (see table
2.4) and in the data during recessions periods (see figure 2.2).
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and persistent decline in aggregate economic activity shown by the blue line with circles in
figure 2.10.26 In this case, output declines almost 2.0% in the first four quarters, the same
as consumption, whereas investment drops almost 40% relative to its pre-shock level.
2.5.5 Robustness
In this section, we discuss the robustness of our findings to different parameterizations.
Recall that in our baseline results, in the period in which a change in risk occurs, firms do
not experience a change in the actual realizations of shocks but only a receive news that
in the next period the skewness of productivity shocks, for instance, will be lower. In the
next period, however, the firm’s productivity distribution changes as the shocks are drawn
from a left-skewed distribution. We compare this baseline case to one in which we keep
the underlying distribution of firms shocks fixed so that we can evaluate the pure effect of
a change in news about the future risk conditions.27 This exercise is similar to an increase
in the probability of a disaster, although in our case it represents an increase of disasters
at the microeconomic level. The blue line with circles in figure 2.11 shows that the overall
effect of a skewness shock combines the impact of a change in the perceptions about future
risk conditions and the actual change in the realizations of idiosyncratic shocks. In fact,
a shock that only represents news about the future risk generates a decline in output of
about 0.5%, which is around one-third to the overall decline in our baseline results.
We then study how our results change with the degree of risk aversion of the entrepreneurs
and their elasticity of inter-temporal substitution while keeping the rest of the parameters
at their values in table 2.6. The red line with triangles in figure 2.11 shows that decreasing
entrepreneur’s risk aversion, ξ, from 6 to 2, does not impact our main results substantially
in terms of aggregate output and consumption, although alters the effect of skewness
on the accumulation of capital and the risk-free asset. An increase of the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution, 1/λ, from 0.2 to 0.5, does reduce the impact of skewness shocks
on output and consumption (green line with squares) although the overall effect is still
26It is worth noticing that an aggregate mean shock (a decline in At) does not generate a sizable change
neither in the dispersion nor the skewness of the distribution of sales growth as we show in figure B.5c.
27In particular, we simulate our model using the same realizations of the aggregate risk process used in
our baseline analysis. In period T all economies receive a skewness shock, however, in this case, we keep the
parameters determining the underlying idiosyncratic productivity process fixed at their pre-shock low-risk
level.
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significant. Investment, in this case, changes much less relative to the benchmark. These
differences highlight the importance of separating the effect of risk-aversion from inter-
temporal substitution when evaluating the impact of risk shocks.
2.6 Conclusions
This paper studies how the distribution of the growth rate of firm-level variables changes
over the business cycle. Using firm-level panel for the United States from Census and non-
Census datasets, and firm-level panel data for over thirty other countries we reach three
main conclusions. First, recessions are characterized by a large drop of the skewness of firm-
level outcomes such as employment growth, sales growth, and stock returns. Hence, the
skewness of firms’ outcomes is strongly procyclical. This decline in the skewness is driven
by an uneven change in the dispersion of the distribution of firms’ outcomes. In particular,
we find that most of the increase observed during the typical recession is accounted for
by a left tail that stretches out. Second, the decline in the skewness of firm’s outcomes
is not only a phenomenon observed in the United States but also in other countries, both
developed and developing. Finally, we find strong procyclicality of the skewness at the
industry level.
In the second part of our paper, we analyze the impact of a change in the skewness of firms’
idiosyncratic productivity in the context of a heterogeneous agents model. We assume that
the exogenous idiosyncratic productivity process faced by entrepreneurs is subject to time-
varying variance and time-varying skewness and we choose the parameters of this model
to match the evolution of the dispersion and the skewness of the sales growth distribution
in the United States. Our results suggest that a change in the skewness of the firm-level
productivity distribution can by itself generate a significant decline in aggregate economic
activity even though the mean and variance of firm’s shocks are held constant. In fact, in
our modeled economy, a decline in the skewness of firm’s shocks of the magnitude observed
in the typical US recession generates a drop in GDP of 1.7%. The combined impact of a
variance and skewness shock generates an even large decline in output (2.0%), consumption
(2.0%), and investment (40.0%).
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Figure 2.1: The Skewness of Firm Outcomes Is Lower During Recessions
(a) Census LBD: Employment Growth Distribution
(b) Compustat: Sales Growth Distribution
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Note: The top panel of figure 2.1 shows the employment-weighted empirical density of the distribution of
employment growth for a sample of firms from LBD. The lower panel shows the empirical density of the distribution
of sales growth from a sample of publicly traded firms from Compustat. Each density has been rescaled to have a
median of zero and unitary variance. The blue-dashed line shows the density of a pooled sample of expansion years
(2003 to 2006 and 2010 to 2014) whereas the red-solid line shows the density of a pooled sample of recession years
(2001 and 2008). In the top panel, the unscaled 10th percentile of the employment growth distribution during
expansion (recession) periods is -16.5% (-26.9%), the 50th is 1.3% (-1.8%), and the 90th is 23.3% (18.0%). In the
bottom panel, the corresponding moments are -21.7% (-47.4%), 5.3% (-3.0%), and 44.6% (33.0%). See appendix
B.1 for additional details on the sample construction and moment calculations in the LBD and Compustat.
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Figure 2.2: The Skewness of Firm Outcomes is Strongly Procyclical
(a) Census LBD: Skewness of Employment Growth Distribution
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(b) Compustat: Skewness of Sales Growth Distribution
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Note: The top panel of figure 2.2 shows the time-series of the cross-sectional Kelley skewness of the distribution of
firm employment growth for a sample of firms from LBD. Moments are weighted by the average firm employment
between years t and t+ 1. The bottom panel shows the time-series of the cross-sectional Kelley skewness of the
distribution of firm sales growth for a sample of publicly traded firms from Compustat. Compustat data shows a
large decline in skewness in 2014 which is not found in the rest of the datasets. We are currently investigating the
source of this anomaly. The shaded bars represent NBER recession periods. See appendix B.1 for details on the
sample construction and moment calculations in the LBD and Compustat.
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Figure 2.3: Dispersion of Left Tail of Firms Outcomes is Countercyclical
(a) Census LBD: Dispersion of Employment Growth
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(b) Compustat: Dispersion of Sales Growth
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Note: The top panel of figure 2.3 shows the time-series of the cross-sectional dispersion of the distribution of firm
employment growth for a sample of firms from LBD. Moments are weighted by the average firm employment
between years t and t+ 1. The bottom panel shows the time-series of the cross-sectional dispersion of the
distribution of firm sales growth for a sample of publicly traded firms from Compustat. Compustat data shows a
large jump in dispersion in 2014 which not found in the rest of the datasets. We are currently investigating the
source of this anomaly. The shaded bars represent NBER recession periods. See appendix B.1 for details on the
sample construction and moment calculations in the LBD and Compustat.
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Figure 2.4: The Skewness of Firm Outcomes is Lower During Country Cycles
(a) Cross-Country: Sales Growth Distribution
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(b) Cross-Country: Firm-Level Employment and Sales Growth
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Note: The top panel of figure 2.4 shows the empirical density of the growth rate of annual sales in US dollars for a
sample of publicly traded firms from BvD Osiris dataset. Each density has been rescaled to have a median of zero
and unitary variance. The red solid line is the empirical density over all the observations of firms during recession
years, defined as years in which the country is in the first decile of the country-specific distribution of the growth
rate of GDP per capita (74,009 observations). The blue dashed line is the empirical density over all the
observations of firms during expansion periods (523,655 observations) which are years not classified as recessions.
The unscaled 10th percentile of the sales growth distribution during expansion (recession) periods is -30.5%
(-42.4%), the 50th percentile is 5.6% (0.0%), and the 90th percentile is 52.5% (43.6%). The bottom left panel
displays a bin scatter plot showing the relation between the within-country average firm employment growth and
the within-country Kelley skewness of firm employment growth for a sample of publicly traded firms from BvD
Osiris dataset. The bottom right panel shows similar statistics for the within-country firm sales growth
distribution. See Appendix B.1 for details on the sample construction and moment calculations.
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Figure 2.5: The Skewness Firm Outcomes is Lower During Industry Cycles
(a) Census LBD: Industry Employment Growth Distribution
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(b) Compustat: Industry Sales Growth Distribution
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Note: The top panel of figure 2.5 displays a bin scattered plot showing the relation between the within-industry
business cycle, measured by the average growth rate of employment, and the within-industry skewness, measured
by the Kelley skewness of firm employment growth for a sample of firms from LBD. Each dot is a quantile of the
industry-year distribution of average employment growth where an industry is defined by a 2-digits NAICS group.
Moments are weighted by the average firm employment. The bottom panel shows the same statistics for sales
growth distribution for a sample of publicly traded firms from Compustat. See Appendix B.1 for details on the
sample construction and moment calculations in the LBD and Compustat.
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Figure 2.6: Robustness using Census Data
(a) Small Firms
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(b) Medium and Large Firms
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(c) Firm Age
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(d) Establishments and Firms
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(e) Other Measures of Skewness
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(f) Entry and Exit of Firms
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Note: Figure 2.6 is based on a sample of firms from LBD. The top panels show the Kelley skewness of the
distribution of firm employment growth within different firm size groups. The center-left panel shows the skewness
of the distribution of firm-employment growth within different firm age groups. Young firms are those of less than
five years, Middle-aged firms are those between six and ten years old, and Mature firms are those of more than ten
years old. Firms already in the sample in 1976 are not considered in any of these groups. Shaded bars represent the
share of the year (in quarters) declared as recession years by the NBER. All moments weighted by average
employment at the firm or establishment level. See Appendix B.1 for details on the sample construction and
moment calculations in the LBD.80
Table 2.1: Data and Sample Characteristics
Source Country Sample Frequency Comments
Period
Census United States 1978-2015 Annual Employment data for entire nonfarm
private sector
Compustat United States 1970-2017 Quarterly Employment, Sales, and Stock Prices
for publicly traded firms
BvD Osiris Several countries 1986-2015 Annual Employment and Sales for publicly
traded firms across 44 countries
Global Several Countries 1970-2017 Daily Stock Prices for publicly traded firms
Compustat across 29 countries
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Table 2.3: Calibrated Parameters
Preferences and Technology
γ 0.45 Frisch elasticity of labor supply
ψ 2.5 Leisure preference, non entrepreneurs spend 1/3 time working
σ 2.0 Risk aversion, non entrepreneurial sector
1/λ 1/5 Elasticity of inter-temporal Substitution
ξ 6.0 Risk aversion
β 0.950.25 Annual discount factor of 95%
r 0.005 Annual return of risk-free asset of 2%
α 0.25 CRS production, markup of 33%
ν 0.50 CRS labor share of 2/3, capital share of 1/3
δ 3.8% Annual depreciation of capital stock fo 14.4%
ρa 0.95 Quarterly persistent of aggregate productivity
σa 0.75% Standard deviation of Innovation of aggregate productivity
ρ 0.95 Quarterly persistence of idiosyncratic productivity
Adjustment costs
φ1 1.50% Fixed cost of changing capital stock
φ2 7.0 Quadratic cost of changing capital stock
φ3 34.0% Resale loss of capital
Note: Table 2.3 shows the calibrated parameters referring to preferences, technology, and adjustment costs.
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Table 2.4: Risk Process Moments
P90− P10 P90− P50 P50− P10 KSK Y rs
Data
Low Risk 0.54 0.30 0.24 0.10 03-06;10-14
High Risk 0.70 0.31 0.39 -0.11 01,08
∆ (H − L) 0.16 0.01 0.15 -0.20 -
Model
Low Risk 0.48 0.27 0.20 0.15 -
High Risk 0.58 0.26 0.32 -0.10 -
∆ (H − L) 0.10 -0.01 0.12 -0.25 -
Note: The top panel of table 2.4 shows cross-sectional moments of the annual growth rate of quarterly sales from
Compustat for low risk periods–quarters in the years 2003 to 2006 and quarters in the years 2010 to 2014–and high
risk periods–quarters in years 2001 and 2008. Quarters in years 2002 and 2009 are discarded for not representing
full recession years. The model moments, shown in the lower panel of table 2.4, are calculated from a
5,000-quarters simulation with the first 500 periods discarded.
Table 2.5: Targeted Moments for Numerical Comparison
P9010 P9050 P5010 KSK
Low Risk 0.54 0.30 0.24 0.10
High Risk 0.70 0.31 0.39 -0.10
Only Skewness 0.54 0.243 0.297 -0.10
Only Variance 0.70 0.39 0.31 0.10
Note: Table 2.5 shows the target used in the estimation of the firm-level productivity process. Rows labeled “Low
Risk” and “High Risk” are used in the baseline estimation. The values for “Only Skewness” are used to estimate
the parameters when the economy is shocked with a change in the skewness only. Similarly, the values for “Only
Variance” are used to estimate the parameters when the economy is assumed to be shocked only by a change in the
variance of firms’ shocks while keeping the skewness constant.
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Table 2.6: Parameters of the Stochastic Process
Parameter of Idiosyncratic Stochastic Process
σL1 1.45 Standard deviation of first mixture in low risk periods (%)
σL2 7.55 Standard deviation of second mixture in low risk periods (%)
µL -0.92 Mean of first mixture in low risk periods (%)
pL 63.67 Probability of first mixture in low risk periods (%)
σH1 4.37 Standard deviation of first mixture in high risk periods (%)
σH2 9.06 Standard deviation of second mixture in high risk periods (%)
µH 1.98 Mean of first mixture in high risk periods (%)
pH 78.28 Probability of first mixture in high risk periods (%)
Transition Probabilities of Risk States
piL 0.97 Quarterly probability of remaining in low risk state
piH 0.84 Quarterly probability of remaining in high risk state
Note: The top panel of table 2.6 shows the parameters of the stochastic process of firm-level productivity. We
target moments of the annual change of quarterly sales in Compustat. The parameters for low-risk periods
(denoted by an upper script L) are obtained by targeting the P90-P10, P90-P50, P50-P10, and Kelley Skewness of
the sales growth distribution for the all the full expansion years between 2000 and 2014. The parameters for
high-risk periods (denoted by an upper script H) are obtained by targeting the same set of moments for years 2001
and 2008 (full recession years). The transition probability piL is calculated as the share of expansion quarters that
were followed by another expansion quarter whereas piH is calculated as the share of recession quarters that were
followed by another recession quarter using data from 1970 to 2014.
Table 2.7: Business Cycle Statistics
Data Model
σ (x) σ (y) /σ (x) ρ (x, y) σ (x) σ (y) /σ (x) ρ (x, y)
Output 1.47 1.00 1.00 2.00 1.00 1.00
Capital Investment 6.86 4.64 0.91 9.38 4.69 0.30
Consumption 1.21 0.82 0.87 1.81 0.91 0.65
Hours 1.89 1.28 0.87 2.00 1.00 1.00
Note: The left panel of table 2.7 displays busyness cycles statistics for quarterly US data covering 1970Q1 to
2017Q4. The column σ (x) is the standard deviation of the log variable in the first column. The column σ (y) /σ (x)
is the standard deviation of the variable relative to the standard deviation of log output. All business cycle data
are current as of February 03, 2019. Output is real gross domestic product (FRED GDPC1), investment is real
gross private domestic investment (FRED GPDIC1), consumption is real personal consumption expenditures
(FRED PCECC96), and hours is total non-farm business sector hours (FRED HOANBS). The second panel
contains business cycle statistics computed from a simulation of the model of 5000-quarter with the first 500
periods discarded. All series are HP-filtered with smoothing parameter 1,600, in logs expressed as percentages.
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Figure 2.7: Productivity and Sales Growth after an Increase in Risk
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Note: The top-left panel of figure 2.7 shows the average of the one-year productivity growth distribution
(∆ej,t = ej,t − ej,t−4) whereas the top-right shows the average of the one-year sales growth distribution
(∆yj,t = log yj,t − log yj,t−4) for different risk shocks. The middle and bottom panels show the dispersion and
skewness. Each plot is based on independent simulations of 1,000 economies of 300-quarter length. We impose a
decline in the skewness in quarter 1, allowing normal evolution of the economy afterward. We plot the deviation
relative to the moment value in quarter 0.
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Figure 2.8: Effect of Skewness Shock in Output
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Note: Figure 2.8 shows the effect of a decline in the skewness of firm idiosyncratic productivity. The plot is based
on independent simulations of 1,000 economies of 300-quarter length. We impose a decline in the skewness in
quarter 1, allowing normal evolution of the economy afterwards. We plot the percentage deviation of Output from
its value in quarter 0.
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Figure 2.9: Effect of Skewness Shock on Macro Aggregates
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Note: Figure 2.9 shows the effect of a decline in the skewness of firm idiosyncratic productivity. Each plot is based
on independent simulations of 1,000 economies of 300-quarter length. We impose a decline in the skewness in
quarter 1, allowing normal evolution of the economy afterwards. We plot the percentage deviation of each
macroeconomic aggregate from its value in quarter 0.
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Figure 2.10: Effect of Skewness and variance Shock on Macro Aggregates
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Note: Figure 2.10 shows the effect of a decline in skewness of idiosyncratic shocks (black line with diamonds), an
increase in variance of idiosyncratic shocks (red line with squares), and a decrease in skewness paired with an
increase in the variance of idiosyncratic shocks (blue line with circles) for different macroeconomic outcomes. Each
plot is based on independent simulations of 1,000 economies of 300-quarter length. We impose a drop in the
skewness, increase in variance, or both, in quarter 1, allowing normal evolution of the economy afterwards. We plot
the percentage deviation of each macroeconomic aggregate from its value in quarter 0. Labor is omitted since it
follows the same pattern of Output.
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Figure 2.11: Effect of Skewness Shocks under Different Parameterization
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Note: Figure 2.11 shows the effect of a skewness shock (black line with diamonds) and the effect of a shock that
only represents news about the future conditions of skewness without a change in the realizations of the
idiosyncratic shocks. Each plot is based on independent simulations of 1,000 economies of 300-quarter length. We
impose a drop in the skewness in quarter 1, allowing normal evolution of the economy afterwards. We plot the
percentage deviation of each macroeconomic aggregate from its value in quarter 0. Labor is omitted since it follows
the same pattern of Output.
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Chapter 3
Heterogeneous Passthrough from
TFP to Wages
3.1 Introduction
What is the role of firm productivity shocks in workers’ income instability?1 To answer
this question we study the the impact of firms’ shocks on workers’ wages, which we define
as passthrough. More precisely, we use matched employer-employee data from Denmark
to measure passthrough as the elasticity of workers’ wages relative to firms’ productiv-
ity shocks. We then carefully study how passthrough varies across firms and workers of
different characteristics and over time.
To illustrate the large amount of heterogeneity present in firm productivity and labor
earnings growth, figure 3.1 shows the density of workers’ wage growth and firms’ Total
Factor Productivity (TFP) growth. Both distributions show significant dispersion and
wide tails, indicating large swings in wages and productivity. Importantly, the changes
in firms’ TFP and the changes in workers’ wages are correlated. Figure 3.2 displays the
average and standard deviation of wage growth for each percentile of the TFP growth
1With Mons Chan and Ming Xu. We thank Fatih Guvenen, Sergio Ocampo, and seminar participants at
the 2nd Dale T. Mortensen Centre Conference, SEA 2018 meetings, Queen’s University, and the University
of Minnesota for helpful comments and discussions. We also thank the Department of Economics and
Business at Aarhus University for support and making the data available.
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Figure 3.1: Distribution of Changes in TFP and Wages
Note: The red line in figure 3.1 shows the distribution of one-year log change in firm-level Total Factor
Productivity (TFP) calculated for a sample of Danish firms that have more than one employee in 2005 and
2006. The blue line shows the distribution of the log change of real annual earnings for a sample of Danish
workers between 2005 and 2006. See section 3.2 for additional details in the sample selection.
distribution.2 We observe four important aspects. First, the average wage growth across
the TFP growth distribution is mostly flat, indicating that firms do not completely adjust
worker’s wages in response to idiosyncratic shocks. Second, there is positive wage growth
even among firms experiencing negative changes in productivity (those at the bottom decile
of the TFP growth distribution). Third, workers at high growth firms (those at the top
decile of the TFP growth distribution) experience wage growth that is three times higher
on average than the wage growth experienced by workers at low growth firms. Finally,
the right panel of figure 3.2 shows that individuals who work at high or low TFP growth
firms experience almost twice as much wage growth dispersion in a given year relative to
individuals working in firms in the middle of the TFP growth distribution.
2Details on the sample selection as well as the calculation of labor income and firm-level productivity
are discussed in section 3.2 and section 3.3.
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Our paper provides four contributions to the empirical passthrough literature. First, we
use individual-level panel data on every worker in Denmark to study the effects of firm-
level shocks separately for stayers (workers that remain in the firm), switchers (workers
that change firms), and those transitioning in and out of unemployment. This enables us
to estimate the effect of productivity shocks on wages separately from the effects of job
separation. Second, the existing literature has focused almost exclusively on continuing
workers and ignores the endogenous selection of firms and workers. Endogenous selection
on the workers’ side can arise, for instance, when workers, who would have experienced
a large wage decline from when their firm experiences a negative shock, switch firms to
avoid a drop in their wages. Similarly, a firm that normally passes productivity shocks
to wages may go out of business after a large productivity drop, reducing the measured
passthrough on continuing workers. Ignoring this selection problem could underestimate
the passthrough and overstate firms’ insurance against shocks. In this paper, we address
these concerns by using exogenous variation derived from spousal linkages. Third, we use
the richness of our dataset to provide a direct measure of firm-level TFP for the entire
private sector of the Danish economy. Our methodology allows us to separately study the
effects of persistent versus transitory shocks to firm TFP as well as asymmetric passthrough
from TFP to wages. This is a significant departure from the existing literature which uses
indirect measures of productivity such as value-added, revenues, or output per worker.3
Fourth, we exploit the breadth of our dataset to study how the passthrough from firm
shocks to worker wages varies across narrow population groups defined simultaneously by
firm characteristics (industry, size, productivity level, etc.) and worker characteristics (age,
education, income level, tenure, etc.), and over the business cycle.
Our novel approach for controlling for selection bias exploits linked spousal information. In
particular, we use variation in marriage status, spousal employment decisions and income
shocks to estimate the probability that individual moves across firms. Our identification
strategy rests on the assumption that changes in a spouse’s income, employment status,
or spouse’s firm productivity, has a significant impact on the decision of an individual
to stay or not in a particular job, but such changes are uncorrelated with the worker’s
3This mostly due to data limitations. For instance, Juhn et al. (2018) use the change in revenues as
the firm-level shock affecting workers’ earnings and Guiso et al. (2005) use the residuals of a regression of
value added on firm-level observables.
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Figure 3.2: Wage Growth Across the TFP Growth Distribution
Note: The left (right) panel of figure 3.2 shows the average of (standard deviation of ) the wage growth
within each percentile of the firm-level TFP growth distribution for a sample of Danish workers and firms.
See section 3.2 for additional details in the sample selection.
within-firm wage growth or the productivity shocks affecting the firm where the individual
works (unless both spouses work at the same firm, which we excluded in our data). We
find that controlling for selection greatly increases the estimated passthrough from firms’
productivity shocks to workers’ wages.
Overall we find large and economically significant passthrough from firm shocks to wages.
In particular, after we have controlled for selection, we find that an individual who works
at a firm which experiences an increase of TFP of one standard deviation receives an
increase in annual earnings of $1,500, which is around 3% of the Danish income per capita.
Considering that in any given year 33% of firms and 40% of workers in Denmark experience
94
a TFP shock of at least one standard deviation away from the average, the effect of firm-
level shocks on wages is quite substantial not only at the micro- but also at the macro-level.
Furthermore, and in contrast to most of the previous literature, we find that persistent and
transitory shocks to firm’s productivity are passed in equal magnitude to workers wages.
The effect of TFP changes on workers that transition across firms has been largely ignored
by the literature and to the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to separately
analyze the impact of productivity shocks on the wage of workers that switch across firms.
Analyzing this group is important as they represent a large fraction of the workforce: in
any given year around 20% of full-time Danish workers change employer. We find that the
effect of between-firm productivity differences on the wages of individuals that move across
firms is large and of greater magnitude than the effect of within-firm TFP shocks on the
wages of stayers. In particular, a worker that moves across firms whose TFP differ by one
standard deviation experiences an income change of $5,200.4
We use the richness of our dataset to analyze how the passthrough differs across firm
characteristics, workers characteristics, and over the business cycle. First, we analyze the
differential effect of productivity shocks for workers at high and low ranks of the income
distribution. We find that high wage workers (those in the 5th quintile of the income
distribution) are much less insulated from changes in firm productivity than low wage
workers (those in the 1st quintile of the income distribution). In fact, we find that the
passthrough for high wage workers is three to four times larger than the passthrough for
low wage workers. Young workers (workers of 35 years or less) are also more exposed to
firms productivity shocks than older workers (workers of 50 years or more). This is both
because young workers work in firms that pass a larger proportion of shocks to wages and
because the volatility of productivity shocks of the firms where young people work is higher.
We also find substantial heterogeneity in passthrough for firms in different industries after
correcting for selection. For instance, the passthrough for workers in the Transportation or
Hospitality sectors is two to three times larger than for workers in ICT or Finance. This
is surprising considering that Finance has a larger fraction of workers under performance
pay schemes that typically tie workers’ income to firms’ outcomes.
Motivated by the robust empirical evidence that firm productivity shocks have a significant
4Note that the TFP change for switchers is the difference in productivity between two different firms
rather than the within-firm shock to productivity.
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impact on workers wages, in the second part of our paper we estimate a flexible stochastic
income process that captures the salient features of the relation between firm-level shocks
and the passthrough to workers’ wages. In particular, we consider an income process similar
to Low et al. (2010) modified to take into account the rich heterogeneity in passthrough
observed in the data. To capture the marked asymmetry of passthrough between positive
and negative shocks, our preferred specification considers a passthrough coefficient of firm’s
productivity to wages that is different depending on the sign of the productivity change.
Our estimation, which is carried out using indirect inference, suggests that firms have a
large role in determining income growth dispersion and income inequality.
In the final part of our paper, we embed the estimated stochastic process into a life-cycle
consumption savings model with incomplete markets. This framework allows us to calculate
the welfare and distributional implications of the partial and heterogeneous passthrough we
document in this paper. Our model does a good job in accounting for the extent of income
and wealth inequality we observe in Denmark. In our main quantitative exercise, we ask
how much value the workers in this economy, in terms of lifetime consumption, assign to
the insurance provided by firms. We do so by comparing our benchmark economy to an
economy in which firms’ shocks are fully passed to workers wages (passthrough equal to
one). Our preliminary results suggest that the insurance provided by firms is of little value
for workers. This is because an increase in the passthrough has two opposite effects on
welfare. On the one hand, higher passthrough has a negative impact as it increases earnings
instability. On the other hand, because a larger fraction of the positive shocks is passed to
workers their average wage increases. The overall effect depends on the ability of workers
to insure against the increase in income risk. In our current steady-state comparison with
infinitely lived workers with access to a risk-free asset, an individual has enough time to
offset the negative impact of an increase in wage dispersion by increasing savings. In other
words, a risk free asset provides enough flexibility to workers to compensate for the decline
in the insurance provided by firms by increasing capital accumulation. At the same time,
higher average permanent income reduces the necessity of workers to save. These two
offsetting effects imply a muted impact on welfare from an increase in the passthrough of
firms’ shocks to workers’ wages and a small increase in capital in the economy. Our ongoing
work aims to fully account for the life cycle income profile and have a more realistic asset
96
market that resembles the frictions in the financial market faced by workers, both of which
will likely increase the value of the insurance provided by firms.
Our paper relates to several strands of the literature. First and foremost, we contribute to
the literature that studies the relationship between firm shocks and worker earnings. Guiso
et al. (2005) analyze the degree of insurance provided by firms using matched employee-
employer data from Italy. Their paper, however, does not analyze how firm-level produc-
tivity affects employment transitions which might explain a large fraction of the earnings
instability observed in the data. Barth et al. (2016) and Juhn et al. (2018) also study
the heterogeneity of passthrough from firm’s shocks to wages. Barth et al. (2016) report
that almost three quarters of the dispersion in wage levels is accounted for by differences
in TFP levels across firms whereas worker characteristics contribute little. Bagger et al.
(2014) use Danish data to study the importance of firm level productivity for wage dis-
persion, the role of rent sharing between workers and firms, and labor force composition
within the firm. They document an important role for fixed TFP differences across firms
in the determination of earnings level dispersion. These papers, however, do not analyze
the role of firm-level TFP shocks for the dispersion of earnings growth and do not take
into account the effects of firm level shocks on employment transitions. These paper also
do not address the selection issue which is at the center of our paper.5
Our paper also contributes to the understanding of labor income risk. Since the seminal
work of Gottschalk et al. (1994), several papers have studied the extent of labor income
instability and its evolution over time.6 Due to data limitations, however, most of the
papers in the literature do not consider the role of firms in driving labor income instability.
An exception is the work of Comin et al. (2009) that studies whether firm’s revenue volatil-
ity is passed to average wage instability using data from a panel of publicly traded firms
and worker level information from survey-level data. The authors find a positive relation
between firms and worker wage volatility. Relative to this paper, we use an employer-
employee matched administrative data set that allows us to have a tighter link between
firm shocks and earnings instability.
5Several recent papers study the relation between firm’s shocks and worker’s wages. See for instance
Lamadon et al. (2017), Friedrich et al. (2014),Carlsson et al. (2015), Garin et al. (2018), Guertzgen (2014),
Kline et al. (2018),Rute Cardoso and Portela (2009), Lagakos and Ordonez (2011), among others.
6See for instance Sabelhaus and Song (2009), Sabelhaus and Song (2010), Ziliak et al. (2011), and
Guvenen et al. (2014).
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The rest of the paper unfolds as follows: In section 3.2, we introduce our data source
and sample selection. We then discuss our estimation strategy for various specifications
of analysis in section 3.3. The baseline model and results with and without selection
correction are shown in section 3.4. We then proceed to explore various dimensions of
heterogeneity along workers, firms and the timing dimension in section 3.5. Section 3.6
presents our quantitative analysis. Section 3.7 concludes our work.
3.2 Data
Our main source of information is a matched employer-employee administrative dataset
from Statistics Denmark. We combine several large panel datasets for our analysis. Worker
data comes from the Integrated Database for Labor Market Research which contains em-
ployment and personal information for the entire population of Denmark. In particular,
we observe annual wages, hourly wages, number of days worked, occupation, labor market
status, position within the firm, age, gender, education, and tenure. Crucially, this dataset
identifies the firm in which each worker was employed at November of each year. We also
have spousal links, which means we observe the same information for everyone’s spouse
across time. This spousal information will be crucial when estimating the first-stage se-
lection model we use in 3.3.2 to correct for selection bias in the passthrough estimation.
Our main measure of labor income of an individual is equal to the worker’s hourly wage
times the total number of hours she would have worked in a year as a full time worker.
In this way we avoid our results being influenced by changes in the number of hours that
individuals work in a year. We then consider full time workers who are 15 years and older,
whose annualized earnings is above 30,000 DKK (about $4600 USD), and who are not
working in the public sector or are self-employed.
We match this individual-level panel to a firm-level panel, the Firm Statistics Register,
which contains accounting and input use data for the universe of Danish firms. The key
variables we use are firm annual revenues, value added, capital stock, intermediate ex-
penditure and employment, as well as firm age, location, and industry. This data allows
us to construct robust measures of TFP following the methods developed by Levinsohn
and Petrin (2003), Ackerberg et al. (2015), Gandhi et al. (2018), and others. We also
link in firm-product data on physical sales, market shares, input and output prices, and
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
Mean Std.dev. N
Workers Characteristics
Annual Wages (dkk) 363,661 208,240 8.98M
Hourly Wages (dkk) 234 147 7.36M
Age 41.7 11.3 8.98M
Firms Characteristics
Log Value Added 14.6 1.33 0.71M
Log TFP 7.94 0.58 0.71M
Firm Age (years) 13.1 12.5 0.71M
Number of Employees 19.8 192.7 0.71M
1 US$= 6.55 dkk
Note: Table 3.1 shows summary statistics for the sample used in our analysis. Monetary values are expressed in
Danish kroner.
imports/exports. This latter data allows us to construct exogenous firm-level TFP shifters
so that we can explore the causal relationship between TFP shocks and wage growth. For
our baseline analysis, we keep all firms in the private sector with at least one employee.
We restrict our analysis to the period from 1995 to 2012. Our sample selection leaves us
with about 8.98 million worker-year observations for our primary empirical analysis and
0.71 million firm-year observations. Basic summary statistics can be found in Table 3.1.7
3.3 Estimation Strategy
In this section we discuss our estimation strategy. Section 3.3.1 describes our baseline
regression model. Section 3.3.3 provides the details of our TFP estimation. Section 3.3.2
discusses our strategy for dealing with the potential bias of the basic model in section 3.3.1
due to the selection of workers.
7For the rest of the paper we express all nominal values in dollars using an exchange rate of 6.55 DKK
per USD.
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3.3.1 Baseline Empirical Specification
Our basic empirical specification relates changes in worker (log) wages and changes in (log)
firm TFP controlling for workers and firms characteristics. The primary model we use is
then
∆wijt = α+ βSjt + Z′jtγ +X ′itλ+ δt + εijt, (3.1)
where ∆wijt is the change of log real wages for individual i that works in firm j between
periods t and t−1, Sjt is a measure of firm’s productivity changes, Z′jt is a set of observable
firm-level characteristics that might vary over time (industry, lagged firm size, lagged firm
age, lagged firm productivity), X ′it is a set of individual characteristics (age, education,
lagged occupation, lagged experience, lagged tenure, job switch indicator, lagged wage),
and δt is a year-fixed effect that controls for aggregate economic conditions. The main
parameter of interest is β which captures the elasticity of wages to changes in firm-level
productivity.8
3.3.2 Selection Model
Our primary goal is to separately estimate the effects of TFP changes on workers’ wage
growth for workers who stay in their firms, and for workers who switch between firms.
However, our analysis is likely subject to selection bias, since workers who choose to stay
at the firm between periods t − 1 and t may tend to experience more or less passthrough
than those who left would have experienced if they stayed. For example, suppose firms pass
negative shocks to workers as productivity decreases. Those workers who receive a large
wage drop may choose to leave the firm, which would tend to bias estimates of negative
passthrough towards zero if one solely analyzes continuing workers. There may also be
selection on the firm side, as firms which experience large negative productivity shocks may
choose to exit the market. If these are the firms which tend to have more passthrough,
then the estimates of passthrough may be biased. This issue has been mentioned by the
previous literature (see for example Guiso et al. (2005)), however, to our knowledge, we
are the first to correct for selection on either the worker or firm side in the passthrough
literature.
8Because our main specification used first-differences in wages and productivity we are implicitly con-
trolling for workers and firms fixed characteristics.
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To correct for selection we adopt a simple model to describe job stayers’ selection problem
as given by
∆wijt = X′itΛ + εijt if uijt > 0,
∆ logwijt = unobserved if uijt ≤ 0,
uijt = Zijtδ + ξijt,
Dijt = 1 if uijt > 0,
Dijt = 0 if uijt ≤ 0.
Here uijt denotes the net utility that a worker gets when she chooses to stay at firm j
at time t as opposed to switching to a different firm or out of employment; wijt,Xijt,
are stayers’ wage and observable firm/workers characteristics which affect workers’ wage
growth (same as equation 3.1), and observable characteristics which affect the utility of
staying in their job, respectively. When the net utility from staying in their firm is below
0, workers switch out, so we are not be able to observe their within-firm wage change and
thus passthrough. We denote whether or not we observe the within firm wage change by
the indicator variable Dijt.
Our strategy to correct for the selection problem follows Heckman (1979). Specifically, we
assume that the joint distribution for the errors is given by:(
εijt
ξijt
)
∼ N
[(
0
0
)
,
(
σ2 ρσ
ρσ 1
)]
.
Given this assumption, we estimate a first-stage probit regression of the probability that
a given worker stays at her firm as a function of Zijt, obtaining δˆ. Then we calculate the
fitted value of the latent variable uˆijt and compute the inverse Mills ratio λˆijt as a function
of uˆijt. Finally we include λˆijt in the second stage regression and get a consistent and
unbiased (though not asymptotically efficient) estimator of β.
Our identification strategy then relies on having a reasonable exclusion restriction for the
first stage, in that we can include some firm and worker variation which plays a role in the
probability that workers will stay or leave their firm, but do not affect the growth rate of
workers’ wages should they choose to stay at the firm that period. In order to do this, we use
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the spousal linkage data to create, for each worker, a set of marital status indicators and –
for those with working spouses – measures of their spouses employment status. Specifically,
we include indicators for marriage status, separation, change of spouse and whether or
not the individual’s spouse is working if married. This last term is interacted with other
spousal information including log wage, change in log wage, firm TFP and log TFP change,
age, experience, and whether or not the spouse is a stayer for that period. We exclude
spousal working information if the couple is working at the same firm. The assumption
for our instrument is that when a worker is getting married/divorced or if his/her spouse
has an income change or other employment shock, this will affect the worker’s decision
on whether or not to keep working at the current firm. However, changes in marriage
status, spousal employment,or spousal wages should not affect the worker’s wage growth
at his/her current firm conditional on staying, unless the couple are working at the same
firm. To control for firm selection, we also include in Zijt various firm-level variables such
as financial information and lags of TFP which shouldn’t directly affect within-firm worker
wage growth conditional on the set of observables in equation 3.1.
3.3.3 TFP Estimation
Most of the literature considers different measures of firm shocks when estimating passthrough,
mostly focusing on either raw value added or changes in value-added residuals from an OLS
regression of value added on firm characteristics. In contrast, we employ a structural model
of firm production and input choice to estimate firm-level total factor productivity (TFP)
which we use as our main measure of firm performance. We do this for two reasons. First,
we want a measure of firm performance which controls for endogeneity and transmission
bias. This is important if we want to separately identify changes in capital stock or worker
composition/ability from changes in firm-level productivity, while allowing these factors
to be potentially correlated. Second, we want to be able to estimate productivity without
placing implicit restrictions on the nature of wages or the flexibility of labor. In particu-
lar, we want to allow both employment and wages to be responsive to contemporaneous
changes in firm productivity. This means we cannot, for example, assume wages perfectly
reflect labor quality, or assume perfectly competitive labor markets. Our methodology,
which draws on recent work by Gandhi et al. (2018) (hereafter “GNR”), allows for both
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imperfectly competitive labor markets with adjustment costs and firm-specific wage shocks.
Labor Quality and Wages
In order to identify firm-level productivity in the next section, we want to be able to
control for changes in firm-level labor inputs. Our main concern is that if we estimate firm
productivity using standard measures of labor inputs (such as a simple count of workers,
or number of hours worked), our measure of TFP may include unmeasured differences in
workers’ quality, driving variation in TFP which may be correlated with wages through this
channel rather than the passthrough channel we want to measure. To attempt to control
for this and peel out changes in worker quality from our measure of firm productivity, we
use worker-side data to construct a quality-adjusted labor input index (the “predicted”
wage-bill) to use in our production function estimation.9
To construct our quality adjusted-labor input index we proceed as follows. Our firm-
side data has information on full-time equivalents working in the firm each year, which
we denote Ejt. The standard procedure would be to use this directly in the production
function estimation, setting Ljt = Ejt. Instead, we use our worker-level information data
to construct a firm-level average quality-adjusted labor input index, G˜jt which we then
multiply by the number of full time equivalents to get our firm-level labor input Ljt ≡
G˜jtEjt. To calculate G˜jt, we estimate a simple Mincer regression of log hourly wages wijt
on individual characteristics Xmijt and individual fixed effects a
m
i :
wijt = X
m′
ijtβ
m + ami + 
m
it . (3.2)
We then define a firm’s total labor input as TLjt ≡
∑
i ŴijtHijt where Ŵijt is the predicted
hourly wages (in levels) from the Mincer regression and Hjt is the total number of hours
9A number of recent papers including Fox and Smeets (2011) argue that controlling for variation in input
quality is important for identifying TFP. Fox and Smeets (2011) suggest that using the wage bill as a proxy
for worker quality is a possible substitute for controlling for worker quality, especially if individual-level data
is not available. However, using the wage bill as the labor input implicitly assumes that wages perfectly
represent worker ability, and preclude the ability of firms to adjust wages in response to changes in TFP. To
get around this, we use the ”predicted” wage-bill based on the fixed effects and observable characteristics of
the workers at the firm, which accounts for variation across firms in the wages paid to observably identical
workers which may stem from differences in wage contracts, TFP passthrough, imperfect labor markets,
etc.
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worked for worker i employed by firm j in year t. Using Hijt and information on the
average number of hours H worked by full time workers in Denmark, we can also construct
a worker side measure of a firm’s full time equivalents, E˜jt =
∑
iHijt/H. We do this since
we observe hourly wages for most but not all workers in every firm. Note that this implicitly
assumes that any workers who are not included in the worker data-side calculation of total
quality adjusted labor or FTEs are of the same average quality as the observed workers.
The firm’s quality-adjusted average labor input is then G˜jt = TLjt/E˜jt. Our measure
of labor input Ljt then controls for both firm and individual-level changes in ability as
measured through the Mincer regression.
Model and Assumptions
We estimate our model on a panel of firms j ∈ J , where for each firm-year pair we observe
output Yjt, capital stock Kjt, labor input Ljt and intermediate inputs Mjt. We will be
relying on several timing assumptions to identify the model.
Define Ijt as the information set available to firm j when it enters period t. Ijt contains
all of the information relevant to the firm (such as firm productivity) when it makes its
period-t decisions. Following GNR, we define any input Xt ∈ Ijt as predetermined. Any
such input is thus a function of the previous period’s information set: Xt(Ijt−1). We will
treat capital as a predetermined input. Inputs which are not predetermined (and thus are
set in period t) we define as variable. We define any input which is variable and where
the optimal choice of Xt is a function of lagged values of itself as dynamic. We will depart
from GNR in assuming that labor is a dynamic input.10 Finally, an input which is variable
but not dynamic we define as flexible. Intermediate inputs will be treated as flexible in our
framework. This implies that both Kjt and Lj,t−1 are elements of Ijt, but Ljt and Mjt are
not.
Here we follow GNR in formally stating the assumptions on the model of firm production.
Assumption 1 The firm’s production function takes the following general form in levels
Yjt = F (Kjt, Ljt,Mjt)e
νjt
10The recent literature (see Ackerberg et al. (2015)) has argued that allowing labor to be fully flexi-
ble introduces significant identification issues. Assuming labor is fully predetermined, as in GNR, would
preclude firms of adjusting labor in response to contemporaneous productivity shocks.
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and in logs
yjt = f(kjt, `jt,mjt) + νjt
where f is a crs and differentiable function which is strictly concave in mjt.
Assumption 2 Capital (Kjt ∈ Ijt) is predetermined and a state variable. Labor input
(Ljt /∈ Ijt) is dynamic, such that Ljt−1 ∈ Ijt is a state variable. Intermediate inputs
(Mjt /∈ Ijt) are flexible, so that Mjt−1 /∈ Ijt.
The Hicks-neutral productivity term νjt can be decomposed into a persistent component
ωjt which is known to the firm when it makes input decisions, and a transitory component
εjt which is unknown to the firm when making input decisions.
Assumption 3 The permanent productivity term ωjt ∈ Ijt is observed by the firm prior to
making period-t decisions and is first-order Markov, such that E[ωjt|Ijt−1] = E[ωjt|ωjt−1] =
h(ωjt−1) for some continuous function h(.). εjt /∈ Ijt is i.i.d across firms and time, with
Pε(εjt|Ijt) = Pε(εjt).
We normalize E[εjt] = 0 and define ηjt = ωjt − E[ωjt|ωjt−1] which implies E[ηjt|Ijt−1] = 0.
This gives us several measures of change in total firm productivity νjt = h(ωjt−1)+ηjt+εjt.
h(ωjt−1)−ωjt−1 is the expected and persistent change in productivity, ηjt is the unexpected
and persistent shock to productivity, and εjt−εjt−1 is the unexpected and transitory change
in total productivity.
Assumption 4 We assume that demand for intermediate input mjt = M(kjt, `jt, ωjt) is
strictly monotone in ωjt.
Note that this conditional (on period-t labor) demand function is critical in identifying the
production function while allowing labor to be a dynamic (and not predetermined) input.
It allows allows for labor adjustment costs and firm-specific wage shocks, both of which
may be important in our setting.11 We also make the following assumption about firm’s
profit maximizing behavior and environment:
11See Ackerberg et al. (2015) and GNR.
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Assumption 5 Firms maximize short-run expected profits and are price takers in both
output and intermediate input markets. Denote the common output price index for period
t as Pt and the common intermediate price index as ρt.
This framework gives us all of the tools to obtain robust estimates of TFP which satisfy
our two main goals.
Identification and Estimation
Following GNR, assumptions 1 to 5 give us the following first order condition for firm’s
profit maximization problem in period t with respect to Mjt:
Pt
∂
∂Mjt
F (Kjt, Ljt,Mjt)e
ωjtE = ρt
where E ≡ E[eεjt ] is a constant. Multiplying both sides by Mjt/Yjt, plugging in the
production function and rearranging provides our first estimating equation:
sjt = ln E + lnD(kjt, `jt,mjt)− εjt
≡ ln (DE(kjt, `jt,mjt))− εjt (3.3)
where sjt ≡ ln(ρtMjt/PtYjt) is the log revenue share of intermediate input expenditure
and D(kjt, `jt,mjt) ≡ ∂∂mjt f(kjt, `jt,mjt) is the output elasticity of materials. Since by
assumption 3 we have E[εjt] = 0, we can use equation 3.3 to identify εjt and DE .
Given εjt = ln
(
DE(kjt, `jt,mjt)
) − sjt, we can identify the constant E = E[exp(εjt)],
which subsequently provides the elasticity D(kjt, `jt,mjt) = D
E(kjt, `jt,mjt)/E . Once we
know D(kjt, `jt,mjt) and εjt, we can estimate the rest of the production function non-
parametrically. Then we have
D(kjt, `jt,mjt) ≡
∫
∂
∂mjt
f(kjt, `jt,mjt)dmjt = f(kjt, `jt,mjt) + Ψ(kjt, `jt) (3.4)
Define y˜jt ≡ yjt − εjt − D(kjt, `jt,mjt) = −Ψ(kjt, `jt) + ωjt. Plugging in the structure of
ωjt from assumption 3, we get our second estimating equation:
y˜jt = −Ψ(kjt, `jt) + h(y˜jt−1 + Ψ(kjt−1, `jt−1)) + ηjt (3.5)
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where y˜jt is observable given the stage-one estimates of εjt and D(kjt, `jt,mjt). Our as-
sumptions on the firm’s information set give us E[ηjt|kjt, `jt−1, kjt−1, y˜jt−1, `jt−2] = 0, which
we use with equation 3.5 to identify Ψ, h, and thus ηjt.
12
Our estimation procedure follows GNR in using a standard sieve-series estimator to non-
parametrically identify the input elasticity and production function. We proceed in two
steps. First, we estimate the share equation with a complete 2nd degree polynomial in kjt,
`jt and mjt using nonlinear least squares. This estimator solves
min
γ′
∑
j,t
ε2jt =
∑
j,t
sjt − ln
 ∑
rk+r`+rm≤2
γ
′
rk,r`,rm
krkjt `
r`
jtm
rm
jt
2 (3.6)
which gives us estimates of εˆjt and D̂E(kjt, `jt,mjt) =
∑
rk+r`+rm≤2(γˆ
′
rk,r`,rm
krkjt `
r`
jtm
rm
jt ).
We can then recover Ê = E[exp(εˆjt)] and the input elasticity
D̂(kjt, `jt,mjt) =
∑
rk+r`+rm≤2
(γˆrk,r`,rmk
rk
jt `
r`
jtm
rm
jt )
where γˆ ≡ γˆ′/Ê . We then integrate the estimated flexible input elasticity to recover
D̂(kjt, `jt,mjt) =
∑
rk+r`+rm≤2
(
mjt
rm + 1
γˆrk,r`,rmk
rk
jt `
r`
jtm
rm
jt
)
which allows us to recover ˆ˜yjt = yjt− εˆjt−D̂(kjt, `jt,mjt). In the second step, we estimate
equation 3.5 using GMM, where we similarly approximate Ψ(kjt, `jt) using a complete 2nd
degree polynomial and h(ωjt−1) as a 1st degree (linear) polynomial, implying that persistent
TFP follows an AR(1) process. Since we can identify both the constant of integration and
TFP only up to an additive constant, we follow GNR in normalizing Ψ to be mean zero and
so allow the constant to show up in the level of productivity. This gives us the following
12This differs from GNR, who assume that labor is predetermined. We relax this assumption since we
want to allow firms to adjust labor in response to persistent shocks in productivity (ηjt).
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second-stage estimating equation:
y˜jt = −
∑
0<τk+τ`≤2
ατk,τ`k
τk
jt `
τ`
tj +
∑
0≤a≤1
δa
y˜jt−1 + ∑
0<τk+τ`≤2
ατk,τ`k
τk
jt−1`
τ`
tj−1
a + ηjt. (3.7)
Since E[ηjt|kjt, `jt−1, Ijt−1] = 0, the only endogenous variable is `jt. Thus we can use
functions of the set {kjt, kjt−1, `jt−1, `jt−2,mjt−1, y˜jt−1} as instruments. In particular, our
moments are E[ηjty˜ajt−1] and E[ηjtk
τk
jt `
τ`
jt−2] for all 0 ≤ a ≤ 1 and 0 < τk + τ` ≤ 2, leaving us
exactly identified.13 This provides us with estimates of the production function parameters
as well as ωˆjt, ηˆjt and ˆ¯ωjt ≡ hˆ(ωˆjt−1) = δˆ0 + δˆ1ωˆjt−1.
3.4 Empirical Results
3.4.1 Non-Parametric Analysis
We start our analysis by discussing the relation between changes in firm-level productivity
and workers’ wage growth using a simple, non parametric approach. For doing that, we
pool our sample of firms and individuals between 1995 and 2012 and we sort firms by their
productivity growth in one hundred bins. Then, within each bin, we calculate different
moments of the wage growth distribution: the mean, the standard deviation, and the 90th,
50th, and 10th percentiles. Moments are weighted by firm’s employment so as to reflect
the underlying firm size distribution within each bin.
The left panel of figure 3.3 shows the average wage growth within each bin of the TFP
growth distribution. Three aspects of the plot are worth noticing. First, the average wage
growth is remarkably stable from the first percentiles of the distribution - where the typical
firm experiences a large decline in TFP - up to the 80th percentile of the distribution. This
suggests that most firms provide insurance to their workers from changes in firm-level
productivity. Second, the average wage growth increases dramatically as we move above
the fifth quintile of the TFP growth distribution. The typical firm above the 80th percentile
of the TFP growth distribution experiences an increase of TFP of 25% which translates
into an average wage growth of 20% for the workers of these firms. Finally, considering
13As pointed out by GNR, this implies that the estimator is a sieve-M estimator, which allows us to do
inference treating the polynomials as if they were the true parametric structure.
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how flat the relation between wage growth and TFP growth is across most of the TFP
growth distribution, it is not surprising that most papers in the literature find very small
average passthrough from TFP to wages.
How does wage growth vary for workers that switch between firms? To provide a first
answer to this question, the right panel of figure 3.3 repeats the previous analysis by
calculating the average wage growth for switchers within each percentile of the TFP growth
distribution. Importantly, the TFP growth percentiles in the x-axis in both plots of figure
3.3 are the same so we can directly compare them. Still, the interpretation of a TFP change
is slightly different. In the left panel, a TFP change reflects the change in the productivity
of the same firm across time whereas in the right panel, a TFP change reflects the gap in
productivity between two different firms across time. We discuss and control for this in the
analysis below. The right panel of figure 3.3 shows two important results, first, workers
that move between firms whose TFP differential implies a growth rate at the left tail of the
TFP growth distribution obtain almost no wage growth. Moreover, these workers observe
lower wage growth than the average worker that stays in the same firm conditional on the
firm experiencing the same decline in TFP. Second, workers that move to more productive
firms do experience a wage growth, which is higher than the wage growth of workers that
stay in the same firm conditional on the firm observing the same TFP growth. In fact, the
average wage growth for stayers and switchers crosses at around the 40th percentile of the
TFP growth distribution.
We also find significant differences in the dispersion of wage growth across the TFP growth
distribution. In fact, firms at the top and bottom of the distribution of TFP growth
command higher wage growth dispersion for their workers relative to firms in the middle
of distribution. To see this, the left panel (right panel) of figure 3.4 shows the 90th-to-10th
percentiles spread of the wage growth distribution within different percentiles of the TFP
growth distribution for workers that stay in the same firm (switch across firms). The figure
shows a marked u-shaped pattern with more dispersion at the top and bottom. In fact,
dispersion of wage growth at lower percentiles of the TFP growth distribution is almost 30
percentage points higher than the dispersion of wage growth among workers in firms at the
middle of the TFP growth distribution. The difference is even more stark between workers
in the middle and at the top of the TFP growth distribution: relative to the middle of
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Figure 3.3: Average Wage Growth Across the TFP Growth Distribution
Note: The left panel of figure 3.3 shows the employment weighted average of the workers’ wage growth
distribution within each percentile of the TFP growth distribution for a sample of workers that stay in the
same firm for two consecutive period. The right panel displays the same statistic for the set of worker that
switch firms between two consecutive periods.
the distribution, dispersion of wage growth almost doubles at the highest percentiles of the
TFP growth distribution.
In summary, our simple non parametric analysis shows a substantial heterogeneity of firm
insurance across firms and positive relation between productivity growth and wage growth.
Still, this heterogeneity can be the product of differences across workers, across firms,
and over time, which cannot be easily captured by the simple setting we have discussed.
Moreover, selection of workers and firms into different groups might impact our results. In
the following section we control for observable characteristics of stayers and switchers to
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Figure 3.4: Dispersion of Wage Growth Across the TFP Growth Distribution
Note: The left panel of figure 3.4 shows the employment weighted 90th-to-10th percentiles spread of the
workers’ wage growth distribution within each percentile of the TFP growth distribution for a sample of
workers that stay in the same firm for two consecutive period. The right panel displays the same statistic
for the set of worker that switch firms between two consecutive periods.
show that passthrough is positive and economically significant.
3.4.2 Passthrough from Productivity Shocks to Wages
Baseline Results
In this subsection we analyze the passthrough of firms’ shocks to workers’ wage growth. We
focus on a simple regression analysis for two reasons. First, this simple approach is similar
to what has been used in the previous literature, allowing us to more directly compare
our results with other papers. Second, we aim to highlight that even if one puts aside
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selection considerations, the passthrough from TFP shocks to workers’ wages is positive
and economically significant.
As described in section 3.3, our baseline analysis is based in a series of OLS panel regressions
of the form,
∆ logwijt = α+ β
ηηijt + β
εεijt + Z′jtγ +X ′itλ+ δt + ijt (3.8)
where the main coefficients of interest are βη and βε, the elasticity of wages to changes in
persistent and transitory shocks to firm-level productivity. In this section we restrict our
sample to stayers, who are workers employed at the same firm in periods t− 1 and t.
Table 3.2 displays our first set of results. Column (1) shows that the passthrough from
TFP shocks to wage growth is positive and statistically significant for stayers. This is true
for both the persistent component of the TFP shock as well as the transitory component.
Our baseline results indicate that a 10% increase in the persistent component of firm’s
TFP drives an increase of 0.16% in workers wages. The same change in the transitory
component generates an increase in wages of 0.4%. Hence, our results suggest that both
types of productivity shocks, transitory and persistent, have a significant impact on workers
wages.
We evaluate the monetary value of firm shocks by simply multiplying the change in the
average wage generated by a positive productivity shock of one standard deviation. The
column labeled Value in table 3.2 shows that a shock of one standard deviation in the
persistent component of firm TFP implies a change in annual income of around $251 USD
for a worker making the average wage. A one standard deviation transitory innovation
in firm-level TFP implies a change in annual income of around US$792. Together they
represent 2% of the overall income per capita in Denmark. Considering that in any given
year around 33% of firms (which employ around 40% of all the workers in the economy)
receive either a persistent or transitory productivity shock that is at least one standard
deviation away from the mean (6% of firms and 8% of workers experience both), this
represents a significant aggregate change in income. Moreover, our measure of wages
reflects only changes in the individual’s wage rate. Using a more standard measure of
income, one that includes changes in the number of hours, would increase the elasticity of
workers’ wages to firms’ shocks.
Does the sign of the change in TFP matter for the passthrough from TFP to wages?
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To answer this question we separate workers employed by firms experiencing a negative
productivity shocks from those workers in firms experiencing a positive productivity shocks.
We then run the same specification in equation (3.8) within each group of workers. Columns
(2) and (3) of table 3.2 show the results. First, notice in column (2) that the coefficient on
negative permanent TFP shock changes to basically zero and is not statistically significant,
suggesting that firms insulate workers from negative shocks to persistent productivity.
Column (3) however, shows a significant and positive correlation between positive shocks
to persistent TFP and wage growth, indicating that firms pass a fraction of positive changes
in productivity to wages. In monetary values, a change in permanent TFP shock of one
standard deviation, conditional on this change being negative, translates into a decline
in annual labor earnings of only $16 for a worker with the average wage in that group,
whereas a positive change in TFP translates into an increase in annual labor earnings of
$671 for that same worker. The effect of transitory TFP shocks on wages is significant for
both negative and positive shocks, showing a similar asymmetric effect to the persistent
shocks.
The positive but small relationship between negative and persistent shocks to firm’s TFP
and wage growth that we find falls in line with results found in other papers (see for instance
Juhn et al. (2018) and Rute Cardoso and Portela (2009)). These results are based on the
sample of workers that stay in the same firm for two consecutive periods. However, these
regression results might be biased by the presence of selection into the status of “stayer”.
We discuss this in the next section and implement a simple method to correct for the effect
of selection on the passthrough coefficients.
Selection
As we discussed in section 3.3.2 selection might have a substantial impact in measuring
the effects of firms’ shocks to workers’ wages. This problem arises because the sample
considered in the first three columns of table 3.2 is defined only for continuing workers
who have stayed at same firm, neglecting the possibility that the probability of staying
may be correlated with passthrough and expected change in wages.14 For instance, after
14In Appendix C.1, we investigate the effect of firm productivity shocks on the probability of worker
entry and exit, confirming that firm-level TFP shocks do drive worker flows in and out of the firm. The
direction of the bias, however, is not ex-ante clear.
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a negative productivity shock firms might decide not to reduce wages but lay off some
workers to reduce labor costs. Since these workers are not counted as stayers, we do not
consider the effect of changes in TFP on their wages, effectively reducing the measured
impact of negative changes of productivity on wages. Workers who are most exposed to
or expect large passthrough from negative shocks may also voluntarily choose to leave
the firm. Similarly, the effect of positive productivity shocks might be downward biased.
Workers facing large passthrough effects from a positive TFP shock may be very high skilled
workers who are more likely to be poached by, or leave for, other firms. In this section we
make some progress in controlling for selection using the simple Heckman selection method
outlined in section 3.3.2.
Columns (4) to (6) of table 3.2 show that the results after correcting for selection are quite
different. First of all, the coefficient for ηijt in column (4) almost triples in magnitude
relative to the impact of persistent TFP shocks on wages when one does not control for
selection (compare to column (1)). The selection-corrected results imply that a worker in
a firm that experiences a persistent shock to TFP of one standard deviation will receive
an average increase in her annual earnings of $705, or 1.4% of the average annual income.
This increase in the passthrough from firms’ productivity to workers’ wages points to a
much smaller role for the firm as a source of insurance for the worker. This holds true
for both positive and negative shocks. Starting from column (5), the effect of a negative
productivity change goes from being near zero in column (2) to 0.035 in column (6) and it
becomes statistically significant. This implies that a worker in a firm receiving a negative
permanent productivity shock of one standard deviation sees his annual income reduced by
$537, a value that is much larger relative to the value measured when one does not control
for selection. We also find a significant increase in the effect of a positive permanent
productivity shock into wages as it is shown in column (6) of table 3.2. In this case, a
positive persistent productivity shock of one standard deviation commands an increase in
wages of more than $1,000, that is, almost 2.6% of the average income per capita.
There are several conclusions we can draw from these results. First, there is asymmetry in
worker exposure to firm-level TFP shocks. Firms appear to pass positive shocks to work-
ers more than they pass negative shocks, providing some insurance against movements
in wages. Second, it seems that selection biases the estimated passthrough coefficients
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downwards on average, as both the overall and negative shock passthrough coefficients
increased dramatically after correcting for selection. This confirms our intuition that both
workers and firms may exit when faced with big negative TFP shocks or threats of sig-
nificant negative passthrough. However, there is also a positive selection bias, with the
effect of a positive shock doubling after correction. This is possibly due to better workers
at firms experiencing TFP growth leaving for better opportunities. The transitory shock
component, however, is not affected when correcting for the selection bias. This is intuitive
and fits with the underlying model of firm optimization – firms and workers make their
employment decisions in period t with information on the persistent shock to TFP ηjt, but
not the transitory shock εjt. Workers can not ex-ante predict and react to the transitory
component of TFP, so selection has almost no effect on the transitory shock coefficient.
To sum up, firms TFP shocks have a sizable and significant passthrough effect on worker
wage growth. After carefully correcting for selection bias, the joint effects of TFP shocks on
wage growth is much bigger than commonly found in the literature. To put into context, a
one standard deviation shock to both the permanent and transitory component is associated
with a more than $1,500 change annual income for a worker with the average wage, or 2%
of per capita income. Importantly, passthrough is not symmetric: firms pass more of
their positive persistent and transitory shocks on to workers than their negative shocks.
However, negative passthrough is significant and not negligible – firms are not providing
full insurance or near full insurance to workers when they encounter a negative TFP shock.
Switchers and Stayers
So far we have focused on the effect of TFP shocks on stayers, that is, workers that maintain
a stable employment relationship with a firm for the two years over which the change in TFP
is calculated. This is a natural starting point as changes in wages for continuing workers
can be tied more easily to changes in firm productivity and concepts of insurance against
firm-level risk. Moreover, this is the group of workers that the literature has analyzed
more often, ignoring the effect of firm shocks on the wages of workers that move between
firms. In this section we extend the existing literature to take into account the effect of
idiosyncratic, firm and worker-level, productivity changes on the wages of those workers
that move across different employers. This is a large group of workers: in any given year
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around 20% of Danish workers changed employer. Unfortunately, our data does not allow
us to directly distinguish between an individual who passed through an unemployment
spell prior to joining a different employer or had a direct transition between employers.
Therefore, we will put aside issues related to voluntary or involuntary separations and we
will treat all workers who make annual employment-to-employment transitions the same.
Similar to the previous section, we run a set of OLS panel regressions in which the depen-
dent variable is the change in real wages for a individual between two consecutive years
and the independent variable is the change in the TFP of the firm in which the individual
works. Notice that for switchers the interpretation of a positive or negative productivity
shock is different than for stayers. For the latter group, it represents a productivity change
for the firm in which they work, whereas for switchers it also captures the difference in
productivity between two different firms. Hence, a positive TFP change for a switcher
indicates that the individual moved to a firm with higher TFP relative to the firm at which
she used to work, and this change is independent of the actual change in productivity ex-
perienced by any of the firms. For instance, it is possible that the transition was motivated
by a productivity decline in the firm of origin, or an increase in the productivity of the new
firm that poached the worker, or both. To capture these effects we include in the regres-
sion the shocks to the productivity of both of the firms the individual is transitioning15 In
particular, we modify the model in equation (3.1) as follows,
∆wijkt = α+ β
η
1ηjkt + β
η
2ηkkt + Z
′
jtγ +X
′
itλ+ δt + εijkt, (3.9)
where ∆wijkt is the change in real log hourly wages of an individual that works in firm j
and moved from firm k. ηjkt is defined as the unexpected in period t− 1 innovation to the
firm TFP at which the worker is employed. Specifically, ηjkt ≡ ωjt − E[ωkt|ωkt−1]. ηkkt is
the unexpected in t− 1 innovation to persistent productivity in the firm which the worker
left. As before, the main coefficient of interest is βη1 which reflects the elasticity of a change
in wages as a response to a shock in persistent TFP for the individual.
The right panels of table 3.2 show the results. Columns (7) to (9) show that the effect of
TFP changes on wages of switchers is much stronger than it is for stayers. Furthermore, the
15Notice that this distinction is irrelevant for stayers as the firm of origin and destination is the same
firm.
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large difference in dollar values that is associated with the shock to persistent TFP is largely
due to the differences in the standard deviation of TFP changes for stayers and switchers,
as well as their difference in average wages. For example, the elasticity of wage growth to
persistent TFP shocks is almost the same between stayers and switchers when they face
negative shocks (0.035 vs 0.034), but the average wage loss from a one standard deviation
negative TFP shock is $537 dollars for stayers vs $9,142 dollars for switchers, or 1.1% of
annual average income vs 13.9% annual average income. This stark difference between
stayers and switchers is because that standard deviation of within-firm TFP changes for
stayers is about 0.4, but about 4 for switchers – job switchers experience 10 times more
variance in persistent TFP between years than job stayers. This makes sense since stayer
TFP changes reflect the same firm’s TFP growth, while TFP changes for switchers reflect
the differences between the old and new firm, which can be significant. Furthermore, the
average annual wage for stayers who see a negative TFP shock is $48,800 dollars, while
switchers the average is $65,800 dollars. Therefore the same passthrough parameter is
associated with drastically different wage losses for stayers and switchers.
3.5 Heterogeneous Passthrough
In this section we study how the passthrough from changes in firm TFP to worker wage
growth varies across the distribution of worker and firm types. We focus on how passthrough
differs across worker age and income levels, across firm productivity levels, and across the
business cycle. We also investigate how wages are affected for workers moving between
firms of differing productivity.
3.5.1 Worker Side Heterogeneity
High versus Low Wage Workers
We first study how passthrough from firm shocks to worker wages varies across workers of
different income levels. We split our sample of stayers into two groups. First, we classify
workers in a given year as “low income” if their labor earnings are below the 20th percentile
of the labor earnings distribution in that year and we classify workers as “high income”
if their labor earnings are above the 80th percentile for that year. We then estimate the
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effect of shocks to firm TFP on wages within each of these groups, correcting for selection
as described in section 3.4.2.
The results both with and without selection correction are shown in table 3.3. The dif-
ferences between low and high wage workers are staggering: selection issues aside, the
response of wages to changes in firm-level TFP are, on average, much higher for high wage
workers relative to low wage workers. For instance, comparing columns (1) and (4) in the
top panel of table 3.3 (panel A) we see that a shock in the persistent component of TFP
of one standard deviation implies a change in worker earnings of about $2,000 more if the
individual is a high wage worker relative to a low wage worker. Even after considering that
high wage workers receive labor earnings that are in average two-times higher than the
income of low wage workers, the effect on high wage workers is still much bigger. In fact, a
change in income associated with one standard deviation of permanent TFP shock is about
3.3% in the annual earnings for high wage workers compare to 2.0% annual earnings for
low wage workers.16 We also find large differences when comparing the effects of positive
and negative shocks. Looking at columns (2) and (3) for instance, we see that the elasticity
of negative shocks is roughly two thirds the wage elasticity for positive shocks among high
wage workers. We observe similar results for low wage workers.17
Note that for both high wage worker and low wage workers, the passthrough effect from
persistent TFP shocks to wage growth is much higher than it is for average wage workers
(column 4 to 6 in table 3.2). This is suggests that middle wage workers (those whose
income ranges from the 20 to 80 percentiles) are the least sensitive to firm TFP shocks.
Finally, the level of transitory shock passthrough is similar for high and low wage workers.
Young and Old Workers
Workers may be more or less exposed to firm TFP shocks depending on their age. One
might expect that older workers are likely to be more experienced on average or have
greater tenure and therefore are potentially more insured by firms than workers who have
just entered the firm. Differences in passthrough across age may also be due to age-related
16Real average annual income for high wage workers is around $85,000 whereas for low wage workers is
around $35,000.
17As before, selection has an important impact on the estimates more so for negative shocks and for
high wage workers – who also appear to be significantly more exposed to income risk due to negative firm
shocks than low wage workers.
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Table 3.3: Passthrough is Highly Heterogeneous Across Worker Types
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A High Wage Workers Low Wage Workers
∆TFPjt −∆TFPjt +∆TFPjt ∆TFPjt −∆TFPjt +∆TFPjt
Persistent (βη) 0.109∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗
Transitory (βε) 0.058∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗
$Value (βη) $2,669 $2,702 $3,759 $621 $436 $873
% of Income (βη) 3.3% 3.3% 4.6% 2.0% 1.4% 2.9%
B Young Workers Old Workers
∆TFPjt −∆TFPjt +∆TFPjt ∆TFPjt −∆TFPjt +∆TFPjt
Persistent (βη) 0.116∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ 0.205∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗
Transitory (βε) 0.050∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗
$Value (βη) $1,594 $1,590 $2,702 $654 $520 $1,158
% of Income (βη) 3.5% 3.4% 6.2% 1.2% 1.0% 2.2%
Note: Table 3.3 shows a set of panel regressions controlling for firm and worker characteristics. In each column, the
dependent variable is the growth rate of real wages for individuals that stay in the same firm for two consecutive
periods. The main explanatory variables are estimated shocks to the transitory and persistent components of
firm-level (log) TFP. The row named Value (USD) shows the change in real wages resulting from a one standard
deviation shock to TFP for a worker with the average wage for that group. The top panel shows estimates
without correcting for selection while the bottom panel shows selection-corrected estimates. High wage: top 20%
of wage distribution; Low wage: bottom 20% of wage distribution. ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Robust
standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
selection into high or low passthrough firms, industries or occupations. We divide our
sample of workers by age, and define workers who are younger than 35 years old as “young
workers”, and define workers who are older than 50 as “old workers”. The results are
shown in the bottom panel of table 3.3. As expected, the effect of persistent TFP shocks
on wage growth is stronger for younger workers than older workers. The passthrough
elasticity for younger workers is almost three times that for older workers. In dollars, the
average younger worker experiences a more than $1,500 dollar wage change from a one
standard deviation shock to persistent TFP, while for older workers, this number is $654.
This is an large effect for younger workers considering that their average annual wage is
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almost $10,000 dollars lower than for older workers. Similar with previous results, workers
are relatively more sheltered from negative shocks than from positive shocks, but negative
passthrough is still significant. As we found with high and low wage workers, there is not
nearly as much heterogeneity in transitory shock passthrough as there is for persistent
shock passthrough, though passthrough from transitory shocks are still economically and
statistically significant.
Long Term Effects of Shocks
So far we have focused on the effect of transitory or persistent productivity shocks on
one-year wage change. Hence, a natural question is whether the passthrough we have
documented so far in our analysis represents transitory or permanent shocks to worker
wages. This is important as firm productivity shocks that translate to permanent changes
in worker wages represent a source of risk that is more difficult to insure against. To look
at this we run regressions of the form
∆ logwijt = α+ β
ηηj,t + Z′jtγ +X ′itλ+ δt + εijt, (3.10)
where, unlike our basic specification in equation 3.1, the dependent variable is defined as
∆ logwijt = logwijt+3− logwijt−1. Hence, the coefficient βη captures the long lasting effect
on wages of a change in the persistent shock to firm’s productivity, η. Thus we are looking
at the effect of a shock in TFP in period t on the total change in wages from t− 1 to t+ 3.
Table 3.4 shows the results for several dimensions of heterogeneity. First it is clear that
productivity shocks at the firm level have a long lasting impact on workers wages and
this effect greatly differs across groups. For instance, a high wage worker of a firm that
experiences a positive change in productivity of one standard deviation between periods
t − 1 and t will have gained by period t + 3 a total of $5,800 USD more than an similar
worker at an otherwise identical firm with no TFP shock. The effect for low wage workers is
smaller but still significant as a change of one standard deviation in productivity generates
a 1% increase in their wages after a year. Negative productivity shocks at the firm level
also have long lasting effect on workers wages, specially for high wage workers and young
workers.18
18Our results also suggest a significant role for transitory shocks – the j,t in the firm’s productivity
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Table 3.4: Productivity Shocks Have Long Lasting Effects on Worker Wages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A Stayers Expansion
∆TFPjt −∆TFPjt +∆TFPjt ∆TFPjt −∆TFPjt +∆TFPjt
Persistent (βη) 0.027∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗
$Value (βη) 419 369 688 570 285 1,258
% of Income 1% 1% 1% 1% 0% 2%
B High Wage Low Wage
Persistent (βη) 0.238∗∗∗ 0.239∗∗∗ 0.246∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗
$Value (βη) 5,874 5,874 6,009 419 285 453
% of Income 7% 7% 7% 1% 1% 1%
C Young Old
Persistent (βη) 0.113∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗
$Value (βη) 1,544 1,409 1,896 503 637 335
% of Income 3% 3% 4% 1% 1% 1%
Note: Table 3.4 shows a set of panel regressions controlling for firm and worker characteristics. In each column,
the dependent variable is the growth rate of real wages between period t − 1 and period t + 3. The main
explanatory variable is the persistent component in the firm’s productivity process. The row labeled Value
(USD) shows the change in real wages resulting from a one standard deviation shock to TFP for a worker with
the average wage for that group. The definitions of stayer/switcher, high/low wage and expansion/recession are
as in previous tables. ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
3.5.2 Firm Side Heterogeneity
Does passthrough differ for workers employed by firms in different sectors? Do more pro-
ductive firms pass a larger or smaller fraction of their productivity gains to wages? To
answer the first question we take the sample of continuing and run our passthrough anal-
ysis within a set of narrow industry groups.
The left panel of figure 3.5 shows the passthrough coefficient by industry sorted by the mag-
nitude of the coefficient associated with a positive persistent productivity shock. First,
notice the marked heterogeneity across sectors. For instance, the passthrough for the
Transportation sector is almost ten times the passthrough estimated for Utilities. Second,
process – on long term changes of worker wages although the effects are smaller relative to the persistent
shock but still significant. In fact, shocks to the transitory component of productivity have an impact on
wages that is half as much as the impact of the persistent component.
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Figure 3.5: Passthrough by Industry
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Note: The left panel of figure 3.5 shows the coefficient of the change in firm-level productivity on a OLS
panel regression as in equation (3.1) conditional on the productivity change to be positive within aggregate
industry groups. The right panel shows the results for negative productivity changes. All coefficients are
statistically significant at the 1% level with robust standard errors clustered by firm.
Manufacturing sits close to the bottom of the distribution with a coefficient that is close
than the economy average. The right panel of figure 3.5 shows the passthrough coefficient
for a negative productivity shock. The differences across industries are again remarkable.
It is also clear that industries that command high positive passthrough are not the same in-
dustries that generate high negative passthrough. Case in point is Finance, which negative
passthrough ranks amongst the highest but commands a negative – and not statistically
significant – passthrough from positive productivity shocks.
Next, we study whether firms of different productivity levels pass shocks differently to their
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workers. For instance, it is possible that firms which experience a persistent decline in pro-
ductivity cannot continue to operate without reducing the wages of their workers. In such
cases, we should see a higher passthrough among lower productivity firms. In contrast,
if low productivity firms are more vulnerable to productivity shocks due to financial con-
straints or other frictions, they may leave the market and therefore low TFP firms that stay
in the market may show lower passthrough. We defined high productivity firms as those
at the top quintile of the TFP level distribution whereas low productivity firms are those
in the bottom quintile of the distribution. We then run the same passthrough regression
within each productivity group. The results are shown in table 3.5. Comparing columns
(1) and (4), one can see that the average passthrough among high TFP firms is one order of
magnitude larger than passthrough among low TFP firms. This difference is more stark in
the passthrough for negative TFP changes. In fact, the passthrough coefficient of negative
shocks is positive and significant for workers in high TFP firms, whereas for workers in
low TFP firms, the passthrough is though significant but very small in magnitude. The
passthrough of positive shocks is also significantly larger among high TFP firms, though
generally smaller than the negative passthrough coefficient. Taken together, these result
suggest that low productivity firms provide better insurance to workers in the face of neg-
ative shocks. This result is in contrast with the intuition that high TFP firms (which are
typically larger and potentially have better access to the financial markets) should be more
capable to respond to shocks without impacting labor earnings.
The higher passthrough among high productivity firms could arise from heterogeneous
response top shocks between high and low productivity firms or from differences between
wage setting.Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2012) suggests that the employment within large
firms, which are typically more productive, are more responsive to shocks than small firms.
That is, large firms are quicker to respond to reduce employment growth during a recession
to adjust for the lower level of economic activity. Our results indicate that large firms also
reduce wages in response to shocks. Dividing the sample further by high wage and low
wage workers who work in high TFP and low TFP firms, we see that high wage workers
who work at high productivity firms are the most sensitive to persistent TFP shocks.19
19Our results can also be affected by the selection of firms into or out of the sample. As discussed in the
main text, if firms of low TFP are more likely to leave the sample and exit the market, then, the passthrough
of negative TFP shocks to wages might be underestimated. Ideally we could use firm borrowing constraints
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Table 3.5: Passthrough regression for high and low TFP firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
High TFP Firms Low TFP Firms
∆TFPjt −∆TFPjt +∆TFPjt ∆TFPjt −∆TFPjt +∆TFPjt
A All Workers
Persistent (βη) 0.215∗∗∗ 0.219∗∗∗ 0.177∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗
$Value (βη) $3,088 $3,088 $2,602 $403 $235 $1,175
% of Income 6.5% 6.6% 5.3% 0.8% 0.5% 2.3%
B High Wage Workers
Persistent (βη) 0.413∗∗∗ 0.401∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗
$Value (βη) $10,339 $9,483 $6,495 $1,846 $1,829 $3,374
% of Income 12.4% 12.0% 7.2% 2.3% 2.2% 4.1%
C Low Wage Workers
Persistent (βη) 0.106∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.221∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗
$Value (βη) $906 $822 $1,947 $470 $319 $738
% of Income 3.2% 2.9% 6.6% 1.5% 1.0% 2.4%
Note: Table 3.5 shows a set of panel regressions controlling for firm and worker characteristics. In each column, the
dependent variable is the growth rate of real wages for individuals that stay in the same firm for two consecutive
periods. The main explanatory variables are estimated shocks to the transitory and persistent components of
firm-level (log) TFP. The row named Value (USD) shows the change in real (USD) wages resulting from a one
standard deviation shock to TFP for a worker with the average wage for that group. Columns 1-3 show results
for firms in the top 20 percentile of the TFP distribution, while columns 4-6 show results for firms in bottom
20 percentile of the TFP distribution. All panels show estimates correcting for worker-side selection but not
firm-side selection. ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
3.5.3 Business Cycle Heterogeneity
Like the rest of the world Denmark was hit by a severe economic downturn in 2008. The
decline in Danish GDP was under-way at the beginning of 2008 accompanied by a large drop
in labor market hiring and an increase in separation rates. Arguably, workers in recessions
and expansions face different labor market environments and therefore the passthrough
from firm-level idiosyncratic shocks to wages may also be different. To investigate if this
is the case, we estimate our passthrough regression separately in recession years (2008 to
2009) and expansion years (2005 to 2006). The results are presented in Table 3.6.
The left three columns are the results for Recessions, and the right three columns show
as an instrument in the selection correction procedure, but we do not currently have that data so firm
selection is a potential issue in our analysis
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Table 3.6: Passthrough Over the Business Cycle
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Recessions (08-09) Expansions (05-06)
∆TFPjt −∆TFPjt +∆TFPjt ∆TFPjt −∆TFPjt +∆TFPjt
A All Workers
Persistent (βη) 0.083∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗
Value (USD) $1,326 $1,342 $1,879 $570 $453 $890
% of Income 2.5% 2.5% 3.6% 1.0% 0.9% 1.7%
B High Wage Workers
Persistent (βη) 0.181∗∗∗ 0.205∗∗∗ 0.234∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗
Value (USD) $4,565 $5,186 $5,790 $2,249 $2,250 $2,433
% of Income 5.4% 6.2% 7.0% 2.7% 2.7% 2.9%
C Low Wage Workers
Persistent (βη) 0.076∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗
Value (USD) $738 $503 $956 $503 $436 $655
% of Income 2.3% 1.6% 3.0% 1.6% 1.3% 2.1%
Note: Table 3.6 shows a set of panel regressions controlling for firm and worker characteristics. In each column,
the dependent variable is the growth rate of real wages for individuals that stay in the same firm for two
consecutive periods. The main explanatory variable is the change in within-firm (log) TFP. The row named
$Value shows the change in real (USD) wages resulting from a one standard deviation shock to TFP for a worker
with the average wage for that group. Columns 1-3 show results for years 2008 and 2009, while columns 4-6
show results 2005 and 2006. The top panel shows estimates without correcting for selection while the bottom
panel shows selection-corrected estimates. ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Robust standard errors, below
the point estimates, are clustered at the firm level.
the results for Expansions. All panels show the results of estimating passthrough after
correcting for selection. The difference between recessions and expansions is clear: in
recessions, on average, workers experience significant passthrough when firms experience
negative TFP shocks, while in expansions workers are relatively insured against negative
shocks – the passthrough for negative TFP shock is significant but small especially for
workers between the 20th and 80th wage percentiles.
The results in panel A show the average passthrough effect in expansions vs recessions
for all workers. As discussed in the previous subsections, workers with different average
wages may be affected differently by TFP shocks. This may be especially true along the
business cycle, since potentially low wage workers are more or less sensitive to recessions
126
than high wage workers. The results shown in panels B and C confirm this difference
between wage groups. Low wage workers don’t have much variation compared to high
wage workers in terms of passthrough elasticity, but do see a stronger passthrough effect in
recessions compare to expansions. High workers are much more sensitive to recessions. In
the recession, high wage worker negative shock passthrough is 10 percentage points higher
than it is during an expansion. The difference in the average dollar value is also significant.
This is intuitive – firms may be more likely to adjust wages for workers who are paid
highly. At the bottom, especially when wages are close to the minimum wage, there isn’t
much room where firms can adjust wages, so firms are more likely to adjust among other
dimensions such as employment or working hours. Generally speaking, low wage workers
in expansions are least sensitive to TFP shocks while high wage workers in recessions are
the most sensitive. This suggests that low wage workers get much more insurance from
the firm when their firms are hit by TFP shocks. High wage workers on the other hand
do not have nearly as much insurance, so their wages vary much more due to TFP shocks,
especially when the economy is in a downturn.
3.6 Quantitative Analysis
Our previous analysis establishes the key relations between the shocks affecting the firms
and the passthrough of these shocks to workers earnings. In this section we take these
results as given and study the impact of the passthrough from firms’ shocks to workers’
wages for inequality and welfare. Doing so is relevant for at least two reasons. First, will
allow us to evaluate the social value of the insurance provided by the firms and also to
estimate how much workers would be willing to pay in order to increase the degree of
insurance they receive. Second, given the large differences in passthrough observed in the
data across workers and firms with different characteristics, using a model will allow us
to better evaluate the welfare costs of this heterogeneity, the cost of idiosyncratic income
fluctuations, and the welfare cost of firm-level shocks.
In order to make progress on these issues, we first estimate a stochastic income process that
incorporates both firms’ and workers’ characteristics. In particular, we extend the standard
stochastic income process adopted in the literature by incorporating firm-level shocks that
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are passed to workers in different degrees. Importantly, we jointly use worker- and firm-
level data. Most papers which estimate income processes use only data on individual
characteristics, wages, and transitions across different employment statuses (see for instance
Low et al. (2010) and Guvenen (2007)). To the best of our knowledge, this is one of the
first papers to directly use firm-level shocks and passthrough to wages in the estimation
of a stochastic income process allowing for an asymmetric and heterogeneous response of
wages to firm shocks.
We then incorporate the estimated income process in an otherwise standard incomplete
markets life-cycle consumption-savings model. Using this model we study the welfare
value of the (partial) insurance provided by the firms. We do this by means of three
counterfactual exercises. In the first, we completely eliminate the insurance provided by
the firms (i.e. we allow the passthrough from firm shocks to wages to be equal to one) and
we ask what are the welfare losses relative to the baseline, partial insurance, case. In the
second, we compare the baseline economy with a case in which the passthrough is zero (i.e.
full insurance) and ask how much, in terms of consumption, workers are willing to pay in
order to eliminate their exposure to firm-level shocks. In the following sections we set up
the basic properties of the stochastic income process and the life cycle income model that
we will use in our welfare evaluation.
3.6.1 Wages and Shocks
We assume that the real wage of an individual i working in firm j in period t, wi,j,t is given
by,
logwi,j,t = µt + xi,j,tΓ + η˜i,t + ε˜i,t + ψi,j,t(zj(i),t, zj(i),t−1), (3.11)
where µt represents the average level of real wages in the economy, xi,j,t is a vector of
regressors including worker and firm level characteristics, η˜i,t is the persistent component
of wages that is uncorrelated to firm-level shocks, ε˜i,t is the transitory component of wages
that is uncorrelated with the persistent component and with firm-level shocks, and zj(i),t
is a measure of firm j’s TFP which affects all the workers of firm j in period t. Here the
subscript j(i), t denotes the firm at which individual i works in period t. The heterogeneity
in passthrough is captured by the function ψi,j,t which may depend on worker and firm-level
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characteristics.20. The function ψi,j,t is flexible in that it allows for asymmetric responses to
increases or decreases in TFP, as well as detailed heterogeneity in the degree of passthrough
and the possibility that the worker switches firms between periods t−1 and t. As mentioned
in section 3.3.3, firm TFP can be further expressed as zj,t = g(ωj,t−1) + ηj,t + εj,t, where
g(ωj,t−1) is the anticipated value of productivity, ηj,t is the unanticipated permanent shock
to productivity and εj,t is the unanticipated transitory shock.
Estimation Procedure
We start by estimating firms’ productivity process. To keep the model as tractable as
possible, we assume the TFP follows an AR1 process,
zj,t = cj + ρ
z
jzj,t−1 + ξj,t. (3.12)
To obtain the first-order-autocorrelation parameter we demean our estimates of firm-level
productivity so cj = 0, and we run the above regression in the data, which gives us a
value of ρz of 0.97. This value is relatively more persistent than the one used in most of
the literature mostly because our TFP estimation carefully controls for observables in a
nonparametric fashion as oppose to attributing much of the variation in firm revenues to
variation in TFP. We discuss in more detail about our TFP estimation strategy and the
corresponding properties in section 3.3.3.21. We assume ξjt is iid and follows a mean zero
normal mixture distribution: with probability p, ξj,t ∼ N(µ1, σ1), and with probability (1−
p), ξj,t ∼ N(µ2, σ2), where µ2 = − p1−pµ1. We then estimate the remaining four parameters
{p, µ1, σ1, σ2} following the method developed by Civale et al. (2016). The estimation
results are shown in Table 3.7. Note that the moments (mean, variance, skewness, kurtosis)
that we use for our estimation in the TFP process are from the worker-weighted TFP
distribution. This simplifies the firm-to-worker match since in the current version of our
model we do not have multi-worker firms. Each firm only employs one worker and therefore
20Notice in this formulation that firm TFP and passthrough parameters enter as an exogenous process.
Modeling the endogenous formation of passthrough and decisions of firms in response to exogenous pro-
ductivity shocks, although beyond the scope of this paper, is an important area of our ongoing research
agenda.
21Further investigation and discussion on how the TFP measure in this paper compare to the TFP
measures in existing literature in terms of properties can be found in Chan et al. (2019)
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we match our model to the worker-weighted TFP distribution.
Given our estimated process for firm productivity, we then estimate the worker wage pro-
cess. In our baseline setting, we assume that firms and workers are randomly matched.
Specifically we first draw firms based on the workers weighted distribution (estimated in
the previous step). We then draw one worker for each firm, so workers and firms match-
ing is independent. This assumption allows us to search for firm-side parameters and
workers-side parameters separately, which greatly simplified the estimation22. One of our
key innovation is that in our stochastic wage process, we capture wage changes that comes
from firms passing TFP shocks to the workers heterogeneously across different worker and
firm groups, and non-symmetrically between positive and negative shocks. We assume that
the passthrough function, ψi,j,t(zj(i),t, zj(i),t−1), is linear and we ignore the time effect and
observable effects for now23. The simplified wage process is then:
log yi,j,t = ηi,t + εi,t +ψ0i,j,szj,t−1 +ψ1i,j,s(zj,t− zj,t−1)1∆zj,t>0 +ψ2i,j,s(zj,t− zj,t−1)1∆zj,t≤0,
(3.13)
where ηi,t is the permanent component of workers wages which follows a standard AR(1)
process: ηi,t = ci + ρ
η
i ηi,t−1 + ζi,t, and εi,t is a transitory component. We assume that
ζ(i, t) ∼ N(0, σζ) and εi,t ∼ N(0, σ), so we have now seven parameters to estimate:
ω = {σεi , σζi , ci, ρηi , ψ0, ψ1, ψ2}.
22Alternatively, one could draw firms and workers jointly according to the joint distribution that we
observe in the data. This will then require the joint estimation of all firms side parameters and workers
side parameters as well as the covariance parameters.
23Time effect and workers observable characteristics are added in the full model section, and the esti-
mation of the full model is ongoing work.
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The wage process specified in equation 3.13 implies the following moments,
∆ log yijt = ∆ηi,t + ∆εit + (ψ11∆zj,t>0 + ψ21∆zj,t≤0)∆zj,t
+ (ψ0 − ψ11∆zj,t−1>0 − ψ21∆zj,t−1≤0)∆zj,t−1
E(log yijt) =
ci
1− ρηi
+ F1(ψ0, ψ1, ψ2,firmparams)
Sd(log yijt) = σ
ε
i +
σζi√
1− ρη2i
+ F2(ψ0, ψ1, ψ2,firmparams)
E(log yijt log yijt−1) =
c2i
1− ρη + ρη
σ2ζ
1− ρ2η
+ F3(ψ0, ψ1, ψ2,firmparams)
Sd(∆ log yijt,t−1) =
√
2σεi +
√
2
1 + ρ
σζi + F4(ψ0, ψ1, ψ2, firmparams)
Sd(∆ log yijt,t−3) =
√
2σεi +
√
2
1 + ρ
(1 + ρ+ ρ2)σζi + F5(ψ0, ψ1, ψ2,firmparams).
F1 − F5 are functions of ψ0, ψ1, ψ2, firm parameters, and TFP values which are predeter-
mined in the firm side estimation. Given the asymmetric passthrough structure of our
wage process, it is rather difficult to derive an analysis solution for our parameters. Hence,
we instead use a mixture of simulated method of moments (SMM) and indirect inference
(Smith Jr (1993)) to jointly estimate all seven parameters. Note that the mean and vari-
ance of log wage, the variance of the change of log wages at one and three years, and the
one-period autocorrelation of wages gives us information about the first four parameters.
To identify the three passthrough parameters, consider the auxiliary models:
log yijt = β¯ + β0zj,t−1 + 1 (3.14)
∆ log yijt = γ¯ + γ1∆zj,t1∆zj,t>0 + γ2∆zj,t1∆zj,t≤0 + 2. (3.15)
The goal is to bring the data and simulated data as close as possible through the lens of
auxiliary model. That is, given a set of parameter guesses, we run the regression of the
auxiliary model using the data (which gives us βˆ0, γˆ1 and γˆ2) and using the simulated data
generated from our economic model (which gives us β˜0, γ˜1 and γ˜2). We want to bring (βˆ0,
γˆ1, γˆ2) and (β˜0, γ˜1, γ˜2) as close as possible. Matching this auxiliary model’s moments will
give us information about ψ0, ψ1 and ψ2. All together we have seven parameters to be
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Table 3.7: TFP and Wage Parameter Estimation
TFP Parameters
Variable Value Description
ρ 0.9702 AR(1) parameter
p 0.9676 Probability of the normal mixture of innovation in TFP
µ1 0.1409 mean of the first normal distribution in innovation
σ1 0.0017 Standard deviation of the first normal distribution in innovation
σ2 0.7382 Standard deviation of the second normal distribution in innovation
Wage Process Parameters
Variable Value Description
ρη 0.701 AR(1) parameter
ση 0.1884 Standard deviation of the permanent wage shock
σε 0.0537 Standard deviation of the transitory wage shock
cη 3.8 Average component in wage process
ψ0 0.0446 TFP marginal effect on wage levels
ψ1 0.0126 Positive TFP shock marginal effect on wage levels
ψ2 0.0036 Negative TFP shock marginal effect on wage levels
identified, and we are matching the following eight moments to identify the parameters of
the wage process:
Moments = {E(log yijt),E(log yijt log yijt−1), Sd(log yijt), Sd(∆ log yijt), Sd(∆ log yijt,t−3), βˆ0, γˆ1, γˆ2}.
This simple way of estimation will give us the estimation of the seven parameters for the
wage process (ω1 − ω7).
3.6.2 Estimation Results
We further simplify the estimation considering that workers and firms are ex-ante homo-
geneous. This reduces the number of parameters to be estimated to twelve (five for firms
and seven for workers).24 The estimation results are shown in Table 3.7, and Table 3.8
shows the model fit.
24Our current work extends our estimation method to account for fixed different across different firms
and worker types.
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Table 3.8: Model Estimation Fit
TFP Moments
Variable Data Model Description
E(z) 0 0.0001 Mean of log TFP process parameter
V (z) 14.34 10.35 Variance of log TFP process
S(z) -1.02 -0.91 Skewness of log TFP process
K(z) 3.32 3.89 Kurtosis of log TFP process
Wage Moments
Variable Data Model Description
E(y) 12.74 12.74 Mean log wage (DKK)
Sd(y) 0.15 0.07 Standard deviation of log wage
E(y ∗ yL) 162.28 162.27 Autocorrelation of log wage
Sd(∆(y)) 0.03 0.05 Standard deviation of changes in log wage
Sd(∆3(y)) 0.09 0.09 Standard deviation of changes in 3 periods log wage
βˆ0 0.04 0.04 Auxiliary model coefficient
γˆ1 0.009 0.009 Auxiliary model coefficient
γˆ2 0.009 0.009 Auxiliary model coefficient
3.6.3 A Consumption-Savings Model
In this section we study some key implications of the rich earnings dynamics generated by
the stochastic process estimated in the previous section. We pose an heterogeneous agents
incomplete markets life-cycle model in which workers are subject to the stochastic process
described by equation 3.11. Individuals can borrow and save using a risk-free asset, ai,t,
with gross return (1 + rt). Borrowing is limited by a predefined minimum level which in
principle can depend on worker characteristics. Denote this minimum value as ai,t. We will
also assume that the individuals pay taxes and receive benefits from the government, which
will be modeled to match the Danish system. Finally, individuals value consumption ci,t
by means of a time separable utility function, u(ci,t). The dynamic programming problem
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of an individual is given by,
V it (ai,t, wi,j,t, µt) = maxci,t,ai,t+1
{(cit)1−σ
1− σ + βEV
i
t (ai,t+1, wi,j,t+1, µt+1)
}
,
subject to
ci,t + ai,t+1 = ai,t(1 + rt) + (1− τt(wi,j,t))wi,j,t + Tt(wi,j,t),
logwi,j,t = µt + η˜i,t + ε˜i,t + ψi,j,t(zj(i),t, zj(i),t−1),
µt+1 = Γ(µt), ai,t+1 ≥ a
where β is the subjective discount factor, σ governs risk aversion and the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution, and µt is the distribution of individuals over idiosyncratic states.
The tax function is defined by τt(wi,j,t) while Tt(wi,j,t) is a government benefits function.
Calibration
To simplify the analysis, we assume that individuals are infinitely lived, and a period in our
model corresponds to a year. The coefficient of risk aversion σ is set to 2 as a conservative
choice. The discount factor is chosen to match a wealth-to-income ratio of 4, the returns
to the risk free asset is set to 3%, and the borrowing limit, a is set equal to the average
annual earnings in the economy.
The key element of our analysis is the stochastic income process faced by workers, and
more importantly, the passthrough of firms’ shocks to workers’ wages. In our baseline
analysis we consider the income process described by equation 3.13 and the parameters
from table 3.7. We then consider two cases, the first sets ψ1 = ψ2 = 1 which corresponds
to a full symmetric passthrough of productivity shocks to wages. The second turns off the
passthrough of positive shocks by setting ψ1 = 1 but ψ2 = 1.
Model Fit
Our model economy is able to generate substantial wealth inequality. Estimates from
Jakobsen et al. (2017) show that in Denmark, 20% of total wealth is held by households at
the top 1% of the wealth distribution, whereas 50% of total wealth is held by the top 10%.
The bottom 50% of the distribution holds little to no wealth. In our model, the top 1%
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holds 15% of the wealth in the economy whereas the top 10% of households holds 45% of
the total wealth. This is remarkable considering that standard consumption-savings models
typically cannot account well for the large disparities in wealth observed in Denmark or
other economies.25
Our first quantitative exercise allows answering the question: what is the value – in con-
sumption equivalents – that workers assign to the insurance provided by the firms? In
our simple setting, this implies comparing the benchmark economy to one in which firms’
shocks are fully passed to workers (ψ = ψ = 1). Our estimates suggest that workers are
willing to pay a very little amount of lifetime consumption for the insurance provided by
firms (less than 1%). This is because, in a model with infinitely lived workers with access
to a risk-free asset, households can undue the decrease of the insurance provided by the
firms by increasing their life-time savings. The offsetting effect of an increase in capital
accumulation reduces the steady-state value of the insurance provided by firms. At the
same time, because there is an increase in the fraction of positive shocks that are passed
to workers, the average workers wage increases. The value of the insurance for negative
shocks, as expected, is more valuable for workers. We can evaluate that case by considering
a 0 passthrough of positive shock, but a full passthrough from negative firms’ shocks to
workers wages. Adding a more realistic labor income process that takes into account em-
ployment status transition and a richer asset market, both of which are part of our ongoing
work, will likely increase the insurance value provided by the firms.
3.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we offer new evidence on the effect of changes in firms’ productivity on
workers’ wages. Using high quality, employer-employee matched administrative panel data
we address two important issues the literature has ignored so far: the effect of selection
and the impact of changes in firm-level productivity for workers that switch between firms.
Moreover, we provide a more direct measure of firm’ total factor productivity and we
explore several degrees of heterogeneity among firms and workers types.
To control for selection, we use a novel approach that exploits employment and income
25For a survey see De Nardi (2015) and the references therein.
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information of spouses to estimate the probability that an individual stays in the same
firm during a particular year. We find that controlling for selection has a major impact in
the passthrough estimates from TFP shocks to wages. In fact, the OLS coefficient more
than doubles when one has controlled for selection relative to the coefficient when selection
issues are not addressed. In general, we find large and economically significant passthrough
coefficients: After we have controlled for selection, we find that a worker in a firm that
experiences a TFP change of one standard deviation sees her annual earnings increase by
$1,500 which is around 2% of the Danish income per capita. Considering that in any given
year 33% of firms - which employ 40% of all the workers in Denmark - receive experience a
persistent or transitory TFP shock of at least one standard deviation from the average, we
see that the effect of firm-level shocks on wages is quite substantial. Furthermore, relative
to continuing workers, the impact of TFP change for switchers is substantially larger.
Heterogeneity plays a major effect on shaping the effect of TFP shocks on wages. In fact,
we find remarkable differences between workers at higher ranks of the income distribution
– who are less insured against the positive and negative shocks affecting the firms – and
workers at the bottom of the income distribution – for which the passthrough is lower and
less economically significant. We also find extremely large differences across industries and
for young and old workers.
In the second part of our paper, we estimate a rich stochastic income process that captures
the salient features we observe in the data. Our major innovation is to consider an inde-
pendent process of firm-level productivity as an additional shock affecting workers earnings
directly and the estimation of a passthrough from the firm’s shocks to workers wages using
indirect inference. Our estimation suggests an important role for firm-level shocks in shap-
ing the dynamics of workers’ labor income. We then incorporate our estimated stochastic
process into an otherwise standard consumption savings model. In our model, the insur-
ance provided by the firms is of little value for the workers which can offset an increase
in the passthrough from firm’s shocks to wages – which increases income instability – by
increasing asset accumulation. Incorporating a richer life-cycle into the model and a more
realistic asset market will likely increase the importance of the insurance provided by firms,
both of which are part of our ongoing work.
136
137
Chapter 4
References
Andrew B Abel. Optimal investment under uncertainty. The American Economic Review,
73(1):228–233, 1983.
Daron Acemoglu. Technical change, inequality, and the labor market. Journal of economic
literature, 40(1):7–72, 2002.
Daron Acemoglu and David Autor. Skills, tasks and technologies: Implications for em-
ployment and earnings. Handbook of labor economics, 4:1043–1171, 2011.
Daniel A Ackerberg, Kevin Caves, and Garth Frazer. Identification properties of recent
production function estimators. Econometrica, 83(6):2411–2451, 2015.
Omar Al-Ubaydli and Patrick A McLaughlin. Regdata: A numerical database on industry-
specific regulations for all united states industries and federal regulations, 1997–2012.
Regulation &amp; Governance, 11(1):109–123, 2017.
Ivan Alfaro, Nicholas Bloom, and Xiaoji Lin. The finance uncertainty multiplier. Technical
report, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2018.
Cristina Arellano, Yan Bai, and Patrick Kehoe. Financial markets and fluctuations in
uncertainty. Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Staff Report, 2010.
David H Autor, Lawrence F Katz, and Melissa S Kearney. Trends in us wage inequality:
Revising the revisionists. The Review of economics and statistics, 90(2):300–323, 2008.
138
Ru¨diger Bachmann and Christian Bayer. ‘wait-and-see’business cycles? Journal of Mone-
tary Economics, 60(6):704–719, 2013.
Rudiger Bachmann and Christian Bayer. Investment Dispersion and the Business Cycle.
American Economic Review, 104(4):1392–1416, April 2014.
Jesper Bagger, Bent Jesper Christensen, and Dale T Mortensen. Wage and labor produc-
tivity dispersion: The roles of total factor productivity, labor quality, capital intensity,
and rent sharing. In 2014 Meeting Papers, 2014.
Robert J. Barro. Rare disasters and asset markets in the twentieth century. Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 121(3):823–866, 2006.
Erling Barth, Alex Bryson, James C Davis, and Richard Freeman. It’s where you work:
Increases in the dispersion of earnings across establishments and individuals in the united
states. Journal of Labor Economics, 34(S2):S67–S97, 2016.
Susanto Basu and Brent Bundick. Uncertainty shocks in a model of effective demand.
Econometrica, 85(3):937–958, 2017.
David Berger, Ian Dew-Becker, and Stefano Giglio. Uncertainty shocks as second-moment
news shocks. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2017.
Nicholas Bloom. Fluctuations in uncertainty. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 28(2):
153–76, 2014.
Nicholas Bloom, Max Floetotto, Nir Jaimovich, Itay Saporta-Eksten, and Stephen J Terry.
Really uncertain business cycles. Econometrica, 86(3):1031–1065, 2018.
Jesse Bricker, Alice Henriques, Jacob Krimmel, and John Sabelhaus. Measuring income and
wealth at the top using administrative and survey data. Brookings Papers on Economic
Activity, 2016(1):261–331, 2016.
Francisco J Buera. A dynamic model of entrepreneurship with borrowing constraints:
theory and evidence. Annals of finance, 5(3):443–464, 2009.
Francisco J Buera and Yongseok Shin. Financial frictions and the persistence of history:
A quantitative exploration. Journal of Political Economy, 121(2):221–272, 2013.
139
Francisco J Buera, Joseph P Kaboski, and Yongseok Shin. Entrepreneurship and financial
frictions: A macrodevelopment perspective. economics, 7(1):409–436, 2015.
Marco Cagetti and Mariacristina De Nardi. Entrepreneurship, frictions, and wealth. Jour-
nal of political Economy, 114(5):835–870, 2006.
Mikael Carlsson, Julia´n Messina, and Oskar Nordstro¨m Skans. Wage adjustment and
productivity shocks. The Economic Journal, 126(595):1739–1773, 2015.
Mons Chan, Sergio Salgado, and Ming Xu. The distribution and evolution of firm produc-
tivity. 2019.
Simone Civale, Luis Dı´ez-Catala´n, and Fatih Fazilet. Discretizing a process with non-zero
skewness and high kurtosis. 2016.
Diego Comin, Erica L Groshen, and Bess Rabin. Turbulent firms, turbulent wages? Journal
of Monetary Economics, 56(1):109–133, 2009.
Jason G Cummins and Giovanni L Violante. Investment-specific technical change in the
united states (1947–2000): Measurement and macroeconomic consequences. Review of
Economic dynamics, 5(2):243–284, 2002.
Steven J Davis and John Haltiwanger. Gross job creation, gross job destruction, and
employment reallocation. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107(3):819–863, 1992.
Steven J Davis and John Haltiwanger. Labor market fluidity and economic performance.
Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2014.
Steven J Davis, John Haltiwanger, Ron Jarmin, Javier Miranda, Christopher Foote, and
Eva Nagypal. Volatility and dispersion in business growth rates: Publicly traded versus
privately held firms [with comments and discussion]. NBER macroeconomics annual, 21:
107–179, 2006.
Mariacristina De Nardi. Quantitative models of wealth inequality: A survey. Technical
report, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2015.
140
Ryan Decker, John Haltiwanger, Ron Jarmin, and Javier Miranda. The role of en-
trepreneurship in us job creation and economic dynamism. The Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 28(3):3–24, 2014.
Ryan Decker, John Haltiwanger, Ron Jarmin, and Javier Miranda. Where has all the
skewness gone? the decline in highgrowth (young) firms in the u.s. Working Paper,
2015.
Ryan A Decker, John Haltiwanger, Ron S Jarmin, and Javier Miranda. Declining business
dynamism: Implications for productivity. Brookings Insitution Hutchins Center Working
Paper No, 23, 2016.
Riccardo DiCecio. Sticky wages and sectoral labor comovement. Journal of Economic
Dynamics and Control, 33(3):538–553, 2009.
David S Evans and Boyan Jovanovic. An estimated model of entrepreneurial choice under
liquidity constraints. Journal of political economy, 97(4):808–827, 1989.
David S Evans and Linda S Leighton. Some empirical aspects of entrepreneurship. The
American Economic Review, 79(3):519–535, 1989.
Jesus Fernandez-Villaverde, Pablo Guerron-Quintana, Juan F. Rubio-Ramirez, and Martin
Uribe. Risk Matters: The Real Effects of Volatility Shocks. American Economic Re-
view, 101(6):2530–61, October 2011. URL https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/
v101y2011i6p2530-61.html.
Jeremy T Fox and Vale´rie Smeets. Does input quality drive measured differences in firm
productivity? International Economic Review, 52(4):961–989, 2011.
Benjamin Friedrich, Lisa Laun, Costas Meghir, and Luigi Pisteferri. Earnings dynamics
and firm-level shocks. Working paper, 2014.
Xavier Gabaix. Variable Rare Disasters: A Tractable Theory of Ten Puzzles in Macro-
finance. American Economic Review, 98(2):64–67, May 2008. URL https://ideas.
repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v98y2008i2p64-67.html.
141
Xavier Gabaix. Variable rare disasters: An exactly solved framework for ten puzzles in
macro-finance. The Quarterly journal of economics, 127(2):645–700, 2012.
Amit Gandhi, Salvador Navarro, and David Rivers. On the identification of gross output
production functions. 2018.
Andrew Garin, Filipe Silverio, et al. How does firm performance affect wages? evidence
from idiosyncratic export shocks. Technical report, Working Paper, 2018.
William M Gentry and R Glenn Hubbard. Entrepreneurship and household saving. Ad-
vances in economic analysis &amp; policy, 4(1), 2004.
Simon Gilchrist, Jae W Sim, and Egon Zakrajˇsek. Uncertainty, financial frictions, and
investment dynamics. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2014.
Robert J Gordon. The measurement of durable goods prices. University of Chicago Press,
2007.
Peter Gottschalk, Robert Moffitt, Lawrence F Katz, and William T Dickens. The growth
of earnings instability in the us labor market. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,
1994(2):217–272, 1994.
Franc¸ois Gourio. Disasters and recoveries. American Economic Review, 98(2):68–73, 2008.
Francois Gourio. Credit risk and disaster risk. American Economic Journal: Macroeco-
nomics, 5(3):1–34, 2013.
Franc¸ois Gourio, Todd Messer, and Michael Siemer. Firm entry and macroeconomic dy-
namics: A state-level analysis. The American Economic Review, 106(5):214–218, 2016.
Francoise Gourio. Disaster risk and business cycle. American Economic Review, 102(6):
2734–2766, 2012.
Jeremy Greenwood, Zvi Hercowitz, and Per Krusell. Long-run implications of investment-
specific technological change. The American Economic Review, pages 342–362, 1997.
Nicole Guertzgen. Wage insurance within german firms: do institutions matter? Journal
of the Royal Statistical Society: Series A (Statistics in Society), 177(2):345–369, 2014.
142
Luigi Guiso, Luigi Pistaferri, and Fabiano Schivardi. Insurance within the firm. Journal
of Political Economy, 113(5):1054–1087, 2005.
Fatih Guvenen. Learning your earning: Are labor income shocks really very persistent?
American Economic Review, 97(3):687–712, 2007.
Fatih Guvenen. A Parsimonious Macroeconomic Model for Asset Pricing. Econometrica,
77(6):1711–1750, November 2009.
Fatih Guvenen, Serdar Ozkan, and Jae Song. The nature of countercyclical income risk.
Journal of Political Economy, 122(3):621–660, 2014.
Fatih Guvenen, Gueorgui Kambourov, Burhan Kuruscu, Sergio Ocampo, and Daphne
Chen. Use it or lose it: Efficiency gains from wealth taxation. Technical report, Working
paper, 2015.
Fatih Guveven, Serdar Ozkan, and Jae Song. The nature of countercyclical income risk.
Journal of Political Economy, 2014.
John Haltiwanger, Ryan Decker, and Ron Jarmin. Top ten signs of declining business
dynamism and entrepreneurship in the us. In Kauffman Foundation New Entrepreneurial
Growth Conference, 2015.
John Haltiwanger, Ron S Jarmin, Robert B Kulick, and Javier Miranda. High growth
young firms: Contribution to job, output and productivity growth. US Census Bureau
Center for Economic Studies Paper No. CES-WP-16-49, 2016.
Richard Hartman. The effects of price and cost uncertainty on investment. Journal of
economic theory, 5(2):258–266, 1972.
Campbell R Harvey and Akhtar Siddique. Conditional skewness in asset pricing tests. The
Journal of Finance, 55(3):1263–1295, 2000.
Ian Hathaway and Robert E Litan. Declining business dynamism in the united states: A
look at states and metros. Brookings Institution, 2014a.
Ian Hathaway and Robert E Litan. What’s driving the decline in the firm formation rate?
a partial explanation. The Brookings Institution, 2014b.
143
James J. Heckman. Sample selection bias as a specification error. Econometrica, 47(1):153–
161, 1979. ISSN 00129682, 14680262. URL http://www.jstor.org/stable/1912352.
Erik Hurst and Annamaria Lusardi. Liquidity constraints, household wealth, and en-
trepreneurship. Journal of political Economy, 112(2):319–347, 2004.
Henry R Hyatt and James R Spletzer. The recent decline in employment dynamics. IZA
Journal of Labor Economics, 2(1):5, 2013.
Cosmin Ilut, Matthias Kehrig, and Martin Schneider. Slow to hire, quick to fire: Employ-
ment dynamics with asymmetric responses to news. Journal of Political Economy, 126
(5):000–000, 2018.
Katrine Jakobsen, Kristian Jakobsen, Henrik Kleven, and Gabriel Zucman. Wealth taxa-
tion and wealth inequality: Evidence from denmark 1980–2014. 2017.
Urban Jermann and Vincenzo Quadrini. Macroeconomic effects of financial shocks. The
American Economic Review, 102(1):238–271, 2012.
Helu Jian and Faisal Sohail. Skill biased entrepreneurial decline. Mimeo, Washington
University in St. Louis, September 2017.
Chinhui Juhn, Kristin McCue, Holly Monti, and Brooks Pierce. Firm performance and the
volatility of worker earnings. Journal of Labor Economics, 36(S1):S99–S131, 2018.
Kyle Jurado, Sydney C Ludvigson, and Serena Ng. Measuring uncertainty. American
Economic Review, 105(3):1177–1216, 2015.
Nishad Kapadia. The next microsoft? skewness, idiosyncratic volatility, and expected
returns. 2006.
Fatih Karahan, Benjamin Pugsley, and Aysegu¨l Sahin. Demographic origins of the startup
deficit. Technical report, NY Fed mimeo, 2016.
Lawrence F Katz and Alan B Krueger. The rise and nature of alternative work arrange-
ments in the united states, 1995-2015. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic
Research, 2016.
144
Matthias Kehrig. The Cyclicality of Productivity Dispersion. Working Papers 11-15,
Center for Economic Studies, U.S. Census Bureau, May 2011. URL https://ideas.
repec.org/p/cen/wpaper/11-15.html.
Truman Lee Kelley. Fundamentals of Statistics. Harvard University Press, 1947.
Mete Kilic and Jessica A. Wachter. Risk, Unemployment, and the Stock Market: A Rare-
Event-Based Explanation of Labor Market Volatility. NBER Working Paper 21575,
September 2015. URL https://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/21575.html.
Tae-Hwan Kim and Halbert White. On more robust estimation of skewness and kurtosis.
Finance Research Letters, 1(1):56–73, 2004.
Patrick Kline, Neviana Petkova, Heidi Williams, and Owen Zidar. Who profits from
patents? rent-sharing at innovative firms. Technical report, National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research, 2018.
Alan B Krueger. How computers have changed the wage structure: evidence from micro-
data, 1984–1989. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108(1):33–60, 1993.
Per Krusell and Anthony A. Smith. Income and Wealth Heterogeneity in the Macroecon-
omy. Journal of Political Economy, 106(5):867–896, October 1998.
Per Krusell, Lee E Ohanian, Jose´-Vı´ctor R´ıos-Rull, and Giovanni L Violante. Capital-
skill complementarity and inequality: A macroeconomic analysis. Econometrica, 68(5):
1029–1053, 2000.
David Lagakos and Guillermo L Ordonez. Which workers get insurance within the firm?
Journal of Monetary Economics, 58(6-8):632–645, 2011.
Thibaut Lamadon, Magne Mogstad, and Bradley Setzler. Earnings dynamics, mobility
costs and transmission of firm and market level shocks. Technical report, 2017.
Sylvain Leduc and Zheng Liu. Uncertainty shocks are aggregate demand shocks. Journal
of Monetary Economics, 82:20–35, 2016.
James Levinsohn and Amil Petrin. Estimating production functions using inputs to control
for unobservables. The Review of Economic Studies, 70(2):317–341, 2003.
145
James Liang, Hui Wang, and Edward P Lazear. Demographics and entrepreneurship.
Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2014.
Hamish Low, Costas Meghir, and Luigi Pistaferri. Wage risk and employment risk over
the life cycle. American Economic Review, 100(4):1432–67, 2010.
Robert E Lucas. On the size distribution of business firms. The Bell Journal of Economics,
pages 508–523, 1978.
Claudio Michelacci and Fabiano Schivardi. Are they all like bill, mark, and steve? the
education premium for entrepreneurs. Technical report, Einaudi Institute for Economics
and Finance (EIEF), 2016.
Benjamin Moll. Productivity losses from financial frictions: can self-financing undo capital
misallocation? The American Economic Review, 104(10):3186–3221, 2014.
Camilo Mondrago´n-Ve´lez. The probability of transition to entrepreneurship revisited:
Wealth, education and age. Annals of Finance, 5(3):421–441, 2009.
Giuseppe Moscarini and Fabien Postel-Vinay. The contribution of large and small employ-
ers to job creation in times of high and low unemployment. American Economic Review,
102(6):2509–39, 2012.
Sangmin Oh and Jessica A Wachter. Cross-sectional skewness. Working paper, Mimeo,
Wharton School at University of Pennsylvania, 2018.
Walter Y Oi. The desirability of price instability under perfect competition. Econometrica:
journal of the Econometric Society, pages 58–64, 1961.
Benjami Pugsley and Aysegul Sahin. Grown-up business cycles. Federal Reserve Bank of
New York Staff Reports, 2014.
Vincenzo Quadrini. Entrepreneurship, saving, and social mobility. Review of Economic
Dynamics, 3(1):1–40, 2000.
Vincenzo Quadrini. Financial frictions in macroeconomic fluctations. Economic Quarterly,
97(3Q):209–254, 2011.
146
EJ Reedy and Robert J Strom. Starting smaller; staying smaller: America’s slow leak in
job creation. In Small Businesses in the Aftermath of the Crisis, pages 71–85. Springer,
2012.
Thomas A. Rietz. The equity risk premium: a solution. Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics, 22(1):117–131, July 1988. URL https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/moneco/
v22y1988i1p117-131.html.
Ana Rute Cardoso and Miguel Portela. Micro foundations for wage flexibility: wage insur-
ance at the firm level. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 111(1):29–50, 2009.
John Sabelhaus and Jae Song. Earnings volatility across groups and time. National Tax
Journal, pages 347–364, 2009.
John Sabelhaus and Jae Song. The great moderation in micro labor earnings. Journal of
Monetary Economics, 57(4):391–403, 2010.
Lawrence Schmidt. Climbing and falling off the ladder: Asset pricing implications of labor
market event risk. Available at SSRN 2471342, 2016.
Anthony A Smith Jr. Estimating nonlinear time-series models using simulated vector
autoregressions. Journal of Applied Econometrics, 8(S1):S63–S84, 1993.
George Tauchen. Finite state markov-chain approximations to univariate and vector au-
toregressions. Economic Letters, 1986.
Jessica A Wachter. Can time-varying risk of rare disasters explain aggregate stock market
volatility? The Journal of Finance, 68(3):987–1035, 2013.
Janet L Yellen. Perspectives on inequality and opportunity from the survey of consumer
finances. RSF, 2016.
James P Ziliak, Bradley Hardy, and Christopher Bollinger. Earnings volatility in america:
Evidence from matched cps. Labour Economics, 18(6):742–754, 2011.
147
Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Data Appendix
A.1.1 The PSID Sample
The PSID sample used for studying the time series of the share of entrepreneurs and other
statistics used in this study was constructed as follows. From the raw data, I extract a
sample of heads of household from the SRC sample (I do not consider information of the
SEO, Immigrants, or Latino Sample) from the waves going from 1970 and 2015. Some in-
dividuals have missing observations in employment status or were registered as “refusing to
answer”. In those cases I replace the employment status variable by the code corresponding
to “no working for money” (code 3). Only 107 observations were replaced in this way. The
variable defining the age of the head of the household has several inconsistencies that are
necessary to fix. In particular, for those individuals whose age jumps up for more than 3
years, or jumps down, I imputed an increase in age based on the first reliable age. Similar
to age, the education variables has many inconsistencies. Because in this paper I focus
on the education as a measure of skill, I create a new variable that considers the highest
educational attainment of the individual as a measure of education. All monetary variables
(income, wealth, etc.) were deflated using the Personal Consumption Expenditure index
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The baseline sample considers households whose
head is between 22 and 60 years old, both ends included. This yields a sample of 112,283
year-household observations with an average of 3,118 observations per year. For the period
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in which I focus my study, that is 1985 to 2015, the number of observations is 75,031 with
an average of 5,573 observations per year. All statistics were calculated using PSID sample
weights.
To calculate the parameters of the income process of equation (1.9) I measure earnings
as the real value of total labor income of individual i in period t. Total labor includes
wages and salaries, tips, commissions, and bonuses. However, the results are quite similar
if one uses wages and salaries as measure of labor income. Then, I drop all observations
of individuals that are self-employed business owners in either period t or t − 1. Given
these restrictions, the parameters of equation (1.9) are calculated on a sample of 6,303
individuals and 58,094 observations. The value of ρw is 0.73 with and standard error of
.0028. The adjusted R2 of the regression is 0.55. The standard error of the residuals 0.53
so I set σy to this value. Estimating equation (1.9) only for individuals with college or
more generates a slightly lower value for ρw equal to 0.70 (0.72 for individuals with high
school or less). Nevertheless, the standard error of the residuals is quite similar and equal
to 0.53.
A.1.2 CPS Data, Supply of Skills and College Premium
In this section, I describe how I constructed the share of college graduates (which is equated
to the share of high skill workers in the model) and the college premium (which is the skill
premium in the model). To calculate both time series I draw a sample of individuals from
the March CPS data (accessed through IPUMS) from 1970 to 2015. To keep the sample
selection as close as possible to the PSID, I keep individuals that are head of the household
aged between 22 and 60 years (both ends included) which are in the labor force and have
valid education information. Individuals in the armed force or with negative weights are
also excluded from the sample. The baseline sample consists of 1.7 million individual-year
observations.
The share of high skill workers is the weighted proportion of individuals with a college
degree or more. The center panel of figure 1.8 shows the corresponding time series from
1980 to 2015. The skill premium, on the other hand, is calculated over a subsample of wage
workers only. This is because both in the model and in the literature, the skill premium
is the relative wage of high skill workers to low skill workers. To avoid issues related to
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the differences in labor supply of college graduates versus non-college graduated, here I
consider a sample of individuals wage workers (not self-employed) that worked more than
40 weeks, and more than 35 hours per week (which is the definition of full time workers
in Acemoglu and Autor (2011)). This leave yields a sample of 1.2 million observations.
Then, the college premium is the difference between the weighted average of log-real wage
for college graduates and the weighted average of log-real wage for high school graduates.
The right panel of figure 1.8 shows the corresponding time series from 1985 to 2015.
A.1.3 Aggregates
In this section, I show some additional details on the construction of the relative price of
capital goods used in my quantitative exercise and the measure of debt and equity relative
to non-financial private sector GDP.
I take the measure of the relative price of investment directly from DiCecio (2009) es-
timates available in the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis website (FRED time series
PIRIC). Alternatively, one could calculate the relative price of investment as the ratio of
the price index of non residential investment calculated by the BEA (FRED time series
A008RD3Q086SBEA) divided by the price index of non durable consumption (FRED series
CUUR0000SAN). A third alternative is to use a more refined measure of investment that
only considers equipment and software (FRED time series A010RD3A086NBEA) relative
to the price index of non durable consumption. The left panel of figure A.1 shows the
evolution of each of these series re scaled to 1985. The three time series show a similar
declining pattern although measure of the price of investment that considers equipment
and software only shows a sharper decline: relative to 1985 the measure that considers all
investment declined 40%, DiCecio (2009) measure declined a 55%, and the measure that
considers equipment and software declined 60%. This makes the choice of the quality ad-
justed time series calculated by DiCecio (2009)’s a conservative option, right in the middle
of these different measures.
To the ratio of debt and equity to business GDP that serves as one of the targets in
my quantitative exercise I consider four different time series. From the Flow of Funds I
consider the Non Financial Non Corporate Businesses Total Liabilities (FRED time series
NNBTILQ027S) and the Non Financial Corporate Businesses Total Liabilities and Equity
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(FRED time series NCBLEYQ027S). Both series are aggregated averaging the quarterly
data to annual levels. Then I add these annual series to have a measure of the total
liabilities of the non financial business sector. The measure of GDP comes from BEA
sectoral measures of GDP from which I add up the annual nominal GDP across all private
industries with the exception of Finance and Insurance. The right panel of figure A.1 shows
the resulting time series.
Figure A.1: Price of Investment and Debt-to-GDP ratio
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Note: The left panel of figure A.1 shows the time series of the relative price of investment for three
different measures. The right panel shows the debt and equity of non financial businesses to non financial
businesses GDP ratio.
A.2 The Algorithm
The solution of the model implies calculating an initial and final steady states, and the com-
plete transition path of aggregate states and factor prices, given the exogenous sequences of
pk,t, Ht, and AH,t. On top of the well known complications of solving heterogenous agents
models, the present model requires finding a combination of three prices that simultane-
ously clear the markets for capital, high skill labor, and low skill labor.
To solve the steady states of the economy I proceed as follows. Consider that the economy
is at the steady state in t = 0 and pk,t = pss,0 = 1, Ht = H, and AH,t = 1. Individuals
expect this vector of aggregate states variables to remain constant forever. Then, given
this aggregate vector, the algorithm to find the stationary equilibrium is as follows,
• S0: Guess a vector of prices {ω˜H , ω˜L, r˜} and solve the problem of the households
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in 1.2, that is, solve the profit maximization problem of the entrepreneurs, and get
the corresponding policy rules and factor demands for the households. To solve the
problem of the households I use Value Function Iteration searchings continuously
over the asset space.
• S1: Given an initial distribution of individuals over idiosyncratic states, µt, iterate
until convergence and calculate the aggregate demand of capital, high skill labor, and
low skill skilled labor coming from the entrepreneurs. Denote these by KD,e, ND,eH ,
and ND,eL respectively. Calculate also the aggregate supplies of capital, and each type
of labor, KS , NSH , and N
S
L .
• S2: Calculate the demands of high and low skilled labor of the non-entrepreneurial
sector as the residual supply after subtracting the demands for the entrepreneurial
sector, that is NH = N
S
H − ND,eH and NL = NSL − ND,eL . If these result in negative
supplies, go to S0 and guess a new set of prices with a larger value of the wages.
• S3: If the residuals demands of labor are positive in S2, use the first order condition
of the problem of the non-entrepreneurial sector to find K, that is, solve the nonlinear
expression, pss,0 (r˜ + δ)− FK
(
NH,, NL,K
C
)
= 0.
• S4: Using NH and NL from S2 and KC from S3, check the three following conditions,
– ω˜H − FH (NH , NL,K) ,
– ω˜L − FL (NH , NL,K) ,
– KS −KC +KD,e
If the sum of the last three expressions is greater than 10−6, go to S0 using a new
guess of prices. If not, the equilibrium set of policy functions, value functions, prices,
and stationary distribution of individuals over idiosyncratic states has been found.
Notice that we could calculate in S2 the residual demand of capital for the corporate sector,
and go directly to S4 to check r˜ = FK
(
NH,, NL,K
C
) − δ. In practice, I have found that
the previous algorithm is much more stable since it avoids iterating over the interest rate.
I repeat these same steps both for the initial and final steady states, changing only the
value of the aggregates, pk,t, AH,t, and Ht.
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To calculate the transition path of the economy between the initial and final steady states
requires taking a stand of what do the household know about the evolution of the economy
from period 0 to the infinite future. Here, we can take two extremes cases. One can
assume that individuals have perfect foresight about the full equilibrium path of prices and
aggregate states, or one can assume that individuals are myopic in the sense that they are
surprised by the change of the relative price of investment goods and perceive that such
price will remain fixed forever. Here I describe both algorithms in detail.
Perfect Foresight Case. Given a sequence of aggregate states Θt = {pk,t, AH,t, Ht}Tt=0
and a fixed value of the vector after T periods, ΘT = {pk,T , AH,T , HT } for all t > T , I
proceed as follows,
• P0: take Θt = Θ0 and Θt = ΘT and calculate the corresponding stationary equi-
librium recording the equilibrium prices, and value functions. Denote the stationary
distribution of the first steady state as µss,1.
• P1: Guess a path of prices {ω˜H,t, ω˜L,t, r˜t}t=Tt=1 which is fully observed by the agents
at the end of period t = 0,
• P2: Starting in period T − 1, take the continuation values of the problem of the
households as given and solve
V sT−1 (aT−1, zT−1, yT−1, dT−2) = maxcT−1,aT
{
c1−σT−1
1− σ+
β
χEz′|z,y′|yV sT (aT , zT , yT , eT ) + (1− χ) ∑
j∈{H,T}
ζs,jEV sT (aT , zT , yT , eT )
}
cT−1 + aT−1 ≤ (1 + r˜T−1) aT−1 + pis (zT−1, aT−1)− I (dT−2 = w)κ,
on a grid of a′s, z′s, and y′z. Do the same for workers, and record the value functions,
V sT−1.
• P3: Go to period T −2, take V sT−1 as given, and solve the problem entrepreneurs and
workers in T − 2 recording the continuation values. Continue until t = 1.
153
This generates a path of value functions that are consistent with {ω˜H,t, ω˜L,t, r˜t}t=Tt=1 . Notice,
however, that these are not the equilibrium prices. To find the equilibrium prices now
we need to iterate forward, taking the initial distribution as given, and solving for the
equilibrium prices in every period. Notice that in going forward, we shall not use the
guessed set of prices. To iterate forward, I proceed as follows.
• F1: Given µ0 = µss,1 and the continuation values, V s1 for s = {H,L}, solve for a
new set of prices {ω1,H , ω1,L, r1} that clears the markets and record the resulting µ1
without using the guessed sequence of prices
• F2: To solve the equilibrium in a given period
– (A) Guess {ωˆ1,H , ωˆ1,L, rˆ1} and solve the problem of the agents
– (B) Given µ0 and the policy functions, calculate the excess demand and check
market clearing as in S4
– (C) If prices clear the markets (tolerance 10−5) stop, record the new equilibrium
prices and the results distribution, µ2 and go to the next period,
– (D) Otherwise, guess a new set of prices and go to (A)
• F3: Proceed in the same way until period T to generate a new path of equilibrium
prices, {ωt,H , ωt,L, rt}t=Tt=1 . Compare them with {ω˜t,H , ω˜t,L, r˜t}t=Tt=1 if the maximum
distance is greater than 10−4, take a weighted average of the series as a new guess
and go to S1, stop other wise
Upon completion, we have found a path of prices, continuation values, policy function,
and distributions that are consistent with the equilibrium along the time series of {Θt}Tt=0.
Given that the algorithm needs to find a vector of three prices in each period which is
consistent with market clearing it requires very good initial conditions. I have found that
the standard method of starting with a linear trend of prices between the initial and last
steady states works quite poorly. Instead, calculating the stationary equilibrium for several
points on the path of {Θt}Tt=0 and using a linear path between these points ensure a faster,
more accurate, solution.
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Myopic Case. Alternatively, we can assume that individuals are surprised every period
by the changes of the exogenous process of Θt and every time they see a new aggregate
vector, they perceive this as remain fixed for the infinite future. To solve the transition in
this case I proceed as follows.
• M1: Solve the initial steady state of the economy with Θt = Θ0 and save the steady
state distribution, µ0
• M2: Go to period t = 1 with Θ1 and assume that individuals think that Θt = Θ1 for
all t, and solve for the equilibrium prices as follows,
– Guess a vector of {ωˆ1,H , ωˆ1,L, rˆ1}, solve the household’s problem, and record
the policy functions. Here we can use value function iteration because future is
perceived as “the same” by the agents.
– Taking µ0 and given and the policy functions, check the equilibrium conditions
for capital and labor as in S4 above. If they hold, then we have found the
equilibrium prices. If not, guess a new set of prices.
• M3: When the prices have been found, update µ0 to µ1 and
• M4: Go to period t = 2 and start again in point M2, and proceed until the entire
transition path is completed.
This generates a new path of equilibrium prices and a distribution of agents over idiosyn-
cratic states.
Some additional details on the numerical implementation of the model are important. The
problem of the households is large and contains several state variables that one needs to keep
track of. To maintain tractability I choose a coarse grid of 7 points in the labor productivity,
y, and a denser grid of 11 points for the entrepreneurial ability, z. Both stochastic processes
are discretized using a modified version of the Tauchen (1986) method. In the particular
case of z, since most of the action in terms of switching between occupations happen at
the upper end of the distribution of z, I place more point in that area of the grid. In
other words, I do not choose a equally spaced grid for the z process. Finally, for the grid
of assets, I choose a corse grid of 205 points. Because the Value Function has kinks at
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the points of occupational switching, I solve the problem using Value Function Iteration
to ensure the accuracy of the solution. For the same reason, I solve the equilibrium of
the model simulating the PDF of the distribution of individuals over the idiosyncratic
distribution. The main challenge of solving the model is finding the vector of prices that
clear the labor and capital markets. There is no clear guidance to solve such non linear
system of equations that involves aggregating the individuals’ decisions. Consequently, I
trade accuracy for speed. I found that solving first the steady state in each of the transition
gives excellent initial conditions for solving the problem along the transition path.
A.3 Model extensions
In this section I consider several extensions and modifications of the baseline version of the
model.
A.3.1 Collateral constraint
In the baseline version of my model entrepreneurs require working capital to run their
firms and they can borrow resources up to a fraction λ > 1 of their own wealth, a. This
assumption was made to have an interesting policy comparison. In this section I consider
a more standard assumption. Entrepreneurs are not required to pay workers in advance
and can borrow capital up to λa. The problem of the workers does not change, but the
problem of the entrepreneurs changes to
V es,t (Ωt,Θt, µt) = maxct,at+1
{
c1−σt
1− σ + β
[
χEzt+1|zt,yt+1|ytVs,t+1 (Ωt+1,Θt+1, µt+1) +
(1− χ) η
∑
j∈{H,L}
ζs,jEVs,t+1 (Ωt+1,Θt+1, µt+1)
]}
, (A.1)
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pis,t (zt, at) = max
nH,t,nL,t,kt
{
ztθs [f (nH,t, nL,t, kt)]
γ − pk,t (r + δ) kt−
ωH,t (Θt, µt)nH,t − ωL,t (Θt, µt)nL,t
}
,
ct + at+1 ≤ (1 + r (Θt, µt)) at + pis,t (zt, at)−I (dt−1 = wt−1)κ,
pk,tkt ≤ λat, at+1 ≥ 0.
The first thing to notice is that written in this, the equilibrium of this economy is con-
strained efficient. Notice this is not the case of the original problem because wages appear
in the borrowing constraint. In such case the decentralized equilibrium does not necessarily
coincide with planner’s solution as the latter internalized the fact that choosing a different
allocation, it relaxes the borrowing constraint, moving the economy closer to the efficient
optimum. This is not the case with the problem in equation A.1 as the value of pk,t is
assumed to be exogenous and therefore is not part of the choice of the planner.
The second thing to notice is that the borrowing constraint relaxes over time as pk,t de-
creases. Everything else equal, a decrease in the relative price of capital would induce more
individuals to start a firm, increasing the share of entrepreneurs in the economy. Still, be-
cause of the general equilibrium effects and the effects of AH,t and Ht, the decrease in the
share of entrepreneurs is quite similar to my baseline results in section 1.4. The left panel
of figure A.2 shows decline almost does not change in this case relative to the data an and
the baseline results. However, because I am using the same set of parameters used in my
baseline exercise, the level of the share of entrepreneurs is lower in this case. The right
panel shows that the distribution within skill groups changes substantially. Notice also
that the share of entrepreneurs declines in this case. This is because, with a more relaxed
borrowing constraint, entrepreneurs can operate even closer to their optimal level. General
equilibrium will increase even more the wages, reducing the share of entrepreneurs in the
economy.
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Figure A.2: Evolution of the Share of Entrepreneurs
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Note: The left panel of figure A.2 shows the evolution of the share of entrepreneurs as calculated from the
PSID data (blue dashed line) and the share of entrepreneurs implied by the baseline model (black-starred
line) and by the model with a more standard borrowing constraint pk,tkt ≤ λat. The right panel shows
the share of entrepreneurs within skill group implied by the model. Lines labeled as Baseline correspond
to the basic results. Lines labelled as Model-BC consider the modified borrowing constraint.
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A.4 Appendix Figures
Table A.1: Sample Characteristics
Wage Bus. Active Self-Emp. Entrepreneurs
Workers Owners Bus. Owners Bus. Owners
Num. obs. per year 2,922 609 526 372 203
Fam. Income (M) 69.2 123.3 124.4 134.8 161.2
Age (mean) 39.8 43.1 43.2 44.0 44.3
Males (%) 70.7 89.7 90.0 91.7 92.9
Drop Outs (%) 7.4 2.8 2.8 2.8 1.4
High School (%) 31.1 24.3 25.0 25.9 18.3
Some College (%) 26.4 25.4 25.9 25.5 22.4
College and More (%) 35.2 47.5 46.4 45.8 57.9
White (%) 87.2 95.5 95.6 96.0 96.3
10th Pct. Wealth (M) -7.8 5.5 6,252 15249 39.2
50th Pct. Wealth (M) 39.0 267.0 278.9 358,9 493.0
90th Pct. Wealth (M) 414.2 1,605.0 1,729.2 2,068.5 2,601.3
95th Pct. Wealth (M) 684.9 2,750.0 2,959.4 3,497.8 4,326.6
Note: Table A.1 reports statics of a sample of heads of households ages between 22 and 60 years
old. See appendix A.1.1 for additional details on the sample selection. Each statistics is the
sample average across the waves of 1985 to 2015. Business owners are individuals that declare
owning a business. Active business owners declares have a business and have worked for it in a
given year. Are active business owners that declare be self-employed. Entrepreneurs are the
subset of the previous group that declare to have a managerial or professional occupation. All
monetary values are deflated by the PCE index and expressed in 2012 US dollars. Household
wealth is defined as the sum if savings checking accounts, bonds, stocks, IRA, housing equity,
other real state, and vehicles, minus total debt. All statistics, with the exception of the number of
observation, were calculated using sample weights.
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Figure A.3: Average of Recent Labor Income
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Note: Figure A.3 shows the average (log of) recent labor earnings for a sample of men, heads of
household, who are neither a business owner nor self-employed in year t. Recent earnings are defined as
the average of the real labor income in periods t, t− 1, and t− 2 for years prior 1997 and the average
labor income in periods t and t− 2 after 1997. The left panel shows the average recent earnings within the
group of households that become business owners in year t+ 2 while the right panel shows the same
statistic for individuals that remain as workers in period t+ 2. The difference in the slope in the left and
right panels is statistically significant at 1%.
Figure A.4: Proportion of Entrepreneurs
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Note: Figure A.4 shows the share of entrepreneurs for different definitions calculated over a sample of
employed heads of households. See the note in table 1.1 for more details on the classification of
entrepreneurial households.
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Figure A.5: Proportion of Entrepreneurs – Additional Definitions
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Note: Figure A.5 shows the proportion of households that are neither business owners nor self-employed
in period t that are classified as entrepreneurs in period t+ 2 for different definitions of entrepreneurship.
The right panel shows the same statistics rescaled to the corresponding value in 1985.
Figure A.6: Share of Entrepreneurs within Different Age groups
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Note: Figure A.6 shows the fraction of entrepreneurs within three different age groups. See notes in table
1.1 for additional details.
161
Figure A.7: Average Wages and Salaries Income for Workers
(a) Some College or More
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(b) High School Graduates or Less
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Note: Figure A.7 shows the average log of wages and salaries income of men head household who are
neither a business owner nor self-employed in year t from PSID. Top panels show the statistics for college
graduates. Bottom panel shows the statistics for workers with some college or less. The left panel shows
the average wage within the group of households that become self-employed business owners in year t+ 2
while the right panel shows the same statistic for individuals that remain as workers in period t+ 2.
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Figure A.8: Average Total Labor Earnings for Workers
(a) Some College or More
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(b) High School Graduates or Less
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y = 10.41*** + 0.001 year
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Note: Figure A.8 shows the average of log labor earnings of men, head household who are neither a
business owner nor self-employed in year t from PSID. Recent earnings are defined as the average labor
income in periods t, t− 1, and t− 2 for years prior 1997 and the average labor income in periods t and
t− 2 after 1997. Top panels show the statistics for college graduates. Bottom panel shows the statistics
for workers with some college or less. The left panel shows the average wage within the group of
households that become self-employed business owners in year t+ 2 while the right panel shows the same
statistic for individuals that remain as workers in period t+ 2.
163
Figure A.9: 50th Percentile of the Labor Income For Workers
Swtiching
y = 10.87*** + 0.012*** year
Non Swtiching
y = 10.87*** + 0.003*** year
10
.4
10
.8
11
.2
11
.6
M
ed
ian
 L
og
-L
ab
or 
Inc
om
e
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Switching Non Switching
Some College or More
Swtiching
y = 10.60*** + -0.004*** year
Non Swtiching
y = 10.53*** + -0.002*** year
10
.4
10
.8
11
.2
11
.6
M
ed
ian
 L
og
-L
ab
or 
Inc
om
e
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Swtiching Non Switching
High School or Less
Note: Figure A.9
Figure A.10: 90th Percentile of the Labor Income For Workers
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Figure A.11: College Premium and Interest Rate in GE
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Note: Figure A.11 shows the evolution of the skill premium and interest rate implied by the mode in the
general equilibrium case.
Figure A.12: Alternative Decomposition of the Decline in Entrepreneurship
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Note: Figure A.12 shows the share of entrepreneurs implied by the model. The black starred line shows
the share of entrepreneurs for the baseline case, the red circled line considers only the evolution of AH,t,
while the green squared line considers AH,t and pk,t. The center and right panel show similar statistics for
high and low skill workers.
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Figure A.13: Decomposition of the Transition Rate
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Note: Figure A.13 shows the time series of the transition rate into entrepreneurship implied by the model.
The black starred line shows the baseline case, the red circled line considers only the evolution of AH,t,
while the green squared line considers AH,t and Ht. The center and right panel show similar statistics for
high and low skill workers.
Figure A.14: Decomposition of the Exit Rate
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Note: Figure A.14 shows the time series of the transition rate out from entrepreneurship implied by the
model. The black starred line shows the baseline case, the red circled line considers only the evolution of
AH,t, while the green squared line considers AH,t and Ht. The center and right panel show similar
statistics for high and low skill workers.
A.5 SFC Sample
In this section, I describe in more detail the sample selection the variable construction
for the results using the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). The SCF is a nationally
representative survey conducted every three years by the Federal Reserve Board of Gov-
ernors. Importantly, the SCF oversample rich individuals which are more likely to be
entrepreneurs. I take data from over the period 1989 to 2016. The raw sample contains
238,880 individual-year observations. For comparability to the results on the PSID, I con-
sider a sample of heads of households between 22 and 60 which are in the labor force with
valid information on education. Following Cagetti and De Nardi (2006) and Michelacci
and Schivardi (2016)I classify an individual as an entrepreneur if she is self-employed in his
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primary job (variable X4106 in the SCF) and she has an active management role in at least
one privately owned business (variable X3104 in the SCF). I further divide the sample on
individuals with a high school degree or less and those with some college studies or more
(variable X5901 in the SCF for the period 1989 to 2013 and X5931 for 2016). Finally, I
drop all those individuals that do not work for a pay (variable X4106 in SCF). This leave
us with a sample of 173,066 individual-year observations. For all the calculations I use the
sample weights (variable X42001).
The main body of the text presented the share of entrepreneurs in the age group of 22 and
60 years old and within education groups (1.6). Here I discuss two additional issues. First,
Michelacci and Schivardi (2016) use the SCF to study the returns to entrepreneurs and he
suggests that the share of entrepreneurs has been stable from 1989 to 2013. The difference
between my conclusions and theirs steams from the sample selection. Given their focus
on entrepreneurial returns Michelacci and Schivardi (2016) consider the entire population
sample while I focus on 22 to 60 years old individuals which are more likely to switch
occupations between workers and entrepreneurs. The left panel of figure A.15 shows the
share of entrepreneurs in the SCF with and without the group of individuals that are over
60 years old. In the second case, the share of entrepreneurs is more or less stable over
the sample period. This is because within the group of over 60 years old, the share of
entrepreneurs is either flat or increasing as it is shown in the center panel of figure A.15.
This, coupled with an increasing share of this group in the US population, pushes the share
of entrepreneurs up, keep the share more or less constant. In contrast to Michelacci and
Schivardi (2016), I focus on individuals that might transit into entrepreneurship and weigh
the costs and benefits of starting a new firm. Importantly, for the group of entrepreneurs
that are between 22 and 60 years old, the share of startups entrepreneurs, that is, the
fraction of entrepreneurs whose primary firm is one year old or less, shows an step decline
during the sample period while this share is smaller and increasing within the group of
entrepreneurs older than 60 years (right panel of figure A.15).
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Table A.2: Distribution of Entrepreneurs Across Industries
Industry Less than College College Graduate All
Agro, Fish, and Forestry 14.70 3.1 7.3
Construction 25.04 7.39 13.53
Manufacturing 7.71 6.86 7.16
Retails and Wholesale Trade 17.26 11.53 13.53
Professional Services 14.39 25.54 21.66
Transportation, Comm. and Utilities 19.98 43.74 35.47
Others 0.92 1.85 1.53
Note: table A.2 shows the distribution of entrepreneurs across 1-digit SIC sectors in the SCF.
Entrepreneurs are defined as heads of household that own a businesses and declare to have an active
management role in the business. SIC sectors are defined using the first main business owner by the
household.
Figure A.15: Share of Entrepreneurs and Startups in the SCF
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Note: Figure A.15 shows the share of entrepreneurs within different population groups and for different
definitions of entrepreneurs. The left panel shows the share of entrepreneurs in the baseline sample
(individuals between 22 and 60 years old) and considering the entire sample (individuals of 22 years or
more). The center panel shows the share of entrepreneurs within age groups. The right panel shows the
share of startups entrepreneurs within age groups. Startup entrepreneurs are entrepreneurs that actively
manage at most two firms and one of them has at most 1 year old.
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Figure A.16: Size Distribution: High and Low Skill Entrepreneurs
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Note: The figure A.16 shows the evolution of the share of entrepreneurs for different size classifications
within high and low skill entrepreneurs. All monetary values were deflated using the PCE and expressed
in 2012 dollars.
A.6 Evidence from CPS
The decline in the share of entrepreneurs documented in section 1.2 comes from a small,
although nationally representative, sample of household. Hence, one might wonder whether
the results presented here using the PSID can also be observed in other data sets. For this
reason, in this appendix a draw a sample of household from the CPS from 1970 to 2015. The
CPS is a nationally representative survey collected by the US Census Bureau. Here, I use
the March supplement that collects information on employment status, income, industry,
and occupation, to analyze if the patters found in the PSID are also present using a much
larger data set. As much as possible, I keep the same sample selection used in the previous
section. The main drawback of using the CPS is that the definition of what constitutes
an entrepreneur can be based only on few questions that mostly refer to whether or not
the individual is self-employed, and therefore, the sample could be skewed to individuals
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that work for themselves and do not hire any other employees. This is important for two
reasons. First, most of the evidence presented by Haltiwanger et al. (2015), Decker et al.
(2016), and others refer to employee firms and therefore self-employed individuals that do
not hire other workers are not considered. Secondly, new empirical evidence suggests that
alternative works agreements (contractors, part time workers, etc.) are in a rise in the
US economy (Katz and Krueger (2016)). To the extent that there is overlap between self-
employed individuals and workers in alternative work agreements overlap, analysis trends
of the share of self-employed might be misleading. With these caveats in mind, I consider
two measures of entrepreneurship. The first is the proportion of individuals that are self-
employed over the entire population, and second, to have a closer definition to the one used
in PSID, I consider the fraction of self-employed head of households.
The left panel of figure A.17 shows that the share of self-employed in the population has
steadily declined since the early 1980s and such decline has accelerated since the mid 1990s.
For better comparison with my previous results, here I also show the proportion of self-
employed head of households from the PSID. The levels are somewhat different, with a
larger proportion of self-employed in the PSID, but the decline is similar in both data set,
as it is shown in the right panel of A.17. Figures A.18 and A.19 complement these results
showing the decline in the share of self-employed within education and age groups.
Because the CPS is a much larger sample, we can go one step further and study in which
which sectors the decline in the share of self-employed is more evident. For doing that, I
calculate the share of self-employed individuals within 14 different sectors. The employment
share accounted for self-employed is quite different across industries, as one can expect from
the large disparities in the scale of production. For instance, the share of total employment
account for by self-employed workers in services is around 15%, while in manufacturing it
is 1.5%. To have a better comparison across sectors, figure A.20 shows the share of self-
employed workers within each industry rescaled to its value in 1985. With the exception
of manufacturing, the decline in the share of self-employed is quite evident in almost all
sectors. Interestingly, the decline in self employment is not circumscribed to sectors such as
retail and whole sale trade (see upper right panel) which has been increasingly dominated
by big retail stores, but it is also present in construction or even within growing sectors ,
such as Services (see the upper left panel).
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Figure A.17: Share of Self-employed in the Population
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Note: Figure A.17 shows the proportion of self-employed individuals aged between 22 and 60 years old.
Individuals which are not in the labor force (students, disable) or are in the military are excluded. The
share of self-employed head of households is the ratio to all the head of households that are self-employed
over the population of head of households.
Figure A.18: Proportion of Self-employed by Age – CPS
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Note: Figure A.18 shows the proportion of self-employed individuals within age groups. Individuals which
are not in the labor force (students, disable) or are in the military are excluded. The share of
self-employed head of households is the ratio to all the head of households that are self-employed over the
population of head of households within each age group.
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Figure A.19: Proportion of Entrepreneurs by Education – CPS data
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Note: Figure A.19 shows the proportion of self-employed individuals within education groups. Individuals
which are not in the labor force (students, disable) or are in the military are excluded. The share of
self-employed head of households is the ratio to all the head of households that are self-employed over the
population of head of households within each education group.
Figure A.20: Proportion of Self-Employed by Industry – CPS data
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Note: Figure A.20 shows the proportion of self-employed individuals within industry sectors. Individuals
which are not in the labor force (students, disable) or are in the military are excluded. The share of
self-employed head of households is the ratio to all the head of households that are self-employed over the
population of head of households within each industry.
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Appendix: Data Sources and Variable Construction
This appendix describes the data sources and sample selection. Firm-level data for the
United States comes the Census Bureau’s Longitudinal Business Statistics (LBD) and
Compustat. For the cross-country comparisons, we use firm-level data available in the
Bureau van Dijk’s Osiris database and Global Compustat. The online appendix and repli-
cation packet–available on the author’s websites–contains further details of the construction
of the sample and moments calculation.
B.1.1 United States: Longitudinal Business Database
We construct measures of employment growth at the firm-level using the Census Bureau’s
Longitudinal Business Database (LBD). The LBD covers the universe of establishment in
the nonfarm private sector in the United States from 1976 to 2015. It provides detailed
establishment and firm-level information on employment, payroll, location, firm age, in-
dustry, legal form of organization, etc.. Crucially, firm and establishment identifiers in
the LBD allow us to construct measures of employment growth at different time horizons.
From the LBD, we select a sample of establishments that, in a given year, have nonnega-
tive, non-missing employment and payroll and have valid industry data. We then sum up
the employment within the same firm to construct an annual measure of employment. We
measure the growth rate of employment of firm j in period t as the log-difference between
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periods t and t + k, gej,t = logEj,t+k − logEj,t where k ∈ {1, 3, 5} and by the arc-percent
change between the same periods.
Calculating the Kelley skewness requires the computation of specific different percentiles
of the distribution sales growth distribution. Notice that a percentile provides information
of a particular firm, which violates the disclosure criteria imposed by the Census Bureau.
Hence, to avoid the disclosure of any sensitive information, we calculate the pth percentile
of the employment growth distribution as the employment-weighted average on a band of
+1 and -1 percent centered around pth. For instance, the 90th percentile of the distribution
is the weighted average of the employment growth across all observations between the 89th
and 91st percentiles of the distribution, both ends included. We proceed in the same way to
construct the 10th and 50th percentiles of the distribution and use these values to calculate
the Kelley skewness. All measures are weighted by the average employment of the firm
between periods t and t+k, that is Ej,t = 0.5× (Ej,t+k + Ei,t). The massive sample size of
the LBD ensures that the sample used to calculate each of the percentiles is large enough
to have an accurate approximation to the actual quantiles of the distribution.
We also use the LBD to compare the distribution of employment growth between recessions
and expansions years using kernel density estimation. The sample selection is the same
used in the rest of our results, however, the Census Bureau requires to drop the bottom
and top 5% of the distribution. The kernel densities presented in figure 2.3 were calculated
over the remaining sample.
B.1.2 United States: Compustat
For the United States, we construct time-series of the cross-sectional dispersion and skew-
ness of the sales growth distribution and the distribution of stock returns. To construct the
time-series of the sales growth distribution we proceed as follows. We begin by retrieving
firm-level data of net sales, and other variables at a quarterly frequency, and employment at
an annual frequency, from Compustat from 1964q1 to 2017q4 available at WRDS database.
The raw dataset of sales (Compustat variable saleq) and stock prices (Compustat variable
prccq) contains more than 1.7 million quarter-firm observations with an average of approx-
imately 4,660 firms per quarter. We drop all observations with negative sales, repeated
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observations, and incorporated outside the United States (we keep observation with Com-
pustat variable fic equal to “USA”). We also drop all observations that do not have a SIC
classification or with a classification above 90. Then, we deflate nominal sales by the CPI
(FRED series CPIAUCSL), and we calculate the growth rate of sales as the log difference
and the arc percentage change between quarter t and t + k with k ∈ {4, 12, 20}. This
leaves us with around 1 million sales growth (log difference) observations. For our main
results, we consider firms with at least 10 years of data on quarterly sales (40 quarters, not
necessarily continuous), which further reduces the sample to 819,977 observations between
1970q4 and 2017q2, with an average of 5,359 firms per quarter. Finally, in each quarter we
calculate different cross-sectional moments discussed in the main body of this document.
Our main sample considers firms with at 10 years of data (40 quarter) although our results
remain robust if we drop this restriction or if we consider firms with 25 years of data.
When accounting for entry and exit of firms using the arc-percentage change, for each firm
we add an observation upon entry (equal to 2) and one additional observation upon exit
(equal -2) under the assumption that before entering and after exit, the firm has a value
of sales or employment equal to 0. We consider entry firms as newly listed firms while
exiting firms are those delisted in a particular period, independent of the reason (M&A,
bankruptcy, or any other).
For our result at the annual frequency, we follow the same sample selection. The raw annual
dataset contains 500,004 year/firm observations. We drop all observations with negative
sales and duplicated entries, with missing SIC classification or two digit SIC above 90.
We deflate nominal variables using CPI (FRED series CPIAUCSL) and we calculate the
growth rate of sales (Compustat variable sale) and employment (Compustat variable emp)
as the log change between year t and t+ k with k ∈ {1, 3, 5}. This leaves us with 266,192
firm/year observation (sales growth) between 1970 and 2016, with an average of 5,663
firms per year. Our main sample consider only firms with at the least 10 years data (not
necessarily continuous) but our results remain robust if we drop this restriction or if we
consider firms with at least 25 years of data. When accounting for entry and exit of firms
using the arc-percentage change, for each firm we add an observation upon entry (equal to
2) and one additional observation upon exit (equal -2) under the assumption that before
and after exit, the firm has a value of sales or employment equal to 0. We consider entry
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firms as newly listed firms, while exiting firms are those delisted in a particular period,
independent of the reason (M&A, bankruptcy, or any other). We complement this data
with macroeconomic series from FRED (real gross domestic product per capita, FRED
series A939RX0Q048SBEA).
B.1.3 Cross-Country: BvD Osiris and Global Compustat
Cross country firm-level panel data on sales and employment come from the Bureau van
Dijk’s Osiris database. Osiris is a database of listed public companies, commodity pro-
ducing firms, banks, and insurance companies from over 190 countries. The combined
industrial company dataset contains financial information for up to 20 years and 80,000
companies. In our analysis, we focus on the industrial dataset.
The raw dataset contains 977,412 country/firm/year observations from 1982 to 2018. We
then drop all observations with missing or negative sales, we clean all duplicated entries,
and firms with missing NAIC classification. We transform all observations into US dollars
using the exchange rate reported in the same database. Then, we deflate nominal sales
using US annual CPI and calculate the growth rate of real sales as the log change and arc
percentage change between years t and t+ k with k ∈ {1, 3}. This leaves us with 748,574
observations (log change of sales). We further restrict the sample to firms with more than
10 years of data; country/year cells with more than 100 observations; countries with more
than 10 years of data; and years with more than 5 countries. This sample selection reduces
the dataset to an unbalanced panel of 678,563 observations in 45 countries between 1989
and 2015. We complement this data with real GDP in US dollars from the World Bank’s
World Development Indicators database.
The data on daily stock prices come from the Global Compustat database, which provides
standardized information on publicly traded firms for several countries at annual, quarterly,
and daily frequencies. The raw data contain firm-level observations of daily stock prices
between 1985 and 2018 for 48 countries. We drop all duplicated observations and drop
all firms with less than 2000 observations (firms with approximately 10 years of data).
Then we calculate daily price returns as the log difference of the stock price between two
consecutive trading days. We apply a similar sample selection, keeping firms with at least
10 years of daily price data. The total sample contains an unbalanced panel of 44 countries
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from 1985 to 2017 from which we drop all country quarter with less than 100 firms. The
final data contains a total of 29 countries from 1985 to 2017. Then, within each quarter, we
calculate the cross-sectional moments of the daily stock price distribution. We complement
this dataset with per capita GDP growth form World Bank’s World Developing Indicators
and quarterly GDP growth from the OECD Stats.
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B.2 Appendix: Additional Robustness Results
Table B.1: Skewness is Lower During Industry Recessions
Kelley Skewness of Three-Years Growth Rate of Firms’ Outcomes
Sample: United States Cross-Industry
(1) (2) (3) (7) (8) (9)
Source CSTAT LBD CSTAT CSTAT CSTAT CSTAT
Sales Emp. Stock Sales Emp. Stock
Price Price
∆GDPi,t 2.89
∗∗ 1.14∗∗ 3.96∗∗∗
(1.32) (0.50) (1.12)
Industry Growth 5.92∗∗∗ 6.02∗∗∗ 0.70
(1.60) (1.67) (1.17)
R2 0.01 0.15 0.10 0.12 0.11 0.09
N 182 35 180 3, 652 930 3, 602
Freq. Qtr Yr Qtr Qtr/ Yr Qtr
F.E. N N N Qtr/Ind Yr/Ind Qtr/Ind
Sample 640K - 650K 780K 193K 651K
Note: Table B.1 shows a series of industry-level panel regressions. In each column, the dependent variable is the
cross sectional Kelley skewness of the growth rates of real quarterly sales, annual employment growth, and quarterly
stock returns distribution within period-industry cells defined by 2-digit NAICS (total of 22 industries) for a
sample of publicly traded firms from the Compustat dataset. The independent variable, ∆Sj,t, is the average of the
sales growth distribution within the period-industry cell. LBD moments were calculated weighting by firm-size. In
all regressions, the sample period is 1970 to 2017 and consider a full set of period and industry fixed effects. Row
labeled Sample corresponds to the total firm-period observations used to calculate the cross sectional moments. N
corresponds to the number of period-industry observations used in the regressions. Standard errors in parentheses
below the point estimates are clustered at the NAIC-2 industry level. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
178
Figure B.1: The Skewness of firm-level Quarterly Sales Growth is Procyclical
(a) Compustat: Skewness of Sales Growth Distribution
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(b) Compustat: Upper and Lower Tail Dispersion of Sales Growth
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Note: The top panel of figure B.1 shows the time-series of the cross-sectional Kelley skewness of the distribution of
firm employment growth for a sample of firms from LBD. Moments are weighted by the average firm employment
size between years t and t+ 1. The bottom panel of figure B.1 shows the time-series of the cross-sectional Kelley
skewness of the distribution of firm quarterly sales growth for a sample of publicly traded firms from Compustat.
The shaded bars represent NBER recession periods. See Appendix B.1.1 for additional details on the sample
construction and moment calculations in the LBD and Compustat.
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Figure B.2: The Skewness Firms’ Outcomes is Lower During Country Cycles
(a) Cross-Country: Firm-Level Employment Growth
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(b) Cross-Country: Firm-Level Sales Growth
-5
0
-4
0
-3
0
-2
0
-1
0
0
10
K
el
le
y 
Sk
ew
ne
ss
 o
f S
al
es
 G
ro
w
th
 (%
)
-50 -40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20
Average of Sales Growth (%)
Note: Figure B.2 shows bin scatter plots of the Kelley skewness and average employment and sales growth. The
figure is based on an unbalanced panel of firms from the BvD Amadeus database in the following European
countries: AUT, BEL, BLR, CHE, DEU, DNK, ESP, FIN, FRA, GBR, GRC, HUN, IRL, ISL, ITA, NLD, NOR,
POL, PRT, SWE, UKR. The data covers years 2000 to 2015. BvD Amadeus contains private and publicly traded
firms. We apply the same selection criteria we use for the rest of the data.
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Figure B.3: The Skewness of Several Firms’ Outcomes is Lower During Industry Cycles
(a) Three-year Sales Growth
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(b) Three-year Employment Growth
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(c) One-year Stock Returns
-2
0
-1
5
-1
0
-5
0
K
el
le
y 
Sk
ew
ne
ss
 o
f S
to
ck
 R
et
ur
ns
 (%
)
-60 -40 -20 0 20 40
Average of One Year Stock Returns (%)
(d) Three-year Stock Returns
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Note: The top left panel of figure B.3 displays a bin scattered plot showing the relation between the
within-industry business cycle, measured by the average growth rate of sales, and the within-industry skewness,
measured by the Kelley skewness of sales growth for a sample of Compustat firms. Each dot is a quantile of the
industry-year distribution of average sales growth. The rest of the plots show similar statistics for employment
growth and stock returns.
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Figure B.4: The Skewness Firms’ Outcomes is Lower During Within-Industry Cycles
(a) Industry: Firm-Level Employment Growth
Kelleyj,t = α + βMej,t + εj,t
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(b) Industry: Firm-Level Sales Growth
Kelleyj,t = α + βMej,t + εj,t
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Note: Figure B.4 shows the coefficients and confidence intervals for within-industry regression of the cross-sectional
Kelley skewness on the average growth of employment (top panel) and sales (bottom panel) for a sample of publicly
traded firms from Compustat. Each industry regression includes a linear trend. Confidence intervals are calculated
at 95% of significance. Industries are defined as 2-digit NAIC. In each plot, the dashed line is the coefficient of a
panel regression of within industry skewness and average firm growth controlling form time and fixed effect. See
Appendix B.1.1 for additional details on the sample construction and moment calculations in Compustat.
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Figure B.5: Skewness of Employment Growth Distribution within Establishment Groups
(a) Census LBD: Small Establishments
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(b) Census LBD: Medium & Large Establish-
ments
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(c) Census LBD: Establishment Age
-3
0
-2
0
-1
0
0
10
20
30
K
el
le
y 
Sk
ew
ne
ss
 o
f E
m
pl
oy
m
en
t G
ro
w
th
 (%
)
1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010 2014
All Young
Middle Mature
Note: Figure B.5 is based on the Longitudinal Business Database, LBD. The top left and right panels show the
skewness of the distribution of establishment-employment growth within different establishment size groups defined
by establishment average employment calculated for each establishment i as Ei,t = 0.5× (Ei,t + Ei,t+1); The
bottom panel shows the skewness of the distribution of establishment-employment growth within different
establishment age groups. Young establishment are those of less than five years, Middle-aged establishment are
those between six and ten years, whereas Mature establishment are those of more than ten years old.
Establishment already in the sample in 1976 were not considered in any of these groups. All moments weighted by
establishment size defined by Ei,t. In all plots, the blue line with circles is the skewness of employment growth for
all establishment in the sample.
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Figure B.6: Model Generated Moments
(a) Skewness of Employment and Sales Growth
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(b) Right and Left Tail Dispersion of Sales Growth
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(c) Aggregate Productivity Shock does not Affect Dispersion or Skewness of Sales Growth
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Note: Figure B.6 shows different model generated moments of the sales growth and employment growth
distribution. Each plot is based on independent simulations of 1,000 economies of 300-quarter length. We impose a
drop in the skewness, increase in variance, or both, in quarter 1, allowing normal evolution of the economy
afterward. We plot the deviation of each macroeconomic aggregate from its value in quarter 0.
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Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 Worker Entry and Exit
Not all workers choose or are able to accept changes in wages at their current firm or a new
firm in response to changes in firm productivity. Some workers respond – either willingly or
not – by entering non-employment in the following period either by becoming unemployed
or exiting labor force entirely. Clearly an analysis of wage changes does not really apply
to this group of individuals. However, they are still exposed to the employment effects of
firm-level TFP shocks, and this passthrough may be just as significant and heterogeneous
as the passthrough to wages. So instead of estimating TFP changes effect on workers
wage changes, we estimate if the probability of transitioning from employment to non-
employment versus other firms becomes higher or lower when firms experience large TFP
shocks. Furthermore, we investigate the effect of a firm’s TFP changes on the probability
of hiring workers out of non-employment relative to hiring from other firms. The regression
model is as follows:
Sijt = α+ β∆TFPjt +Xijtγ + εijt
where Sijt denotes the indicator of individual i’s status change between period t − 1 and
t. For example, Sijt is equal 1 if the worker switches from their current firm in period t
into unemployment in t+ 1 and 0 otherwise. Alternately, it might indicate that a workers
switched from unemployment in t − 1 to their current firm in period t. The variable
∆TFPjt indicates firm j’s TFP change between t−1 and t whereas Xijt includes the workers
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characteristics as well as the spousal characteristics we include in the selection model. The
main parameter of interest is β, which measures the effect of firm level idiosyncratic TFP
changes on worker probabilities of changing status.
The results of this analysis is shown in Table C.1. The top panel of Table C.1 shows
the results for workers moving in and out of non-employment whereas the bottom panel
shows the result for job switchers. The left two columns show the effect of TFP shocks on
a worker’s probability of moving into non-employment or another job. The sample here
includes workers who will stay at their firm. The right two columns show the results for
workers who move to firm j in period t. The sample here is workers who were not working
at firm j in t-1. Looking at the top panel, the results suggest that the bigger the size
of the TFP shock (positive or negative), the more likely workers will switch out of their
firm into non-employment. Positive TFP shocks have a stronger effect on switching out:
when firms experience a 1% TFP increase, the probability that workers move out to non-
employment increases by 3.4%. A corresponding negative shocks also drives this up by
0.2%. This suggests that firms adjust their labor composition in reaction to large changes
in TFP in either direction. The right two columns tell a strikingly different story where
large changes in TFP make it more likely that a newly employed worker is coming from
unemployment. Positive shocks increase the probability by 2.6% while 1% negative shocks
also increase the probability by 1.5%. This is consistent with the churning story that
when firms experiencing large TFP change, there will be more hiring and firing (churning).
Looking at the bottom panel, we see that the TFP shocks have a very large effect on
the probability of a worker leaving for another firm. As in the selection story, both large
positive and negative shocks induce exit to other firms, which much larger magnitudes than
for movements to non-employment. A 1% increase in TFP leads to a 19.3% increase in the
probability that a worker switches to another firm. Finally, conditional on switching (as
opposed to staying in the same firm between t-1 and t), workers entering a firm experiencing
large positive shocks are less likely be coming from another firm relative to unemployment.
However the are more likely to come from other firms if the TFP shock is negative. The
asymmetry on the bottom panel is due to the differences in the sample in our analysis.
The results in this section further confirmed the importance of properly correcting for
selection bias: when firms shocks are big (positive and negative), workers are more likely
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to switch out to another job and to unemployment. This biases our stayer and switcher
analysis and therefore carefully correcting for this bias makes a stark difference in our
results.
Table C.1: Moving In and Out of Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Move to Come from
−∆TFPjt +∆TFPjt −∆TFPjt +∆TFPjt
Non-employment
β −0.005∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ −0.011∗∗∗
Other Job
β −0.102∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗
Note: Table C.1 shows a set of linear probability regressions controlling for firm and worker characteristics.
In columns 1-2, the dependent variable is an indicator which is 1 if the individual moves from employment to
non-employment (top panel) or another employer (bottom panel). In columns 3-4, the dependent variable is an
indicator which is 1 if the individual has moved to their current job from non-employment (top panel) or another
employer (bottom panel). The main explanatory variable is the change in within-firm (log) TFP spanning the
individual’s transition into or out of the firm. ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Robust standard errors are
clustered at the firm level.
C.2 Model Extension
In this section, we consider the full model with selection. We allow for full asymmetric
passthrough between positive and negative shocks, and we allow heterogeneous passthrough
between stayers and switchers. This work is still ongoing.
Consider that log-wage of individual i that workers in firm j in period t is given by:
log yi,j,t =dt +X
′
i,tγ + ηi,t + εi,t
+ψ0i,j,szj,t−1 + ψ1i,j,s∆zj,t1∆zj,t>01St + ψ2i,j,s∆zj,t1∆zj,t≤01St
+ ψ3i,j,s∆zj,t1∆zj,t>01Mt + ψ4i,j,s∆zj,t1∆zj,t≤01Mt (C.1)
dt represents the average log price of human capital at time t, Xit is a set of workers’
characteristics including age. The indicator 1Mt is equal to one when a worker is new to
firm j. This wage process has a richer structure compare to the wage process in equation
3.13 in two ways: 1. it includes individual characteristics and time effects; 2. It allows
the switchers and stayers to have different wage passthrough, in levels and changes. This
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implies:
∆ log yijt = ∆dt + ∆X
′
itγ + ∆ηi,t + ∆εit
+ (ψ11∆zj,t>0,S + ψ21∆zj,t≤0,S + ψ31∆zj,t>0,M + ψ41∆zj,t≤0,M )∆zj,t
+ (ψ0 − ψ11∆zj,t−1>0,S − ψ21∆zj,t−1≤0,S)∆zj,t−1
+ (ψ0 − ψ11∆zj,t−1>0,M − ψ21∆zj,t−1≤0,M )∆zj,t−1 (C.2)
We could estimate all the parameters either using SMM (2 additional parameters, so add 2
more moments for movers), or use LMP’s method, and directly back out all the parameters
by algebra.
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